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out our daily conversations, the past three years would have been less fun and a lot more demanding.
Frederik Silbye
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Introduction and Summary
This thesis presents seven papers which all investigate aspects relevant for competition policy. Apart
from that, the papers are unconnected and can be read independently. My hope is that the thesis will
contribute to a better understanding of how various regulations and policy initiatives will affect the intensity
of competition and, ultimately, consumers and social welfare.
A prominent and profiled threat to sound competition is cartels. Illegal price-fixing and market-sharing
raise prices and harm consumers. In the early 2000s more than 20 international cartels were discovered
each year,1 and to this figure one can add cartels only operating on the national level and cartels that have
remained undetected. Furthermore, Connor (2007) reports that the median overcharge for all types of cartels
is massive 25 percent. These numbers indicate that cartel activity is a serious problem that deserves attention
from authorities as well as academia.
An important step in the fight against cartels is knowing how to find them. Cartels are known to increase
the price gradually over a period of time until it reaches some steady state level. The first paper of the thesis
explains this observation by introducing uncertainty about the risk of getting caught.
Another step is to create an enforcement environment that destabilizes existing cartels and deters the
creation of new cartels. A tool to reach this goal is leniency programs that reduce the sanctions to wrongdoers
who report their involvement in cartels to the antitrust authorities. Such programs have in recent years proved
to be highly effective at uncovering price-fixing conspiracies. As stated by Thomas O. Barnett from the US
Department of Justice, ”the Antitrust Division’s leniency program continues to be our greatest source of cartel
evidence.”2 I study the design of the optimal leniency program in the second, third, and fourth papers of the
thesis.
In addition to explicit collusion, a wide array of business practices has the potential to reduce competition
and harm consumers. One such practice is behavior-based price discrimination where consumers are offered
different prices contingent on their previous choice of supplier. In the thesis’ fifth, sixth, and seventh papers,
I investigate the scope for government intervention when firms discriminate in this way.
A detailed summary of all seven papers are given below.
The first paper entitled Cartel Pricing Dynamics Under Detection Risk Uncertainty takes as its point of
departure the claim that wrongdoers committing a crime rarely know the exact risk of getting caught by the
law enforcing authorities. Nevertheless, they may use their criminal experience to form beliefs about the risk,
1Connor (2003).
2Barnett (2007).
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and this learning process will matter for the level of criminal activity. To resolve some of the uncertainty,
a cartel can use the fact that, as long as it exists, it has not yet been caught. Hence, the cartel will adjust
its detection risk estimate downwards over time. I show in a repeated-game setting that this adjustment can
result in an increasing cartel price path if prices are linked to the detection risk estimate. Firstly, such a link
exists if the cartel price is positively correlated to government sanctions. Indeed, this is the case in the US as
well as in the EU where fines are supposed to reflect the damage inflicted on customers. Secondly, the link
exists if the cartels incentive compatibility constraint is binding such that the cartel is forced to collude on
a price below the monopoly price. As time goes and the detection risk estimate is adjusted downwards, the
constraint is relaxed and the cartel can choose a higher price. Studies of uncovered cartels shows that cartels
do not immediately increase their price to a higher steady-state level. Instead, they slowly increase the price
as predicted by this paper.
The second paper entitled A Note on Antitrust Damages and Leniency Programs explores the relation
between leniency programs and private actions for damages in cartel cases. The European Commission
has in recent years initiated an effort to facilitate private actions but the impact on the effectiveness of
leniency programs has received little attention. In this paper, I set up a simple game-theoretic framework
demonstrating that an increase in antitrust damages can be pro-collusive if whistleblowers are not exempted
from damages which is the case in most jurisdictions. The result holds true even if antitrust authorities are
allowed to re-shape their leniency program in reaction to the higher damage level. Larger damage payments
imply lower incentives to self-report when damages are not fully encompassed by the leniency program; in
effect, the leniency program has to be more generous to enforce self- reporting. But if antitrust authorities are
not allowed to offer cash rewards to whistleblowers, the sufficient level of generosity might be unattainable.
The third paper entitled Asymmetric Evidence and Optimal Leniency Programs is based on the claim
that cartel members are asymmetric in terms of the evidence they posses about the cartel’s activities. This
asymmetry gives grounds for a leniency program where the fine discount offered to a whistleblower depends
on the submitted evidence. I construct a model containing two firms which can form a cartel. First, I
consider a simple static setting that allows me to achieve a profound understanding of the results. The
simplified model is subsequently extended to a traditional collusion framework of repeated games. In each
period, the firms learn the value of their evidence which is private information and independently drawn from
a continuous distribution. The model has two main results. First, it is optimal to give firms access to the
leniency program only if they add significant value to the evidence already in the hands of the authorities.
That is, the amount and quality of submitted evidence must exceed some threshold if the firm is to qualify
for any level of leniency. Second, the model’s optimal fine discount is strictly increasing in the provided
evidence. In plain words, more evidence gives a lower fine. Both conclusions are in line with the wording of
the EU leniency notice. For instance, the EU policy has the feature that ”in order to qualify, an undertaking
must provide the Commission with evidence of the alleged infringement which represents significant added
value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission’s possession.”3 Hence, one can argue in favor of
3Litra 24 in the leniency notice, European Commission (2006).
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the structure of the European leniency program on the basis of asymmetric evidence.
Also the fourth paper entitled Optimal Leniency Programs with Case-Dependent Fine Discounts studies
the design of the optimal leniency program. In this paper, I let the strength of the authorities’ case against
the cartel prior to any leniency applications be stochastic but observable by all parties. In a model of repeated
interaction in the market, I derive the optimal rule for determining fine discounts contingent on the evidence
collected by the authorities. This rule has two important implications. The first implication is that it is
optimal to accept leniency applications even if the authorities hold evidence sufficient to convict the cartel
with a high probability. In such cases additional evidence from the leniency program only strengthens the
authorities’ case, and the authorities just have to offer a very modest fine reduction to make firms report.
This favors a European-style policy vis-a-vis the US program, which contains the requirement that ”The
[Antitrust] Division, at the time the corporation comes in, does not yet have evidence against the company
that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction”.4 The second implication is that it can be optimal,
depending on the probability distribution generating the authorities’ evidence, to offer larger fine discounts
when the authorities hold a stronger case. This result is somewhat counter-intuitive; still, I show that the
relationship is globally negative in examples with reasonable parameter values. Finally, I consider another
extreme where the firms do not observe the strength of the case against them, and I find that it is beneficial
for the antitrust authorities to disclose information about the outcome of their investigations if the fines are
low. If the information is not disclosed, the expected punishment is not sufficiently severe to induce firms to
make use of the leniency program.
The fifth paper entitled Behavior-Based Price Discrimination when Firms are Asymmetric investigates
Behavior-Based Price Discrimination in a generalized version of the model in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
Two firms sell competing brands that are imperfect substitutes, and consumers make a purchase in two
periods. Firms can discriminate in the second period depending on the consumers’ choice of supplier in
the first. The choice reveals information about the brand preferences of the individual customer and this
creates the scope for price discrimination. My contribution is to allow firms to be asymmetric in size where the
asymmetry is generated endogenously from a difference in either quality or costs. The focus on an asymmetric
market structure can be motivated by the fact that under EC competition law, price discrimination is only
regulated in markets where one or more undertakings hold a dominant position. From this perspective, it is
of interest to study the effects of price discrimination in a model where one firm is dominant compared to
its rival. A secondary motivation is that firms behave as if they were myopic in a symmetric model. Only
when there is asymmetry, firms alter their first-period decisions to put themselves in a better position in
the second period. I find that price discrimination harms consumers and benefits all firms only if these are
sufficiently asymmetric. Price discrimination intensifies competition and lower prices when firms are fairly
symmetric. On the other hand, if one firm is very dominant, it behaves more like a monopolist who benefits
from the increased price flexibility when allowed to discriminate. In addition, price discrimination is shown
to improve social welfare when the asymmetry is neither too small nor too large. The bottom line is that
4Litra B.2 in the Corporate Leniency Policy, United States Department of Justice (1993).
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competition authorities should pay close attention the level of asymmetry in the market when investigating
price discrimination schemes.
The sixth paper entitled Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and R&D Investments considers the con-
nection between price discrimination and R&D based on the notion that price discrimination has the potential
to affect relevant market aspects other than prices. This is also recognized by EC competition law in Article
82(b) which states that any market conduct by undertakings in a dominant position limiting technological
development to the prejudice of consumers is considered an abuse of that position.5 This paper extends the
fifth paper by giving firms the opportunity to invest in better quality or cost-saving technology prior to the
two periods of market interaction. In this way, the asymmetric market structure is endogenized even further;
however, since firms are ex ante symmetric, they choose the same level of R&D investments in equilibrium. I
show that firms, when given the possibility to discriminate, have less incentives to invest if consumers behave
strategically. The reason is that forward-looking consumers are harder to attract with better quality as they
foresee that they will be offered higher prices in the second period if they initially choose the firm with the
better brand. In contrast, the equilibrium R&D level improves when consumers are myopic. From a welfare
perspective, quality is under-supplied. Hence, price discrimination reduces social welfare whenever it provides
less incentives to invest in quality.
The seventh paper entitled Price Discrimination when Firms Learn the Brand Preferences of Their Cus-
tomers also builds on the framework in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). The idea explored in the paper is that a
given customer’s supplier, contrary to its competitors, learns about the preferences of the customer through
personal interaction and negotiation. This implies that in the two-period set-up, firms in the second pe-
riod have more information than the competitor about the brand preferences of their first-period customers.
Consumers are distributed on a Hotelling line, and I assume that each firm in the second period observes
the exact location of every consumer who bought from the firm in the first period. This allows the firms to
give individual price offers to these consumers. I find that this kind of individualized price discrimination
decreases profits in both periods while consumers benefit. Especially, the effect in period 1 is striking. When
firms do not observe their customers’ locations, forward-looking consumers foresee that second-period prices
will be lower on the smaller turf. Hence, ceteris paribus, they are inclined to choose the smaller firm. This
reduces the price sensitivity in the first period and pushes the price above the static equilibrium price. The
effect is reversed in the set-up I consider in this paper. Instead, consumers have a tendency to favor the
larger firm as this will imply lower prices in the second period. The price sensitivity increases while the
price decreases. Finally, I show that it is profitable for the firms to exchange customer information about
brand preferences. However, such an information exchange is not self-sustaining and requires an appropriate
commitment device.
5European Union (2010).
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Cartel Pricing Dynamics Under Detection Risk
Uncertainty
Frederik Silbye
Abstract
Cartel prices tend to increase gradually upon the formation of the cartel. This paper explains this
observation by letting firms be uncertain about the true risk of being detected by the antitrust authorities.
As time goes and the cartel remains undetected, it adjusts its risk estimate downwards using Bayesian
inference. If the penalty is increasing in the cartel price, this leads to a gradually increasing price path.
Even if the penalty is fixed, cartel prices might increase in a transitionary period as long as the cartel’s
incentive compatibility constraint is binding. Finally, sufficient conditions are given such that prices are
higher, the more uncertainty there is as regards the detection risk.
JEL Classification: D43; D83; K21; L40.
Keywords: Cartels, Antitrust; Pricing.
1 Introduction
Wrongdoers committing a crime rarely know the exact risk of getting caught by the law enforcing authorities.
Nevertheless, they may use their criminal experience to form beliefs about the risk. Likewise, the detection
records of other wrongdoers in similar situations can be useful when forming these beliefs. For firms engaging
in cartels, these means of updating beliefs seem to have a limited scope. Since most firms entering a cartel
do so for the first time, they do not a have past criminal career to draw conclusions from, and since the risk
of getting caught is specific for each industry and even for each cartel, it might prove difficult to use the
number of detected cartels in the economy as a guideline.1
However, the cartel may use the fact that, as long as it exists, it has not yet been caught to resolve some
of the uncertainty. As time goes, the cartel will adjust its detection risk estimate downwards to reflect the
informational value that its survival brings. This adjustment can result in an increasing cartel price path
if prices are linked to the detection risk estimate. Such a link is present in most jurisdictions as antitrust
penalties are determined based on the cartel overcharge.
In this light, I set up a dynamic model where the firms, which have the opportunity to form a cartel, set
prices in an infinite number of periods. Colluding firms are, if detected by the antitrust authority, subject
to a penalty, and the firms have a common prior on the risk of detection. The prior formalizes the notion
1Empirical estimates of the detection probability exist, but only across industries. See e.g. Bryant and Eckard (1991).
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of detection risk uncertainty and yields an estimate of the risk which enters into the cartel’s profit function.
Each period in which the cartel is not detected, it updates the prior using Bayes’ Rule implying that its risk
estimate declines. If the penalty is increasing in the cartel price, this leads to gradually increasing prices over
the lifetime of the cartel with the cartel price approaching an upper limit. I also consider a fixed penalty
which entails increasing cartel prices in a transitional period until the detection risk estimate has decreased
sufficiently for the cartel’s incentive compatibility constraint to no longer bind. For a simple family of priors,
the variance is a measure of the degree of detection risk uncertainty. When the variance is increased while
the mean is preserved, cartel prices increase. The reason is that cartels facing a high degree of uncertainty
are more inclined to attribute their survival to an overshooting risk estimate rather than luck.
Studies of uncovered cartels reveal, as predicted by this paper, that colluding firms do not immediately
raise their prices to a new steady state upon forming a cartel. Instead the price increases gradually, either
throughout the entire cartel period or in some transitional period. Levenstein and Suslow (2003) report
increasing cartel prices for the citric acid cartel and the graphite electrodes cartel. In the latter, the price
was $2,200 per metric ton right after the cartel was formed in July 1992 but nearly $3,300 in June 1997 when
the cartel was detected. In the intervening period, the price rose gradually, 1995 being the only exception.
Bolotova et al. (2005) find a similar increasing trend in the lysine cartel, and in Sproul (1993), even though
the focus here is on prices after indictment, many of the analyzed cartels display gradually increasing prices
during the period of collusion.
Cartel pricing has been thoroughly analyzed in a static setting. Block et al. (1981) consider a simple
model where the probability of detection is increasing in the cartel price level. This work is extended in Spiller
(1986), Salant (1987), and Baker (1988) to allow customers to take into account that high-pricing firms might
be colluding and, thus, that there is a chance of obtaining damages. Baker (1988) introduces detection risk
uncertainty in the sense that customers and firms might have private information about the detection risk. If,
for example, the firms observe high demand, this can be the result of customers having a high risk estimate
such that they expect to obtain damages. In response, the firms adjust their estimate upwards; however, the
updating is not endogenized. Besanko and Spulber (1989, 1990) endogenize the probability of detection by
letting either the antitrust authority or the customers decide upon opening a case based on the prices they
observe.
Another strand in the literature deals with cartel pricing in a dynamic setting. Influential contributions are
Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) which both consider a framework of fluctuating
demand but under different information assumptions. Like demand, cartel prices become fluctuating in
these model. The first paper to take the role of the antitrust authority into consideration is Cyrenne (1999)
which builds on the Green and Porter model. Harrington (2004, 2005) is the first to account for gradually
increasing cartel prices. He maintains that firms know the probability of detection with certainty but lets
the probability depend on the price charged. To be more precise, the probability is higher the more today’s
cartel price deviates from the price in the previous period. The underlying intuition is that large price jumps
attract suspicions of collusion from customers and authorities. This structure implies that the cartel slowly
raises its price to avoid detection. His work is further extended in Harrington and Chen (2006) in which
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the detection probability is endogenized based on customer optimization and in Harrington and Chen (2007)
which studies the impact of leniency programs on cartel prices.
The issue of cartel pricing can be interpreted in a context of repeated single-agent crime in the law
and economics literature if the incentive compatibility constraints in the cartel’s maximization problem are
ignored. In this interpretation, the cartel price corresponds to the level of the offence and profits are the
payoffs derived from the crime. Examples are tax evasion, accounting fraud etc. Davis (1988) models a
single agent that in each period must decide whether to engage in crime and at what level. However, since
he only considers time-independent detection probabilities, the agent’s problem becomes stationary and no
interesting dynamics arise. This framework has been extended by several authors, e.g. in Leung (1995) which
allows the detection probability to depend on the number of apprehensions in the past.
Another ramification, which is of special relevance to this paper, lets the agent learn about the risk
of detection. Sah (1991) considers individuals that choose to be criminal based on their perception of
the detection risk. This perception is based on the observed number of criminals and convictions in their
vicinity. In a similar vein, Ben-Shahar (1997) constructs a two-period model where agents learn the detection
probability and penalty perfectly if they are convicted. However, both contributions focus solely on the
decision to be criminal, not the level of the crime.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model, and the firms’ updating of the detection risk
is characterized in Section 3. I then, in Section 4, derive the optimal cartel price path ignoring the incentive
compatibility constraint; this constraint is taking into account in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 considers the
impact of increased detection risk uncertainty on the cartel price path, Section 7 introduces accumulation of
penalties over time, while Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an industry of n identical, risk-neutral firms that interact in the market in an infinite number
of periods. The firms contemplate forming a cartel knowing that collusion is sanctioned by an Antitrust
Authority and that they are penalized if caught colluding.
The market structure is kept fairly general. Firms set prices simultaneously in each period. Prices are
required to be non-negative. If all firms charge the price p, the profit to each firm is pi (p) which is twice
differentiable, strictly quasiconcave, and has a unique maximizer pM > 0: the monopoly price. I assume
that the single-period price game has a unique Nash equilibrium; in this, each firm sets the price pN < pM .
It is convenient to normalize pi
(
pN
)
at zero such that any other profit is measured with the Nash profit as
the benchmark. If n− 1 firms all charge the price p, the optimal deviation by the last firm yields the profit
piD (p) ≥ pi (p) where it is assumed that piD (p) is non-decreasing. This property implies that a firm never loses
if its competitors raise their price. The simple Bertrand price game as well as many differentiated-product
models fit into this structure.
The fact that the monopoly price exceeds the Nash equilibrium price creates a scope for cartels. For
simplicity, only cartels consisting of all n firms are considered. A cartel must specify a cartel price path, i.e.
11
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a sequence of cartel prices {pt}∞t=1 where the subscript denotes the relevant period. In case of deviations, I
restrict attention to grim trigger strategies; in other words, deviations from the cartel price path are punished
with infinite reversion to the Nash equilibrium.
If the cartel is detected in a period where the firms collude on the price p, each firm pays a penalty
F (p) > 0 where F (p) is non-decreasing and twice differentiable. The penalty can be perceived as a mixture
of fines, imprisonment, and damages. Only this period’s price affects the penalty; something which can be
explained by a one period statute of limitations. Such a short limitation period is not fully realistic, but it
keeps the model tractable as the dynamics are kept to a minimum. Letting the penalty depend on previous
prices or the duration of the cartel introduces dynamic effects that, although interesting, are not the main
focus of this paper. Nevertheless, Section 7 briefly discusses the case where penalties are accumulated over
the lifetime of the cartel.
Four further assumptions are imposed. First, detection prevents the cartel from colluding in all future
periods. One can justify this assumption by presuming that the antitrust authorities closely monitor the
industry in the future, rendering resumed collusion impossible. Second, any firm deviating from the cartel
price is not subject to penalty. This assumption, which is not crucial for the qualitative results, is justified
if the deviator applies for leniency when deviating. Both the European Union and the United States have
leniency programs that grant amnesty to the first firm coming forward before the antitrust authorities have
started investigating the cartel.2 Third, I only consider penalties such that F ′ (0) ≤ pi′ (0). This assumption
ensures an interior solution to the cartel’s maximization problem. Fourth, even if the cartel charges a price
below the Nash equilibrium price, it is still subject to detection and penalty. As price-fixing is illegal per se
in most jurisdictions, this seems plausible. As an alternative to the third and fourth assumptions, one can
assume that the cartel can neither be prosecuted nor update its beliefs about the detection risk whenever it
sets a price p ≤ pN . Then, one needs to assume that F ′ (pN) ≤ pi′ (pN) to ensure the interior solution.
The penalty function F (p) can potentially have many shapes. However, to avoid too much ambiguity in
the conclusions, I focus my attention on the following two cases:
• The fixed penalty regime where F (p) = F for all p.
• The increasing penalty regime where F ′ (p) > 0 for all p.
According to the US sentencing guidelines, antitrust fines must be based on the pecuniary loss caused by the
cartel. Often 20 percent of the affected volume of commerce is used in lieu of the exact loss.3 However, if
the actual overcharge appears to be either substantially more or substantially less, this should be taken into
account. In addition, damages are calculated as some multiple of the pecuniary loss. In the EU, regard is
given to the gravity of the infringement, but only such that the fine does not exceed 10 percent of total firm
turnover.4 One can interpret gravity as the overcharge. From these considerations, it seems reasonable to
claim that the two analyzed regimes altogether cover the different possibilities in the United States and in
the EU.
2See United States Department of Justice (1993) and European Commission (2006).
3See United States Sentencing Commission (2008), §2R1.1, application note 3.
4See European Commission (2002), article 23.
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Let λ ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that the cartel is detected in a given period. This probability is constant
over time, and it is not affected by the cartel prices.5 Firms are uncertain about λ, but their beliefs are
contained in a common prior. Let g (λ) be the prior probability distribution function where g (λ) > 0 for all
λ, and let G (λ) be the associated prior cumulative distribution function. The firms update their beliefs over
time using Bayesian inference.
The sequence of events is this. Before any market interaction takes place, the n firms decide collectively
upon forming a cartel. The creation of a cartel involves determining a price path. Subsequently, in period
1 and in any other period t ≥ 2 where the cartel has not been detected in previous periods, the firms play
the following stage game: (1) the firms form beliefs on λ, (2) the firms set prices, and (3) the cartel is either
detected or not. If detected, the firms pay the fines and play the Nash equilibrium in all future periods; if
not, the stage game is repeated in period t+ 1.
3 Updating The Detection Risk Estimate
As noted previously, the firms share a common prior on the detection risk, λ. The prior probability distri-
bution function is g (λ), and G (λ) ≡ ∫ λ
0
g (x) dx is the prior cumulative distribution function. The posterior
probability distribution function in the beginning of period t is denoted gt (λ) where Gt (λ) ≡
∫ λ
0
gt (x) dx.
According to this notation, g (λ) = g1 (λ) and G (λ) = G1 (λ).
Suppose that the cartel has not been detected in the first t − 1 periods. This occurs with probability
(1− λ)t−1, which is the likelihood function of this particular event. Using Bayes’ Rule to update beliefs, the
posterior probability distribution function at time t is
gt (λ) =
(1− λ)t−1 g (λ)∫ 1
0
(1− x)t−1 dG (x)
. (1)
In words, the posterior density gt (λ) is calculated as the prior density g (λ) multiplied by the likelihood
function and then divided by a normalizing constant. Denote λt ≡
∫ 1
0
λdGt (λ) the detection risk estimate
at time t. Using (1), the detection risk estimate at time t can be written as
λt =
∫ 1
0
λ (1− λ)t−1 dG (λ)∫ 1
0
(1− x)t−1 dG (x)
(2)
Lemma 1 demonstrates that the detection risk estimate is decreasing over time, approaching zero.
Lemma 1 For any prior,
(i) λt > λt+1 for all t, and
(ii) limt→∞ λt = 0.
5Harrington (2004, 2005) covers the case of price-dependent detection probabilities, but this is not the focus of this paper.
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Proof. Part (i): Let λ′ and λ′′ be such that 0 ≤ λ′ < λ′′ ≤ 1. Then, for t ≥ 2,
(1− λ′′)t
(1− λ′)t <
(1− λ′′)t−1
(1− λ′)t−1 .
For some λ ∈ (0, 1), integrate over λ′′ to get
∫ 1
λ
(1− λ′′)t dG (λ′′)
(1− λ′)t <
∫ 1
λ
(1− λ′′)t−1 dG (λ′′)
(1− λ′)t−1 ,
which is equivalent to
(1− λ′)t∫ 1
λ
(1− λ′′)t dG (λ′′)
>
(1− λ′)t−1∫ 1
λ
(1− λ′′)t−1 dG (λ′′)
.
Integration over λ′ yields ∫ λ
0
(1− λ′)t dG (λ′)∫ 1
λ
(1− λ′′)t dG (λ′′)
>
∫ λ
0
(1− λ′)t−1 dG (λ′)∫ 1
λ
(1− λ′′)t−1 dG (λ′′)
.
Using (1), this implies that
Gt+1 (λ)
1−Gt+1 (λ) >
Gt (λ)
1−Gt (λ)
and, hence, Gt+1 (λ) > Gt (λ). That is, Gt dominates Gt+1 in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
In effect, λt > λt+1.
Part (ii): Note that the denominator in (1) is positive and bounded away from zero for all t since g (λ) > 0
for all λ. As t goes to infinity, the numerator converges to zero for any λ > 0. Hence, limt→∞Gt (λ) = 1 for
any λ > 0. It then follows that limt→∞ λt = 0.
The first part of Lemma 1 reveals that the firms adjust their beliefs regarding the detection risk downwards,
the longer the cartel remains undetected. The proof follows basically from Milgrom (1982), which considers
the impact of good and bad news on the posterior distribution. That the cartel has survived one more period
is in this respect good news. The second result shows that the detection risk estimate can become arbitrarily
small if the cartel survives long enough. The proof relies on the assumption that the prior has full support
on the unit interval.
4 The Unconstrained Cartel Price Path
When determining the optimal price path, the cartel faces the incentive compatibility constraint that unilat-
eral deviations from the cartel price must be unprofitable. As an instructive benchmark, this section derives
the optimal price path when the constraint is ignored. As mentioned in the introduction, the results can
then also be seen in the context of single agent crime. Examples are accounting fraud and tax evasion. If p
is interpreted as a general measure of the offence level and pi (p) as the payoff derived from the offence, the
optimal price path demonstrates how the offence level evolves over time.
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For a given price path, let Pt be the sequence of prices from period t and beyond, i.e. Pt ≡ {pτ}∞τ=t. The
expected, discounted value to each firm derived from this path is at time t
Vt (Pt) = pi (pt)− λtF (pt) +
(
1− λt
)
δVt+1 (Pt+1) =
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−t
(
τ−1∏
s=t
(
1− λs
)) (
pi (pτ )− λτF (pτ )
)
(3)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the common discount factor. The value of collusion in some future period τ > t is the profit
minus the expected penalty. If the cartel is detected, it earns zero profits in all future periods. The cartel
anticipates that it will update its beliefs in the future if it is not detected. Hence, the expected probability
at time t of reaching period τ is
(
1− λt
) · (1− λt+1) · ... · (1− λτ−1).
To simplify the notation, I shall write P instead of P1 and V instead of V1. If established, the cartel’s
objective is to choose a price path P that maximizes the value of collusion V (P ) . Let PU be the price path
that solves this problem and let pUt be the associated price in period t. I label P
U the unconstrained cartel
price path.
It is easily verified from (3) that period t’s cartel price, pt, is not affecting the future cartel value,
Vt+1 (Pt+1). Also, the probability that the cartel reaches some future period does not depend on pt. Due to
these observations, the cartel can maximize the value of each period separately without paying attention to
any dynamic effects. Put differently,
pUt ∈ arg max
p≥0
pi (p)− λtF (p) .
The first-order condition to the problem is
pi′ (p) = λtF ′ (p) . (4)
Since pi′ (0) ≥ F ′ (0) by assumption, pUt > 0 for all t. Note also, since F ′ (p) ≥ 0 in both of the penalty
regimes I consider, that pUt ≤ pM for all t. In effect, (4) is a necessary condition for a maximum.6 Proposition
1 states the monotonicity properties of the unconstrained cartel price path.
Proposition 1 The unconstrained cartel price path satisfies
(i) pUt = p
M for all t in the fixed penalty regime,
(ii) pUt < p
U
t+1 for all t in the increasing penalty regime, and
(iii) limt→∞pUt = p
M in both penalty regimes.
Proof. Part (i): Since F ′ (p) = 0, (4) is reduced to pi′ (p) = 0 which has the unique solution pM for all t.
Part (ii): Let p˜t be any price that satisfies (4). Taking the total derivative of (4) with respect to λt yields
∂p˜t
∂λt
=
F ′ (p˜t)
pi′′ (p˜t)− λτF ′′ (p˜t)
.
6Though it is a knife-edge case, pUt is not necessarily unique. To resolve this tie-breaker, I assume that the cartel in any
such case chooses the lowest, optimal price. This assumption can be justified since lower prices are easier to sustain when the
incentive compatibility constraint is taken into account as will be the case in the next section.
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If p˜t is a maximum, the second-order condition at pt = p˜t,
pi′′ (p˜t)− λtF ′′ (p˜t) < 0,
must hold implying that ∂p˜t
∂λt
< 0. From the envelope theorem, ∂pi(p˜t)
∂λt
= −F (p˜t) which is decreasing in the
price; hence, pUt cannot jump upwards in response to a marginal increase in λt. In total, p
U
t decreases when
λt increases, and since Lemma 1 proves that λt > λt+1, it follows that pUt < p
U
t+1.
Part (iii): From Lemma 1, limt→∞ λt = 0 which implies that in the limit (4) reduces to pi′ (p) = 0. Hence,
limt→∞ pUt = p
M .
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the cartel price path is flat and equal to the monopoly price in the fixed
penalty regime while increasing in the increasing penalty regime. In the latter regime, there is a marginal
loss in terms of higher penalties associated with price increases. The loss is larger, the larger the detection
risk estimate is. In the former regime, this marginal loss is zero. Also, as time goes to infinity, the cartel
price approaches the monopoly price. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 1 that proves that the detection
risk estimates converges to zero. In the limit, fines can be ignored, and the cartel charges the monopoly price
even in the increasing penalty regime.
It is illustrative to consider a specific example. Let the firms produce homogeneous goods and let them
compete a` la Bertrand. Furthermore, assume zero costs and the linear demand function D(p) = 1 − p
where it is understood that p is the lowest price in the market. Finally, consider a linear penalty function
F (p) = F+φp, φ ≥ 0, and a uniform prior, i.e. g (λ) = 1 for all λ. Figure 1 depicts the cartel’s unconstrained
price path in the cases where φ = 0 and φ = 1; the former illustrates the fixed penalty regime while the latter
is an example of the increasing penalty regime. The firms agree on colluding at t = 0, launching the cartel
in t = 1. As pM = .5 in this example, the Figure confirms the findings in Proposition 1.
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Figure 1: Unconstrained cartel price paths
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So far, I have not addressed the question whether collusion is profitable. Only cartels with a non-negative
value is formed. The individual rationality constraint is consequently
V
(
PU
) ≥ 0. (5)
Cartel profitability depends, among other things, on the discount factor, the penalty function, and the
underlying prior. One can prove the remarkable result that for any level of penalties, no matter how harsh
they might be, cartels cannot be deterred if firms are sufficiently patient.
Proposition 2 For any penalty function, the cartel is profitable if δ is sufficiently close to one.
Proof. Let θt be the probability in period 1 of staying undetected until period t. This probability is
θt ≡
t−1∏
τ=1
(
1− λτ
)
=
∫ 1
0
(1− λ)t−1 dG (λ)
which yields the infinite sum
∞∑
t=1
θt =
∫ 1
0
1
λ
dG (λ) .
Define gmin ≡ minλ∈[0,1] g (λ). Since g (λ) > 0 for all λ, it follows that gmin > 0. Using gmin, the sum above
can be rewritten as ∞∑
t=1
θt = gmin
∫ 1
0
1
λ
dλ+
∫ 1
0
1
λ
(g (λ)− gmin) dλ.
Since the first integral on the right-hand side can be shown to be infinite and gmin > 0, the series on the
left-hand side is divergent. A consequence of Lemma 1 is that for any penalty function F (p) a period T
exists such that pi
(
pUt
) − λtF (pUt ) > 0 for t ≥ T . Due to the divergence, it follows from continuity that
limδ→1− VT
(
PUT
)
=∞. Since the cartel reaches period T with positive probability, i.e. θT > 0, (5) is fulfilled
when δ is sufficiently close to one.
The scope of Proposition 2 can be highlighted if one considers a set of potential cartels that are hetero-
geneous with respect to δ in a way such that all δ ∈ (0, 1) can occur with positive density. In this case,
cartel activity will occur with positive probability no matter the severity of the punishment. In other words,
complete deterrence can never be achieved.
5 The Constrained Cartel Price Path
In the previous section, I ignored the cartel’s incentive compatibility constraint. In this section, the constraint
is taken into account. The consequence is that the cartel can be forced to price below the unconstrained
price path in order to deter firms from deviating.
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A cartel price path P is sustainable if and only if
Vt (Pt) ≥ piD (pt) for all t. (6)
The left-hand side is the cartel value at time t, whereas the right-hand side is the value of deviation. A
deviating firm receives the deviation profit piD (pt) in period t and is not subject to any penalty7 while it
earns zero profits in all subsequent periods. As Lemma 2 shows, the incentive compatibility constraint in (6)
can be restated in terms of the discount factor.
Lemma 2 There exists a threshold δ ∈ (0, 1) such that (6) is satisfied for at least one price path if and only
if δ ≥ δ.
Proof. Two observations can be made from the definition of Vt (Pt) in (3). First, taking the derivative of
Vt (Pt) with respect to δ yields
∂Vt (Pt)
∂δ
=
∞∑
τ=t+1
(τ − t) δτ−t−1
τ−1∏
s=t
(
1− λs
) (
pi (pτ )− λτF (pτ )
)
=
∞∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t−1
τ−1∏
s=t
(
1− λs
)
Vτ (Pτ )
for any t. If a price path P satisfies (6) for some discount factor δ′, then Vt (Pt) > 0 for all t ≥ 2; otherwise
deviations are not punished. Thus, the derivative is positive evaluated at δ′, and P satisfies (6) for any
δ > δ′. Second, for PM ≡ {pM}∞
t=1
, Vt
(
PM
)
can be made arbitrarily large for any t if δ approaches one.
This argument follows from the proof of Proposition 2. Combined, these two insights prove the existence of
a threshold δ < 1 such that (6) is satisfied for some price path if and only if δ ≥ δ. Finally, if δ = 0, (6) is
reduced to pi (pt)− λtF (pt) ≥ piD (pt) and is clearly violated. Thus, δ > 0.
The result that δ < 1 is analogous to Proposition 2. The interpretation is that collusion is always
sustainable if firms are sufficiently patient, i.e. a variation of the folk theorem. Still, it might be the case
that the unconstrained cartel price path is unsustainable for a given discount factor. In this light, I next
investigate which price paths are sustainable for a given discount factor and penalty function.
I define the sustainability function at time t as
St (pt, Pt+1) ≡ Vt (Pt)− piD (pt) = δ
(
1− λt
)
Vt+1 (Pt+1) + pi (pt)− λtF (pt)− piD (pt) (7)
which implies that (6) is satisfied if and only if
St (pt, Pt+1) ≥ 0 for all t. (8)
In case δ ≥ δ such that a cartel can be sustained, let PC maximize V (P ) subject to (8). I shall denote PC
the constrained cartel price path and define the constrained cartel price in period t as
pCt ∈ arg max
p≥0
pi (p)− λtF (p) st. St
(
p, PCt+1
) ≥ 0.
7As mentioned in Section 2, this can be explained by a leniency program.
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In words, the cartel chooses the sustainable price that maximizes current profits net of expected fines while
taking the future price path PCt+1 as given. The cartel will at time t choose p
C
t = p
U
t if the unconstrained
cartel price is sustainable, i.e. if St
(
pUt , P
C
t+1
) ≥ 0. However, if St (pUt , PCt+1) < 0, the cartel is forced to
choose a price below pUt . Lemma 3 shows that the incentive compatibility constraint is less of a restriction
as time goes.
Lemma 3 St+1
(
p, PCt+2
)
> St
(
p, PCt+1
)
for any price p.
Proof. Lemma 1 and (3) imply that Vt
(
PCt
)
< Vt+1
(
PCt
)
for any t. Thus, by inspection of (7), St+1
(
pCt , P
C
t+1
)
>
St
(
pCt , P
C
t+1
) ≥ 0. That is, PCt is a sustainable price path from period t + 1 and onwards; in effect,
Vt+1
(
PCt+1
) ≥ Vt+1 (PCt ) since PCt+1 is defined as the optimal, constrained price path beginning in period
t+ 1. In total, one gets that Vt+1
(
PCt+1
)
> Vt
(
PCt
)
which from (7) implies that St+1
(
p, PCt+2
)
> St
(
p, PCt+1
)
for any p.
The intuition underlying the Lemma is this. As time goes, three effects have an impact on the incentive
compatibility constraint. First, the expected penalty declines for a given cartel price which means that the
gain to deviators in terms of saved fines declines as well. Second, it is more likely that the cartel survives and
earns future cartel profits. Third, future cartel profits increase as expected fines are lower. All three effects
imply that the incentive to deviate diminishes over time for which reason higher cartel prices are sustainable
the longer the cartel survives.
Using Lemma 3, I can now characterize the monotonicity properties of the constrained price path in
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Suppose that collusion is sustainable, i.e. δ ≥ δ. Then, there exists a non-negative integer
T , which might be infinite, such that pCt < p
C
t+1 ≤ pM for t ≤ T and pCt = pM for t ≥ T + 1. Moreover,
(i) in the increasing penalty regime, T is infinite,
(ii) in the fixed penalty regime, there exist thresholds δ1 and δ2 where δ ≤ δ1 ≤ δ2 < 1 such that
- T is infinite if δ ∈ [δ, δ1],
- T ≥ 1 but finite if δ ∈ (δ1, δ2),
- T = 0 if δ ∈ [δ2, 1], and,
(iii) in both penalty regimes, limt→∞pUt = p
M if and only if δ ≥ δ1.
Proof. Part (i): Lemma 3 implies that St+1
(
pCt , P
C
t+2
)
> 0. Then, by the definition of pCt+1,
pi
(
pCt+1
)− λt+1F (pCt+1) ≥ pi (pCt )− λt+1F (pCt ) . (9)
Suppose that pCt > p
C
t+1 such that F
(
pCt
)
> F
(
pCt+1
)
. Then (9) yields
pi
(
pCt+1
)− λtF (pCt+1) > pi (pCt )− λtF (pCt ) (10)
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since λt > λt+1 as proved in Lemma 1. Moreover, as pCt > p
C
t+1 implies that pi
D
(
pCt
) ≥ piD (pCt+1), (10)
and (7) produce St
(
pCt+1, P
C
t+1
)
> St
(
pCt , P
C
t+1
) ≥ 0. But this and (10) now contradict pCt being the optimal
price in period t. In effect, pCt ≤ pCt+1.
To prove that the inequality is strict, suppose that pi′
(
pCt
) − λtF ′ (pCt ) < 0. By assumption, pCt > 0 in
this case. For ε > 0 sufficiently small,
pi
(
pCt − ε
)− λtF (pCt − ε) > pi (pCt )− λtF (pCt )
and St
(
pCt − ε, PCt+1
)
> St
(
pCt , P
C
t+1
) ≥ 0. This contradicts pCt being the optimal price in period t. Therefore,
pi′
(
pCt
)− λtF ′ (pCt ) ≥ 0. Then, pi′ (pCt )− λt+1F ′ (pCt ) > 0 since F ′ (·) > 0, and as a consequence,
pi
(
pCt + 
)− λt+1F (pCt + ) > pi (pCt )− λt+1F (pCt ) (11)
for  > 0 sufficiently small. From Lemma 3, St+1
(
pCt , P
C
t+2
)
> 0; thus, by continuity, St+1
(
pCt + , P
C
t+2
) ≥ 0
such that pCt +  is a sustainable price in period t+ 1. Consequently, (11) implies that p
C
t < p
C
t+1.
Part (ii): I begin by noting that St
(
pM , PM
)
is increasing in t. This allows me to define T in such a way
that St
(
pM , PM
)
< 0 if and only if t ≤ T . Hence, pCt < pM for all t ≤ T and pCt = pM for t ≥ T + 1. For
t ≤ T , pi′ (pCt ) > 0 as pi (p) is strictly quasiconcave. Hence, pi′ (pCt + ) > pi′ (p) for  sufficiently small and
for all p ≤ pCt . From Lemma 3, St+1
(
pCt , P
C
t+2
)
> 0; thus, by continuity, St+1
(
pCt + , P
C
t+2
) ≥ 0. In effect,
pCt < p
C
t+1.
The threshold T is finite if and only if
lim
t→∞St
(
pM , PM
) ≡ pi (pM)
1− δ − pi
D
(
pM
)
> 0.
Solving for δ yields
δ >
piD
(
pM
)− pi (pM)
piD (pM )
.
Define δ1 ≡ max
{
δ,
piD(pM)−pi(pM)
piD(pM )
}
implying that δ1 ∈
[
δ, 1
)
. If δ ∈ [δ, δ1], T is infinite. Furthermore,
T = 0 if and only if S1
(
pM , PM
) ≥ 0. Since S1 (pM , PM) > 0 when δ is close to one, there exists a threshold
δ2 ∈
[
δ1, 1
)
such that T = 0 if and only if δ ≥ δ2. Hence, if δ ∈
(
δ1, δ2
)
, T ≥ 1 but finite.
Part (iii): In the limit, PM is sustainable if and only if δ ≥ δ and limt→∞ St
(
pM , PM
) ≥ 0. That is,
limt→∞ pCt = p
M if and only if δ ≥ δ1.
The cartel price is globally increasing in the increasing penalty regime. As demonstrated by Lemma 3, the
incentive compatibility constraint is less restrictive as time progresses, and higher cartel prices can therefore
be sustained. In addition, the proof of Proposition 3 shows that whenever the cartel chooses a price such
that the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding, this price increases with t. Hence, the introduction
of the incentive compatibility constraint does not alter the conclusion found in Proposition 1.
In the fixed penalty regime, the monopoly price is sustainable if the discount factor is high. In case of
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an intermediate discount factor, the cartel reaches the monopoly price after a transition period of lower but
increasing prices.8 The monopoly price is not sustainable until some time has elapsed and the detection risk
estimate has decreased sufficiently. If the discount factor is low, the monopoly price is never sustainable for
any t. Instead, the cartel price approaches a lower steady state. Note finally that not all three δ-intervals
are necessarily non-empty. For example, one can show that δ = δ1 in a Bertrand-game with homogeneous
goods.
Again, it is illustrative to see the price path in a specific example. Let the structure be the same as in
Figure 1 but with different parameter values. Beginning with the increasing penalty regime, Figure 2 depicts
the example of n = 3, δ = .9, F = 0, and φ = 1. It can be seen from Figure 2 that the unconstrained cartel
price cannot be sustained until t = 8. To illustrate the fixed penalty regime, consider the example of n = 6,
δ = .9, F = .03 and φ = 0 in Figure 3. The price increases until t = 11; hereafter, the monopoly price,
pM = .5, is sustainable.
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Figure 2: Cartel price paths in the increasing penalty regime.
The results of this section have been based on trigger strategies. Nevertheless, I conjecture that they can
be extended to include cartels using optimal penal codes. If the value of the optimal punishment path at
time t is V OPt , the cartel’s incentive compatibility constraint becomes
Vt (Pt) ≥ piD (pt) + δ
(
1− λt
)
V OPt+1 .
The crucial question to address is whether Lemma 3 still holds; that is, whether the set of sustainable cartel
prices expand over time when the optimal punishment is enforced. If this is true, the results in Proposition
3 are still valid. The sustainability function becomes
St (pt, Pt+1) = δ
(
1− λt
) (
Vt+1 (Pt+1)− V OPt+1
)
+ pi (pt)− λtF (pt)− piD (pt)
8The quasiconcavity assumption is essential for this conclusion. If pi (p) is not strictly quasiconcave, the transtion period
might feature intervals where the price is constant.
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Figure 3: Cartel price paths in the fixed penalty regime.
where Vt+1 (Pt+1)− V OPt+1 constitutes the punishment in period t+ 1 if a firm deviates in period t. To argue
that Lemma 3 still holds true, it suffices to show that the punishment becomes harsher as time goes; however,
it is beyond the scope of the paper to provide a formal proof for this claim. On the intuitive level, consider a
”stick-and-carrot” strategy a` la Abreu (1986). As time goes, collusion (the carrot) becomes more profitable
and that supports an even lower profit (the stick) in the punishment period following a deviation since the
gain from accepting the punishment and returning to the collusive phase is greater. This indicates that the
punishment to deviators increases with t.
6 The Impact of Detection Risk Uncertainty
The dispersion of the prior reflects the cartel’s uncertainty as regards the true detection risk. Among other
statistics, the prior’s variance measures this dispersion and, thus, the degree of uncertainty. It is intuitive
to assert that a higher variance, ceteris paribus, will result in higher prices along the cartel price path. The
argument goes as follows. If the cartel survives for some number of periods, a cartel facing large detection risk
uncertainty and, thus, a high variance will be more inclined than a cartel facing little uncertainty to adjust
its detection risk estimate downwards. The former cartel will place greater emphasis on the observation that
the cartel has not yet been detected and conclude that its initial detection risk estimate was too high. On the
other hand, the latter cartel still has confidence in its initial estimate and, thus, tends to ascribe its survival
to luck, adjusting its estimate only slightly. As seen in the previous sections, lower detection risk estimates
will lead to higher cartel prices.
However, as will be demonstrated below, this intuition only holds true for specific priors; it is not true in
general. To investigate the matter formally, let σ2t denote the variance of the prior at t = 1 or the posterior
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at t ≥ 2. In effect, σ2t is defined as
σ2t ≡
∫ 1
0
(
λ− λt
)2
dGt (λ) ,
which, using integration by parts, can be rewritten as
σ2t =
(
1− λt
) (
λt − λt+1
)
such that
λt+1 = λt − σ
2
t
1− λt
. (12)
For a fixed detection risk estimate in period t, the detection risk estimate at time t + 1 is lower the larger
the variance is in period t.
Consider a shift in the prior such that the initial variance σ21 increases while the initial detection risk
estimate λ1 is kept unchanged. Then, it is easily seen from (12) that λ2 is reduced. However, this result does
not necessarily generalize to all t. First, the ceteris paribus property is no longer valid at t ≥ 3 as the mean
at time t− 1 is not preserved. Second, σ2t−1 might have decreased even though σ21 increases.
To illustrate this, I construct a simple example with two discrete priors, A and B. In the example, λ can
only take the values .25, .5, .75, and 1. Table 1 specifies the probability masses for the four values of λ.
λ .25 .5 .75 1
A .5 0 .5 0
B .5 .25 0 .25
Table 1: Probability mass functions for priors A and B.
The priors have the same mean, but B has the largest variance of the two.9 As Table 2 demonstrates, B has
the lowest mean in periods 2 and 3, while the mean derived from A is lowest in period 4. The latter is partly
due to the fact that from t = 2 and onwards, the variance of B is lower than the variance of A. Hence, the
intuition given in the introduction of this section pulls in the opposite direction.
t 1 2 3 4
λt
A .500 .375 .300 .268
B .500 .312 .296 .282
σ2t
A .063 .046 .023 .009
B .094 .012 .009 .007
Table 2: Means and variances for priors A and B.
This example reveals that a mean-preserving increase in the variance of the prior not necessarily decreases
the detection risk estimates for all periods beyond period 2. To obtain such a result for all periods, one needs
to put more structure on the prior. Therefore, I restrict attention to a specific family of priors, the beta
9Also, B dominates A according to second order stochastic dominance. Whenever this is true and the means are the same,
the variance of B exceeds the variance of A. However, the opposite does not necessarily hold.
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distribution, which covers a large range of distributions, e.g. the uniform distribution. These distributions
are defined on the unit interval and, determined by only two shape parameters, are sufficiently simple to be
realistic representations of the firms’ beliefs. The probability distribution function is
g (λ) =
λα−1 (1− λ)β−1∫ 1
0
xα−1 (1− x)β−1 dx
where α, β > 0 are the shape parameters. One can show that
λ1 =
α
α+ β
and σ21 =
αβ
(α+ β)2 (α+ β + 1)
. (13)
Keeping λ1 fixed, an increase in σ21 is a mean-preserving increase in spread as defined by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970).10
At time t, using (1), the posterior density is
gt (λ) =
λα−1 (1− λ)β+t−2∫ 1
0
xα−1 (1− x)β+t−2 dx
Hence, the posterior also follows a beta distribution, shape parameters being α and βt ≡ β + t − 1. That
is, the beta distribution is a conjugate prior which makes it convenient for analytical purposes. Now, it is
possible to show the following Lemma for all t ≥ 2.
Lemma 4 If the prior is beta distributed, any mean-preserving increase in spread lowers λt for t ≥ 2.
Proof. Solving (13) for α and β yields
α = λ1
(
λ1
(
1− λ1
)
σ21
− 1
)
and β =
(
1− λ1
)(λ1 (1− λ1)
σ21
− 1
)
.
At time t, the mean of λ is
λt =
α
α+ βt
=
α
α+ β + t− 1 .
Taking the derivative with respect to σ21 gives
∂λt
∂σ21
=
∂α
∂σ21
(α+ β + t− 1)−
(
∂α
∂σ21
+ ∂β
∂σ21
)
α
(α+ β + t− 1)2 = −
λ1
(
1− λ1
)
(σ21)
2
λ1 (t− 1)
(α+ β + t− 1)2 < 0
for t ≥ 2.
With Lemma 4 in hand, it is straight-forward to conclude on the effect on prices. Making use of Proposition
3, I show in Proposition 4 that when the cartel price is below the monopoly price, it increases for any t ≥ 2
when the cartel’s uncertainty regarding the true detection risk goes up.
10Rothschils and Stiglitz (1970) define a mean-preserving increase in spread as a second-order stochastic shift in the distri-
bution, keeping the mean constant. As mentioned in the previous footnote, this is in general not equivalent to an increase in
the variance; however, it is so for the beta distribution.
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Proposition 4 If the prior is beta distributed, any mean-preserving increase in spread raises pCt for any
t ≥ 2 where pCt < pM . For t where pCt = pM , pCt remains unchanged.
Proof. For a given t ≥ 2, it follows from Lemma 4 that any mean-preserving increase in spread is, in its
effect, equivalent to an increase in t. Hence, the Proposition follows directly from Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 deals with prices charged in period t ≥ 2. At time t = 1, the detection risk estimate is, by
definition, unaffected by any mean-preserving increase in spread. Therefore, the unconstrained cartel price
is also unaffected; however, the constrained cartel price might increase since future collusion becomes more
profitable and, hence, a higher cartel price can be sustained.
Figure 4 illustrates the effect on the constrained price path from a mean-preserving increase in spread.
In the Figure, n = 3, δ = .9, F = 0, φ = 1, λ1 = .5, and σ21 =
1
12 or σ
2
1 =
1
24 . When σ
2
1 =
1
12 , the prior is the
uniform distribution, whereas σ21 =
1
24 implies a less dispersed prior. It is seen that prices are lower in the
latter case.
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Figure 4: Constrained price path when the prior variance is increased.
7 Accumulation of Penalties
In the analysis thus far, only the current period’s price determines the penalty. This assumption corresponds
to a one period statute of limitations. In this section, I allow for an extended limitation period such that
penalties can be accumulated over time. Such accumulation introduces an additional dynamic effect into the
model.
Let F (pt) be the penalty charged due to collusion in period t. The total accumulated penalty the cartel
pays in period t if detected is
Φt (p1, ..., pt) =
t∑
τ=1
κt−τF (pτ ) (14)
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where the factor κ ∈ [0, 1] accounts for the fact that more distant collusion is harder to document. This
structure follows Harrington (2004) in which 1 − κ is explained as the rate of deterioration of evidence.
Alternatively, one might interpret (14) as a stochastic statute of limitations such that a higher κ means that
the probability that firms are subject to prosecution for past collusion increases. The previous analysis has
considered the special case of κ = 0 in which case Φt (p1, ..., pt) = F (pt).11
The value of collusion is in period t
Vt (Pt) =
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−t
(
τ−1∏
s=t
(
1− λs
)) (
pi (pτ )− λτΦτ (p1, ..., pτ )
)
.
I assume that the cartel even in periods where it does not collude can be detected and penalized for past
collusion. This assumption implies that the decision to collude in period t is not affected by the accumulated
penalties as these are sunk. In effect, since the detection risk estimate is decreasing over time, if the cartel
finds it optimal to collude in period 1, it wants to continue colluding in all future periods where it has not
yet been detected.
First, consider the unconstrained problem. In period t, the cartel chooses pt so as to maximize Vt (Pt).
When determining pt, it takes past prices and, thus, accumulated penalties as given. Also, it takes future
prices as given since pt does not affect the first-order conditions of future periods. In period t, the first-order
condition is
pi′ (pt) =
∞∑
τ=t
(δκ)τ−t λτ
(
τ−1∏
s=t
(
1− λs
))
F ′ (pt) ≡ ωtF ′ (pt) . (15)
This first-order condition differs from (4) since ωt has been substituted for λt; ωt can be interpreted as the
probability that the cartel must pay the fine F (pt), today or in the future. In this interpretation, it is evident
that ωt must be decreasing over time. Hence, Lemma 1 can be extended to the case of accumulated penalties.
Lemma 5 For any prior and any value of κ,
(i) ωt > ωt+1 for all t, and
(ii) limt→∞ ωt = 0.
Proof. Part (i): Using period t as the benchmark period, let Gt (λ) be the prior and let period τ be defined
as the period τ − 1 periods after period t. Then, ωt can be rewritten as
ωt =
∞∑
τ=1
(δκ)τ−1 λτ
(
τ−1∏
s=1
(
1− λs
))
From (2)
λτ =
∫ 1
0
λ (1− λ)τ−1 dGt (λ)∫ 1
0
(1− x)τ−1 dGt (x)
11Strictly speaking, it is necessary to define 00 = 1 if (14) is to cover the case of κ = 0.
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and
τ−1∏
s=1
(
1− λs
)
=
∫ 1
0
(1− x)τ−1 dGt (x) .
Hence, ωt can be simplified to
ωt =
∞∑
τ=1
(δκ)τ−1
∫ 1
0
λ (1− λ)τ−1 dGt (λ) =
∫ 1
0
λ
∞∑
τ=1
(δκ (1− λ))τ−1 dGt (λ)
=
∫ 1
0
λ
1− δκ (1− λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ω(λ)
dGt (λ) .
Integration by parts yields
ωt = 1−
∫ 1
0
ω′ (λ)Gt (λ) dλ.
It is easily seen that ω′ (λ) > 0. This combined with the finding in the proof of Lemma 1 that Gt dominates
Gt+1 in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance proves that ωt > ωt+1.
Part (ii): The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 1 part (ii).
Having proved that also ωt declines over time, approaching zero, it is straightforward to show that the
monotonicity properties of the unconstrained cartel price path are the same as without accumulation of
penalties.
Proposition 5 The conclusions of Proposition 1 carry over to the case of accumulated penalties for any
value of κ.
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 1 using ωt and Lemma 5 instead of λt and Lemma
1.
The constrained problem is less clear-cut. Whenever the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, two
dynamic effects have an impact on the constrained cartel price. First, the incentive compatibility constraint
is loosened over time as λt decreases. This is the effect described in Section 5. Second, penalties accumulate
over time which tightens the incentive compatibility constraint. If κ is close to zero, the accumulation effect
can be ignored and prices are gradually increasing as shown in Proposition 3. However, if κ is close to one, it
might be case that the accumulation effect dominates which can lead to falling prices. This will be the case
in the extreme where there is no detection risk uncertainty and λt is constant. Proposition 6 summarizes
this discussion stating that the conclusions reached about the constrained cartel price path still hold if the
accumulation of penalties is sufficiently slow.
Proposition 6 A threshold κ > 0 exists such that the conclusions of Proposition 3 carry over to the case of
accumulated penalties if κ < κ.
Proof. Proposition 3 covers the case of κ = 0. Due to continuity, the results of the Proposition also hold
when κ is close to zero.
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8 Concluding Remarks
As demonstrated in this paper, allowing for detection risk uncertainty and Bayesian updating produces
interesting dynamics as regards the level of crime or, in the interpretation of collusion, the cartel price. The
firms reduce their estimate of the detection risk the longer time they stay undetected which, if the penalty
is increasing in the price, gives rise to a path of gradually increasing prices.
Still, this paper’s approach is not the only one explaining the price patterns observed in uncovered cartels.
Another possibility is that the detection probability depends on price changes and, in response, the cartel
raises its price in small steps to avoid suspicions about collusion. One potential way of distinguishing between
the two explanations can occur, if the cartel for some reason is temporarily forced to be out of operation
and charges the Nash equilibrium price. On the basis of this paper’s explanation, the starting price when
collusion continues will be higher than the starting price when the cartel begun operating for the first time
since the firms in the meantime have learned about the risk of detection. Under the latter explanation, the
two starting prices will be identical.
The effect I investigate is one of several dynamics that have an impact on the cartel price path. Accu-
mulation of penalties or damages over the lifetime of the cartel is another. In addition, one might consider a
variety of learning effects within the cartel. For example, if the cartel is uncertain about the individual firm’s
willingness to stick to the cartel agreement, something that can be modeled by heterogeneity in the discount
factor, the cartel learns about this willingness the more periods no firm deviates. In effect, the cartel might
find it optimal to raise its price over time as the risk of deviation decreases. Future research along these lines
seems fruitful.
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A Note on Antitrust Damages and Leniency Programs
Frederik Silbye
Abstract
The European Commission has in recent years initiated an effort to facilitate private actions for
damages in cartel cases. This paper demonstrates in a simple game-theoretic framework that an in-
crease in antitrust damages can be pro-collusive when a leniency program is already in place. The result
holds true even if antitrust authorities are allowed to re-shape their leniency program in reaction to the
higher damage level. Larger damage payments imply lower incentives to self-report if damages are not
fully encompassed by the leniency program; in effect, the program has to be more generous to enforce
self-reporting. But if antitrust authorities are not allowed to offer cash rewards to whistle-blowers, the
sufficient level of generosity might be unattainable.
JEL Classification: K21; K40; L41
Keywords: Antitrust; Leniency; Cartels; Damages
1 Introduction
The fight against cartels has traditionally rested on two pillars: sanctions and monitoring. However, these
means have a limited range. Improving monitoring is costly, and even though fines levied by e.g. the European
Commission have increased significantly, sanctions must be proportional to the infringements and cannot be
raised unrestrainedly.
Therefore, antitrust enforcement has seen two major improvements in recent years. First, increased use
of leniency programs has been praised as the single most important reason for the fact that an unprecedented
number of cartels has been prosecuted in the United States and the European Union since the introduction of
these programs (OECD 2003). As stated by Thomas O. Barnett, former Assistant Attorney of the Antitrust
Division, US Department of Justice, ”the Antitrust Division’s leniency program continues to be our greatest
source of cartel evidence.”1 Second, more focus has been put on private enforcement by means of private
actions for damages. Commissioner Neelie Kroes (2007) has announced that the European Commission
will work on improving the conditions for private actions at the EU member state level. As part of this
effort, the Commission has issued a White Paper which declares that ”improving compensatory justice would
inherently produce beneficial effects in terms of deterrence of future infringements and greater compliance
with EC antitrust rules.”2
1Barnett (2007).
2European Commission (2008).
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However, leniency programs and damage claims affect each other, making it necessary to pay close atten-
tion to the interaction when designing antitrust policy. Spagnolo (2004) investigates the nature of optimal
leniency programs and emphasizes in the concluding section that most programs, which only exempt a self-
reporting firm from sanctions, not from damages, are inefficient seen from a deterrence perspective. A cartel
member faces low incentives to self-report if he cannot avoid paying damages. The argument is said to be
the reason for the 2004 de-trebling of the damage liability of leniency applicants in the United States.3 The
Commission also acknowledges this concern in its White Paper where it suggests that further consideration
is given to the possibility of limiting leniency recipients’ liability for damages.
A few other contributions have explored the link between leniency and damages. Chen and Harrington
(2007) analyze the cartel price path in the presence of a leniency program and find that high damages tend to
increase the price that can be sustained in equilibrium. Another approach is taken by Hviid and Medvedev
(2008) who show that leniency applicants subject to damages have to accept unfavorable settlement terms
with plaintiffs since these applicants have no new information to provide.
My paper complements this strand in the literature by demonstrating in a stylized model that better
conditions for private actions, as proposed by the European Commission, have the potential to enhance the
scope for collusion even when the antitrust authorities are allowed to re-shape their leniency program in
response to a higher damage level. Hence, the pro-collusive effect of higher damages is not due to poorly
designed leniency programs. Instead, the effect is driven by the restriction that authorities are not allowed
to reward whistle-blowers, i.e. offer the self-reporter a cash reward in addition to immunity from sanctions.
Thus, I provide an additional argument for such a reward scheme.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a basic leniency model with
damage payments, and the main results that increased damages can be pro-collusive are derived in Section
3. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Basic Leniency Model
This section sets up a simple one-period leniency model where two symmetric, risk neutral firms contemplate
forming a cartel. The firms take into account the enforcement efforts of the Antitrust Authority (henceforth,
the AA). A cartel is formed whenever the gain of collusion exceeds the expected punishment.
The timing of the model is as follows. First, the firms decide upon engaging in a cartel. If a cartel
is formed, additional profits pi are realized for each firm. Second, each firm decides separately and non-
cooperatively upon self-reporting, i.e. informing the AA about the cartel’s breach of competition law. If only
one firm self-reports, this firm pays a reduced fine FR according to a pre-announced leniency program. The
other firm pays the full fine F ≥ FR. If both firms wish to self-report, each firm qualifies for leniency with
probability 12 . Third, if no firm self-reports, the cartel is detected and convicted with probability λ ∈ (0, 1)
and both firms pay F .
3In the US, courts are permitted to triple the amount of compensatory damages to be awarded to a plaintiff. The leniency
program allows applicants to escape treble damages but they still face a single damage claim.
4See Aubert, Rey and Kovacic (2006) and Spagnolo (2008) for further arguments.
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In addition to the fines F and FR, the firms are jointly and severally liable for damages 2D from private
actions. I assume that each firm pays half the full liability, i.e. D, if the cartel is detected, whether it is due
to a leniency application or the AA’s own investigation efforts. Damages are not covered by the leniency
program, though I shall consider a modification of this in Section 3.
Report (R) Not report (NR)
Report (R) 1/2 (F + FR) +D , 1/2 (F + FR) +D FR +D , F +D
Not report (NR) F +D , FR +D λ (F +D) , λ (F +D)
Table 1: Expected punishments if a cartel is formed.
The reporting game that follows the creation of a cartel is a simple Prisoners’ Dilemma as shown in Table
1. Each firm can either report (R) or not report (NR). The pair (NR,NR) is a Nash equilibrium whenever
λ (F +D) ≤ FR +D (1)
or, equivalently,
D ≥ λF − FR
1− λ ≡ D. (2)
In contrast, (R,R) constitutes an equilibrium regardless of parameters values. When both equilibria can be
sustained, I assume that the cartel coordinates on the pay-off dominant equilibrium; that is, the equilibrium
having the lowest expected punishment. Hence, (NR,NR) is pay-off dominant only if
λ (F +D) ≤ 1
2
(F + FR) +D. (3)
Since the right-hand side of (3) exceeds the right-hand side of (1), the cartel plays (NR,NR) whenever this
is an equilibrium.
Let Φ (FR, D) denote the expected punishment of each firm in equilibrium as a function of the leniency
program, FR, and the level of damages, D. Collusion is profitable whenever
pi > Φ (FR, D) .
Supposing that pi is randomly distributed across industries, Φ (FR, D) can be interpreted as a measure of the
deterrence effect of the antitrust enforcement environment. The larger Φ (FR, D) is, the fewer cartels will be
created.
If the AA is modeled as an optimizing agent, it chooses the optimal leniency program in response to
the damage level D given by the legal regime, which the AA cannot affect. In effect, the AA seeks to
maximize Φ (FR, D) with respect to FR. Figure 1 depicts the expected punishment as a function of FR
for a fixed damage level. In the self-reporting equilibrium (R,R), the punishment increases as the leniency
program gets less generous, but at some point the punishment drops to a constant level when it becomes
an equilibrium not to report. As indicated in Figure 1, it is optimal to set the highest value of FR, labeled
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F ∗R (D), that implements (R,R) as the unique equilibrium given D; that is
5
F ∗R (D) = arg max
FR
Φ (FR, D) = λF − (1− λ)D
where the solution side follows from (1) solved with equality. Given F ∗R (D), the expected punishment is
Φ∗ (D) ≡ Φ (F ∗R (D) , D) =
1
2
(1 + λ) (F +D) . (4)
FR
Φ (FR, D)
Φ∗ (D)
F ∗R (D)
(R,R) (NR,NR)
Figure 1: Expected punishment for different values of FR and fixed D.
3 Increasing Damage Payments
I shall interpret an increase in D as an improvement of the customers’ possibilities to bring an action for
damages against the cartel. This can come about by giving the plaintiff access to AA material, by relaxing
the plaintiff’s burden of proof when the AA has already established a breach of competition law, by applying
damage calculation methods that are more biased towards the plaintiff, or by doubling or even trebling the
liability for damages.
To begin with, let the leniency program be fixed and consider an increase in damages. Denote the initial
damage level D0 and the increase ∆ > 0. When analyzing this case, it is convenient to define the threshold
D such that
1
2
(F + FR) +D = λ
(
F +D
)
.
In words, D is the damage level that yields an expected punishment when both firms report equal to the
punishment when they do not report and the the damage is D. The graphical interpretation of D is shown
5To be precise, F ∗R (D) must be infinitesimally below λF − (1− λ)D. However, I allow myself to ignore this detail.
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below in Figure 2. Inserting the definition of D from (2) and rearranging gives
D =
1
2
(3λ− 1)F − (1 + λ)FR
1− λ ≤ D.
Figure 2 illustrates the expected punishment as a function of the damage level when the leniency program
is fixed. The punishment is increasing in both equilibria; however, it drops when the damage level reaches
D since the non-reporting equilibrium is sustainable when D ≥ D. From inspection of Figure 2, I can state
Result 1.
D
Φ (FR, D)
D DD0 D̂
(R,R) (NR,NR)
Figure 2: Expected punishment for different values of D and fixed FR.
Result 1 Given an initial damage level D0 ∈
(
D,D
)
and the leniency program FR, there exists a value
D̂ > D such that Φ (FR, D0) > Φ (FR, D0 + ∆) for all damage increments ∆ ∈
[
D −D0, D̂ −D0
)
. That is,
an increase in the damage level can be pro-collusive when the leniency program is fixed.
Two effects arise when D increases. First, the expected punishment in both equilibria becomes more
severe. This tends to improve deterrence. Second, the self-reporting equilibrium is no longer pay-off dominant
if the change in D is sufficiently large. Result 1 shows that the latter effect dominates for intermediate values
of ∆ when the initial value of D is not too small. Hence, it may harm deterrence to facilitate private actions
for damages when the leniency regime is kept unchanged.
Now, let the AA be an optimizing agent that enforces the optimal leniency program F ∗R (D) in response
to changes in the damage level. It is evident from (4) that Φ∗ (D) is increasing in D. From this observation,
Result 2 follows directly.
Result 2 Φ∗ (D0 + ∆) > Φ∗ (D0) for any pair (D0,∆). That is, any increase in the damage level is anti-
collusive when the AA responds optimally to the increase.
Result 2 demonstrates that an increase in damages always improves deterrence when the AA continuously
maintains the optimal leniency program F ∗R (D) and induce reporting. The result hinges crucially on the fact
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that no upper bound has been put on the fine discounts as F ∗R (D) might be negative when D is large. In
other words, I allow the AA to reward whistle-blowers. In that way the AA can decrease FR unrestrictedly
to meet increases in D and leave the incentives to self-report unchanged.
I now impose the restriction FR ≥ 0. Put differently, the leniency regime is restricted to fine discounts
only; rewards cannot be given. This is, in fact, the reality in most jurisdictions.6 The restriction can be seen
as a moral constraint. Many people find it unethical to literally reward wrongdoers.
Given the constraint, the optimal leniency program is
F ∗R,con (D) = max {0, F ∗R (D)} .
This program implements (R,R) whenever the constraint FR ≥ 0 is not binding, imposing the expected
punishment from (4). If the constraint binds, (NR,NR) dominates for all valid leniency programs and
the expected punishment is λ (F +D). Let Dcon denote the threshold where the constraint just binds, i.e.
F ∗R
(
Dcon
)
= 0. Thus,
Dcon =
λ
1− λF.
Moreover, let Dcon define the damage level that yields an expected punishment in the reporting equilibrium
equal to the punishment in the no-reporting equilibrium if, in the latter case, the damage is Dcon. That is,
Dcon is given from
1
2
(1 + λ) (F +Dcon) = λ
(
F +Dcon
)
where the left-hand side follows from (4). Solving for Dcon yields
Dcon =
2λ− 1 + λ2
1− λ2 F < Dcon.
Let the expected punishment in the constrained case be defined as Φ∗con (D) ≡ Φ
(
F ∗R,con (D) , D
)
. This is
illustrated in Figure 3, which resembles Figure 2; hence, a result similar to Result 1 exists.
Result 3 Given an initial damage level D0 ∈
(
Dcon, D
con
)
, there exists a value D̂ > Dcon such that
Φ∗con (D0) > Φ
∗
con (D0 + ∆) for all damage increments ∆ ∈
[
Dcon −D0, D̂ −D0
)
. That is, an increase in
the damage level can be pro-collusive when the AA responds optimally to the increase but is not allowed to
reward whistle-blowers.
Result 3 reveals that if FR is restricted to being non-negative, an increase in damages might decrease
the expected punishment even when the AA continuously maintains the optimal leniency program. When
D becomes sufficiently large, no valid leniency program can induce self-reporting. This elimination of the
leniency weapon might dominate the direct effect of more severe punishment when D increases.
So far, it has been assumed that a leniency applicant faces full liability for damages. Instead, consider
the more general case where an applicant is only liable for the fraction θ ≤ 1 of the total liability. Then, the
6Korea is to my knowledge the only exception. See Spagnolo (2008).
36
A Note on Antitrust Damages and Leniency Programs
D
Φ∗con (D)
Dcon DconD0 D̂
(R,R) (NR,NR)
Figure 3: Expected punishment for different values of D and F ∗R,con (D).
applicant pays θD and the other firm (2− θ)D. Thus, I assume that the other firm covers the liability that
the leniency applicant is exempted from. If one instead assumes that the other firm’s liability is still D, the
analysis remains the same. The game matrix is shown in Table 2.
Report (R) Not report (NR)
Report (R) 1/2 (F + FR) +D , 1/2 (F + FR) +D FR + θD , F + (2− θ)D
Not report (NR) F + (2− θ)D , FR + θD λ (F +D) , λ (F +D)
Table 2: Expected punishments if a cartel is formed, limited liability
The analysis proceeds as in the previous special case of θ = 1 though the variables are now explicit
functions of θ. The optimal leniency program is
F ∗R,con (D, θ) = max {0, λF − (θ − λ)D}
and the critical thresholds are
Dcon (θ) =
λ
θ − λF
and
Dcon (θ) =
(1 + λ)λ− (1− λ) θ
(1 + λ) (θ − λ) F < Dcon (θ) .
In a similar vein, I define Φ∗con (D, θ) ≡ Φ
(
F ∗R,con (D, θ) , D, θ
)
. A crucial assumption is that θ > λ such that
the non-negativity constraint, FR ≥ 0, binds when D is sufficiently high. Under this assumption, one can
draw a picture similar to Figure 3 and, in effect, Result 4 follows.
Result 4 Given θ > λ and an initial damage level D0 ∈
(
Dcon (θ) , Dcon (θ)
)
, there exists a value D̂ >
Dcon (θ) such that Φ∗con (D0, θ) > Φ
∗
con (D0 + ∆, θ) for all damage increments ∆ ∈
[
Dcon (θ)−D0, D̂ −D0
)
.
That is, an increase in damage payments can be pro-collusive when the AA responds optimally to the increase
but is not allowed to reward whistle-blowers and the leniency program only exempts firms partly from liability
for damages.
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In the US, θ = 13 , cf. footnote 3. Hence, the potential pro-collusive effect of increased damages prevails in
the US system if the detection probability is below one third which seems plausible as most evidence suggests
a 10 to 20 percent probability.7 However, if a self-reporting firm is exempted fully from damage liability, i.e.
if θ = 0, the pro-collusive effect disappears.
4 Concluding Remarks
Better conditions for private actions for damages have the potential to decrease the expected punishment
of collusion. This pro-collusive effect exists for a fixed leniency program as well as when the authorities
adjust the program optimally to higher damage levels. To overcome this problem, one can either exempt
reporting firms fully from damage liability or allow the leniency program to reward whistle-blowers. The
former solution has the downside that damaged parties may not find it worthwhile to engage in legal actions
for damages. Moreover, it may violate fundamental property rights. The latter is likely to lead to moral
concerns about rewarding criminals. The bottom line is that policy makers should be very much aware that
the interaction between leniency and damages potentially can facilitate collusion when conditions for private
damage suits are improved.
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Asymmetric Evidence and Optimal Leniency Programs
Frederik Silbye
Abstract
Cartel members applying for leniency under EU policy are offered more generous fine discounts, the
more evidence they submit. Such a scheme can be explained by asymmetry of evidence within the cartel.
This paper characterizes the leniency program that minimizes cartel activity under evidence asymmetry.
I find it optimal to be more lenient, the more evidence an applicant provides. Also, if cartel fines are
not too low, antitrust authorities should deny applicants access to leniency if they can only add little
value to the evidence already in the hands of the authorities. Both findings support the EU leniency policy.
JEL Classification: K21; K40; L41.
Keywords: Antitrust; Leniency; Cartels.
1 Introduction
In recent years, leniency programs have gained an ever increasing role in the unraveling of cartels. As stated
by Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General at the Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice,
”the Antitrust Division’s leniency program continues to be our greatest source of cartel evidence.”1 Currently,
the United States government is receiving three leniency applications each month.2 Beginning with the US
leniency program in 1978, leniency is now an integrated part of the antitrust legislation in most industrialized
countries. The importance and prevalence of leniency programs motivate the study of such programs and,
ultimately, the search for the optimal policy design. Since the pioneering contribution by Motta and Polo
(2003), a growing literature has a gone a long way to shed light on these issues; nevertheless, many open
questions remain.
In its essence, a leniency program allows a cartel member to trade incriminating information about itself
and its fellow conspirators for reduced sanctions. Thus far, the literature has mainly focused on the size of the
”price” in this kind of information trade. A central question in this regard is how much antitrust sanctions
must be reduced to induce firms to apply for leniency. Contributions like Motta and Polo (2003), Hinloopen
(2003), Spagnolo (2004), Harrington (2008), and Chen and Rey (2008) all take this approach. Less attention
has been given to the ”product” of the trade: the information itself. As most other products, information
comes in a variety of different qualities; the quality is in this context the degree to which the information
enables the authorities to prosecute the cartel. In a cartel, each firm holds information, or evidence, that
1Barnett (2007).
2Leslie (2006).
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incriminates the other members of the cartel. Evidence of high value can be interpreted as hard evidence that
is easily verified in court. Submission of such evidence makes it more likely that the remaining cartel members
are convicted. A few papers, e.g. Feess and Walzl (2005), investigate the optimal relationship between price
and quality, i.e. the relationship between the offered fine discount and the value of the submitted evidenc. I
extend this work in ways that I go into details about below.
First, I shall take the time to motivate the subject by sketching a major difference between the leniency
programs in the United States and the European Union. The European Commission declares that ”in order
to determine the level of [the fine] reduction ... the Commission will take into account ... the extent to which
[the evidence] represents added value”3 where ”the concept of ‘added value’ refers to the extent to which
the evidence provided strengthens, by its very nature and/or its level of detail, the Commission’s ability to
prove the alleged cartel.”4 In short, firms can expect to be charged a lower fine if they submit more valuable
evidence. In comparison, the US Corporate Leniency Policy offers full immunity to all applicants accepted
in the program and can, as such, not let the fine reductions depend on evidence.5 The EU policy exhibits
the additional feature that ”in order to qualify, an undertaking must provide the Commission with evidence
of the alleged infringement which represents significant added value with respect to the evidence already in
the Commission’s possession.”6 The keyword is here ”significant”, which indicates that only firms submitting
evidence of a value above some, rather unspecified, threshold are eligible for leniency. In conclusion, analyzing
the relationship between evidence and fine discounts is crucial if one wishes to compare the effectiveness of
leniency programs in the European Union and the United States.
One explanation for the fact that the leniency rates in the EU leniency program depend on the submitted
evidence is that such a scheme provides firms with the adequate incentives to submit complete leniency
applications containing all available evidence. The US policy provides the same incentives by requiring that
”The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provides full, continuing and
complete cooperation to the [Antitrust] Division throughout the investigation.”7 That is, completeness is a
prerequisite for leniency.8 In fact, the EU program has a similar clause requiring that self-reporting firms
are ”providing the Commission promptly with all relevant information and evidence relating to the alleged
cartel that comes into its possession or is available to it.”9 This shows that the European leniency notice
already contains a condition that should coerce firms into giving complete testimonies, and in the US such a
condition is apparently found to be sufficient.
Another explanation, which I shall pursue in this paper, is evidence asymmetry. If colluding firms are
asymmetric in terms of the evidence they can provide, the antitrust authorities might want to provide high-
evidence firms with larger incentives to come forward by offering these firms more generous fine discounts.
Evidence asymmetry within the cartel can occur if, for example, one firm have tape recordings of cartel
3Litra 26 in the leniency notice, European Commission (2006).
4Litra 25 in the leniency notice, European Commission (2006).
5See The Corporate Leniency Policy, United States Department of Justice (1993).
6Litra 24 in the leniency notice, European Commission (2006).
7See The Corporate Leniency Policy, part A, condition 3, United States Department of Justice (1993).
8As an example of this, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. was first granted leniency for reporting its role in an international parcel tanker
shipping cartel, but the company had its leniency revoked because it withheld and provided false and misleading information
about the true extent of the conspiracy. See United States Department of Justice (2006).
9Litra 12(a) in the leniency notice, European Commission (2006).
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meetings, another firm can provide incriminating e-mails, whereas yet another firm has maintained exhaustive
records of the cartel’s activities. Many pieces of evidence, for example e-mails, has a reciprocal character;
still, the decision to save the specific e-mail is taken by an individual manager, and these might have different
incentives to do so in different companies. Also, some firms are likely to be more involved in the organization
of the cartel and therefore equipped with more evidence. The claim, which this paper takes as its departure,
is therefore that cartels display some degree of evidence asymmetry.
I construct a model containing two firms which can engage in an illegal collaboration: a cartel. Initially,
I consider a simple static setting that highlights the results. The simplified model is subsequently extended
to a traditional collusion framework of repeated games. In each period, the firms learn the value of their
evidence. I assume that these values are private information and independently drawn from some continuous
distribution; hence, there is asymmetric evidence within the cartel as well as incomplete information. The
antitrust authorities commit to a leniency program before any firm interaction takes place. Formally, a
leniency program in this set-up is a function that to every possible realization of evidence assigns a fine
discount. The optimal leniency program is the function that is most likely to deter the formation of cartels.
The model has two major findings. Firstly, I show, no matter the prior distribution of evidence, that
it is optimal to give firms access to the leniency program only if they add significant value to the evidence
already in the hands of the authorities. The word ”significant”, though not very specific, is in line with the
wording of the European Leniency Notice cited above in the sense that firms must submit evidence above
some threshold to qualify for leniency. As indicated, the result hinges crucially on the evidence asymmetry
within the cartel, and the intuition is that such a scheme, by excluding low-evidence firms, enhances the
average value of the submitted evidence. Although the finding in the static version of the model is true
for all parameter values, it only holds for sufficiently large antitrust fines in the dynamic version. Secondly,
the model’s optimal fine discount is strictly increasing in the provided evidence, exactly like in the EU. In
conclusion, I find support for a European-style leniency program.
A related paper by Kobayashi (1992) on plea bargaining investigates a prosecutor’s optimal plea offers in
cases with multiple defendants. As in my model, defendants are asymmetric in terms of the evidence they
can provide, but there is no incomplete information as the evidence available to each defendant is public
knowledge. The paper finds in a simple Prisoners’ Dilemma-style model that it is optimal for the prosecutor
to offer the best plea bargain to the defendant whose evidence is most likely to lead to the conviction of
his co-conspirators. Plea bargaining and leniency are almost similar concepts; however, one should bear the
differences in mind. As pointed out by Spagnolo (2008), leniency programs are formalized, public systems
that also apply to situations where the authorities have not yet identified the wrongdoers.
In the context of leniency, the paper by Feess and Walzl (2005) also considers a two-firm setting, but
their model is different to mine in terms of the evidence structure and the information structure. Moreover,
they only consider the static case, not the dynamic case. Firstly, evidence is perfectly, negatively correlated
across firms; that is, the cartel has always one high-evidence firm and one low-evidence firm. Hence, there
is no incomplete information among the cartel members. Second, evidence in their model can only take
two realizations: high and low. I consider a continuum of evidence. Their model finds, as I do, that the
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high-evidence firm should be granted the highest fine discount, but it does not produce the result that firms
with very low evidence should be denied access to leniency.
Harrington (2008) models the notion of evidence in a more indirect way. Instead of having firms with
different values of evidence, he considers variations in the evidence available to the antitrust authorities.
The idea is that investigations of an alleged cartel can lead to different results in terms of the collected
evidence, and if the investigation finds large amounts of evidence, any additional evidence submitted in a
leniency application will have less value to the authorities. Harrington shows, under plausible parameter
assumptions, that it is optimal for the authorities to offer leniency only when they hold a sufficiently weak
case, i.e. only when its investigation has found little evidence. An underlying assumption is that only one
leniency rate can be offered when firms are given access to the leniency program. Silbye (2010) removes this
assumption and allows the offered fine discounts to depend on the actual strength of the authorities’ case
prior to any assistance from leniency applications. It is shown that it is now optimal to offer leniency even
in cases where authorities have collected enough evidence to convict the cartel with almost certainty since
the authorities can offer a very low fine discount in such strong cases and more generous discounts in weaker
cases. Aubert, Kovacic and Rey (2006) focus on why evidence is available in cartels and explain how leniency
programs provide incentives for managers to keep evidence instead of destroying it. In comparison, I treat
evidence as something totally exogenous which firms can choose to submit to the authorities or not. An
interesting topic, which is not studied here, is how leniency programs affect the structure of cartels and the
communication between the firms. It seems reasonable to assume that cartel members when faced with a
leniency program will communicate less to reduce the amounts of evidence available. Nevertheless, I briefly
explore in an extension to the model the impact of allowing firms to destroy pieces of evidence or creating
brand new evidence.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the set-up of the static model and discusses the
assumptions made, while Section 3 derives the equilibrium firm behavior given an arbitrary leniency program.
The optimal leniency program, which maximizes the expected fine of colluding, is characterized in Section
4. Section 5 extends to the model by allowing cartel members to destroy or create evidence. The static
framework is extended to a repeated game set-up in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes. All proofs are
collected in the Appendix.
2 The Model
This section introduces a static two-firm model. Two identical firms have the option to engage in an illegal
collaboration, which I shall denote the cartel. Due to the static nature of the model, I will not elaborate on
how the cartel can be sustained; it is simply assumed that it is sustainable. Colluding has a value piC > 0 to
each firm.
The cartel faces a probability λ ∈ (0, 1) of being detected and convicted in which case each firm has to
pay the fine F > 0. The interpretation of λ in terms of evidence is that the cartel inevitably provides the
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Antitrust Authority (AA) with evidence that enables the AA to establish a breech of competition law with
probability λ.
The firms can apply for leniency by adding to the evidence of the AA. In general, firms will differ in terms
of their evidence endowments. The evidence available to, say, firm 1 is measured by θ1 ∈ [λ, 1] where θ1 is
the probability that firm 2 is convicted if firm 1 testifies. The probabilities θ1 and θ2 are privately observed
after the cartel is executed and drawn independently from a distribution with the cumulative distribution
function G (·).10
The AA can let the degree of leniency depend on the submitted evidence. Formally, a leniency program
is a function ρ : [λ, 1]→ [0, 1] that to every θ assigns a fine discount. If, for example, firm 1 reports and plead
guilty, it is charged the reduced fine ρ (θ1)F , while firm 2 pays the full fine F with probability θ1. Notice
that in this notation ρ measures the ”inverse” fine discount; 1 − ρ is the fine discount. Only the first firm
coming forward is eligible for leniency. The level of penalties, F , is taken for granted by the AA. If F also
becomes a controllable policy variable, the AA will in this model wish to set the fine as high as possible.
However, one then has to take legal considerations as well as the risk of (type I) judicial errors into account.
Though interesting, the question of optimal fines is beyond the scope of this paper.11
Before any action take place, the AA commits to a leniency program. Observing the program, the two
firms decide collectively whether or not to form a cartel. If a cartel is formed, the firms engage in the following
reporting game:
1. Firm 1 and 2 privately observe the values of their evidence measured by θ1 and θ2, respectively.
2. The firms decide simultaneously whether to report to the AA. If both firms attempt to report, the
probability that a firm is first is 12 . If, say, firm 1 is first, it pays ρ (θ1)F , whereas firm 2 pays the full
fine F with probability θ1.
3. Without the assistance of leniency applications, the cartel is found guilty with probability λ. If the
cartel is convicted, both firms pay F . If the cartel is not convicted, no fines are paid.
Some of the assumptions in this game need to be addressed. Firstly, the formulation of stage 2 implicitly
assumes that if both firms attempt to report, they have an equal chance of winning the ”race to the court-
house”. It is further assumed that the firms observe if the other firm reports. This enables the loser of the race
to abort its attempt to report when it realizes it has reached the courthouse too late, and it chooses not to
report as there is no fine discount to the firm reporting second. It is not standard procedure in most leniency
programs to inform other firms about a submitted application; however, it has been the experience in many
countries that rumors about applications spread anyway.12 I therefore assume that leniency applications are
publicly observed.
10The cdf. G is strictly increasing and twice differentiable. This structure ensures full support on [λ, 1] and eliminates point
masses.
11In a potential extension of the model, F is a function of the firm’s evidence based on the idea that a firm with more evidence
has been more involved in the organization of the cartel, i.e. as ringleader, and is therefore subject to a harsher punishment.
12I am grateful to Kirsten Levinsen, Chief Special Advisor with the Danish Competition Authority, for providing this insight.
45
Asymmetric Evidence and Optimal Leniency Programs
Secondly, I make the explicit assumption that only the first firm coming forward is eligible for leniency. As
an alternative, consider a more general structure in which the leniency functions are ρ1
(
θ1, θ2
)
and ρ2
(
θ1, θ2
)
and where θi denotes the evidence of the firm applying in position i ∈ {1, 2} and 1− ρi is the fine discount
given to this firm. Here, also the second-comer may qualify for leniency, and the fine discounts are allowed to
depend on the evidence provided by the other firm. However, when a firm contemplates reporting, whether
it is in first or second position, it does not know the evidence of the other firm and its incentives to report are
therefore not affected by the particular realization of this evidence. In effect, the AA cannot do better than
sticking to the simplified leniency functions ρ1
(
θ1
)
and ρ2
(
θ2
)
where a firm’s fine discount only depends on
its own evidence. Now, suppose that ρ2
(
θ2
)
< 1 such that the second-comer is given leniency. This firm, let
it be firm 2, reports in second place only if leniency reduces its expected fine. Thus, firm 2 can only gain from
having access to the leniency program, and because firm 1’s fine discount is not affected, no externalities are
created. The bottom line is that no generality is lost by restricting attention to the case where only the first-
comer is eligible for leniency. In contrast, if cartels of more than two firms are considered, the second-comer
can possibly provide evidence incriminating firms that have not yet reported and, for this reason, it might
be optimal to give fine discounts to firms not reporting first. Nevertheless, this issue is beyond the scope of
this paper and I therefore only consider the two-firm case.
Thirdly, the firms of the model can fully predict what fine reduction their evidence will entitle them
to receive. In reality, the evidence-based leniency program proposed in this paper leaves plenty of room
for discretion when the authorities are to assess the quality of the submitted evidence. Furthermore, the
authorities are likely to have a commitment problem if the quality of evidence is not easily verifiable. However,
the uncertainty for a firm considering to report can be reduced significantly if one allows for hypothetical
leniency applications as in the EU system. Such applications allow a firm to get a provisional statement as
to how the Commission will consider an actual leniency application from the firm and the evidence involved.
Finally, the evidence structure is such that the firms’ evidence endowments are independently distributed.
This assumption, which is made to reduce the complexity of the model, can be seen as an analogue to the
private values model in auction theory. A more plausible evidence structure involves some positive correlation
between the two firms’ endowments. However, as a first attempt, this paper explores the natural benchmark
of non-correlated evidence.
3 A Collusive Equilibrium
Suppose a cartel has been formed given some leniency program ρ. Subsequently, each firm has to decide on
reporting when it observes its endowment of evidence. Firm 1 works out a so-called reporting plan denoted
Θ1 ∈ [λ, 1] such that the firm reports if and only if θ1 ∈ Θ1. Likewise, firm 2 settles on a reporting plan Θ2.
This section investigates when a reporting plan constitutes a symmetric equilibrium. Consider the common
reporting plan Θ1 = Θ2 = Θ. Two incentive compatibility conditions have to be fulfilled for Θ to be an
equilibrium. Letting firm 1 be the firm in consideration, this firm must firstly find it optimal to report if
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observing evidence θ1 ∈ Θ, i.e.
Pr (θ2 ∈ Θ)
(
1
2
ρ (θ1) +
1
2
E [θ2| θ2 ∈ Θ]
)
F + (1− Pr (θ2 ∈ Θ)) ρ (θ1)F ≤
Pr (θ2 ∈ Θ)E [θ2| θ2 ∈ Θ]F + (1− Pr (θ2 ∈ Θ))λF (1)
where Pr (θ2 ∈ Θ) is the probability that firm 2 attempts to report and E [θ2| θ2 ∈ Θ] is the expected prob-
ability of being convicted if firm 2 reports. The left-hand side of (1) is the expected fine from attempting to
report, while the right-hand side is the expected fine from not attempting. Solving for ρ (θ1) yields that if Θ
constitutes an equilibrium, then13
ρ (θ1) ≤ λ+
∫
Θ
(θ − λ) dG (θ)
2− ∫
Θ
dG (θ)
≡ η (Θ) for all θ1 ∈ Θ. (2)
It is instructive to think of η (Θ) as the report-adjusted detection risk that firm 1 faces given the reporting
plan Θ. Firm 1 compares the reduced fine ρ (θ1)F with η (Θ)F when deciding on reporting. The report-
adjusted detection risk can be divided into a base detection risk λ plus an excess risk originating from the
evidence that the AA might acquire from firm 2 through the leniency program.
Secondly, for any θ1 /∈ Θ, the opposite must hold true such that firm 1 is discouraged from reporting.
Formally, if Θ constitutes an equilibrium, then
ρ (θ1) ≥ η (Θ) for all θ1 /∈ Θ. (3)
Figure 1 illustrates an equilibrium seen from the perspective of firm 1.
η (Θ)
1
λ 1
θ1
ρ (θ1)
Θ
Figure 1: Illustration of an equilibrium.
Given the reporting plan Θ, the expected fine prior to the realization of evidence can be written as
Φ (Θ, ρ) = (1− Pr (θ ∈ Θ))2 λF +
(
1− (1− Pr (θ ∈ Θ))2
)(1
2
E [ρ (θ)| θ ∈ Θ] + 1
2
E [θ| θ ∈ Θ]
)
F
13To derive (2), I use that Pr (θ2 ∈ Θ) =
∫
Θ dG (θ2) and E [ θ2| θ2 ∈ Θ] =
∫
Θ θ2dG(θ2)∫
Θ dG(θ2)
.
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where firm subscripts are omitted since the firms are symmetric ex ante. The first term is the expected fine
when neither firm reports, λF , times the probability of this event. The second term is the expected fine when
at least one firm reports. Each firm has an equal chance of paying the reduced fine ρ (θ)F as part of the
leniency program or facing the increased expected fine θF when the other firm reports. Rewriting Φ (Θ, ρ)
gives
Φ (Θ, ρ) =
(
1−
∫
Θ
dG (θ)
)2
λF +
1
2
(
2−
∫
Θ
dG (θ)
)∫
Θ
(θ + ρ (θ)) dG (θ)F. (4)
In case of multiple equilibria, I assume that the firms coordinate on the ex ante Pareto dominant equilib-
rium. Let ΘPD (ρ) denote the reporting plan of this equilibrium. Formally,
ΘPD (ρ) ∈ arg min
Θ
Φ (Θ, ρ) st. (2),(3).
If more than one reporting plan minimizes Φ (Θ, ρ), I break the tie by assuming that ΘPD (ρ) is the reporting
plan of these having the lowest probability of reporting. It is convenient to define ΦPD (ρ) ≡ Φ (ΘPD (ρ) , ρ).
Hence, a cartel is formed if and only if
piC ≥ ΦPD (ρ) . (5)
4 The Optimal Leniency Program
The AA seeks to render collusion unprofitable. In other words, the AA should, if possible, commit to a
leniency program such that (5) is violated. On the basis of this objective, I let the optimal leniency program
ρ∗ be the one that maximizes the expected fine. Formally,
ρ∗ ∈ arg max
ρ
ΦPD (ρ) .
To justify this notion, one can think of piC as being randomly distributed across industries and not observed
by the AA. If so, the optimal leniency program maximizes the expected fine in order to make the number of
cartels in the economy as low as possible. Many leniency programs can be labelled optimal. For example,
for any θ /∈ ΘPD (ρ∗), the fine discount can be anything as long as it does not induce firms to report; the
expected fine will remain unaffected. To eliminate this ambiguity, I fix ρ∗ (θ) = 1 for all θ /∈ ΘPD (ρ∗). In
words, as long as the cartel is not reporting, there is no loss of generality from assuming that no fine discount
is offered.
Focusing solely on the optimal leniency program, I can characterize the cartel’s preferred reporting plan
in a simple way. Lemma 1 shows that given this leniency program, each firm reports if and only if it holds
evidence exceeding some cut-off.
Lemma 1 Given the optimal leniency program ρ∗, a cut-off θ ∈ [λ, 1] exists such that ΘPD (ρ∗) = [θ, 1].
The intuition underlying Lemma 1 is this. It is always better for the AA to induce firms to report for
high values of θ than for low values. If the AA denies some firms access to the leniency program, these
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should be low-evidence firms. Reporting inflicts a negative externality on the other firm, and the externality
is enhanced when the reporter submits more evidence. For this reason, it can never be optimal for the AA
to maintain leniency programs other than those that induce the firms to have cut-off reporting plans.
When the optimal leniency program is in place, Lemma 1 implies that the equilibrium can be described
in terms of a cut-off rather than a reporting plan. Replacing Θ with θ, (4) and (2) become
Φ
(
θ, ρ
)
= G
(
θ
)2
λF +
1
2
(
1 +G
(
θ
)) ∫ 1
θ
(θ + ρ (θ)) dG (θ)F (6)
and
η
(
θ
)
= λ+
∫ 1
θ
(θ − λ) dG (θ)
1 +G
(
θ
) . (7)
From these, Proposition 1 derives the optimal leniency program.14
Proposition 1 Let θ be the cut-off induced by the optimal leniency program. Then, this program is
ρ∗ (θ) =
 1 if θ < θη (θ) if θ ≥ θ .
Proposition 1 demonstrates how the optimal fine discount is calculated. If a firm submits evidence corre-
sponding to some θ ≥ θ, the optimal (inverse) fine discount is equal to the report-adjusted detection risk
calculated as if the firms’ common reporting plan is to report only when they hold evidence in excess of θ.
1
η ({θc})
η ({θb})
λ
θθa θb θc
θ
ρ (θ)
Candidate I
Candidate II
Figure 2: Derivation of the optimal leniency program.
To understand Proposition 1 in depth, suppose that the support of G (·) is the discrete set {θa, θb, θc}
where θa < θb < θc and suppose further that θa, θb, and θc occur with equal probability. Consider the case
where the AA wants the firms to report only at θb and θc. The argument is illustrated in Figure 2. To
eliminate the equilibrium where the firms do not report at all, either ρ∗ (θb) or ρ∗ (θc) is set equal to λ.15
14Note that ρ∗ (θ) is not just equal to η
(
θ
)
for all θ. If the AA implements this program, an additional equilibrium exists
where the firms do not report at all, and this equilibrium is Pareto dominant.
15To be precise, no optimal value of ρ∗ (θb) exists since ρ∗ (θb) has to be strictly below λ. However, I allow myself to ignore
this caveat.
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If ρ∗ (θb) = λ, the AA fixes ρ∗ (θc) = η ({θb}) to induce reporting at θc. This leniency program is labeled
”Candidate I” in Figure 2. However, if instead θc is assigned the lowest discount, one gets ρ∗ (θb) = η ({θc})
and ρ∗ (θc) = λ. This program is labeled ”Candidate 2”. Since η ({θb}) < η ({θc}), the AA prefers Candidate
II. By first ensuring that high-evidence firms report, the AA can charge higher fines on low-evidence firms
rather than doing it the other way around.
Figure 2 indicates that ρ∗ (θ) is a decreasing function. Proposition 2 shows this formally. In fact, given
the way ρ∗ is derived in Proposition 1, the proof is simply to show that η (θ) decreases with θ. Hence, firms
eligible for leniency receive larger fine reductions, the more evidence they submit.
Proposition 2 The optimal leniency program, ρ∗ (θ), is strictly decreasing for all θ ≥ θ.
A subproblem in the AA’s general optimization problem is to choose the cut-off that maximizes the
expected fine given the optimal leniency program as derived in Proposition 1. The AA faces a trade-off in
this respect. A lower the cut-off makes it more likely that reporting occurs, but, on the other hand, it reduces
the expected probability that, say, firm 2 is convicted when firm 1 comes forward. Balancing these opposite
effects leads to Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 In the optimal leniency program given in Proposition 1, λ < θ < 1.
Proposition 3 demonstrates two important results. Firstly, since θ < 1, firms must be allowed to qualify
for leniency with some positive probability. This confirms findings in Motta and Polo (2003) and other
contributions in the sense that leniency programs, when designed optimally, are useful in the fight against
cartels. The intuition for this result is straightforward; since ρ∗ (θ) = η (θ) > λ for all θ ∈ [θ, 1), a leniency
application increases the expected fine for the applicant as well as for the other firm compared to the
benchmark case where no firms report and both firms faces the expected fine λF . Secondly and more
importantly, since θ > λ, not all applications are accepted and firms should only be eligible for leniency if
they can provide a significant amount of additional evidence.
To understand the second result, suppose that θ = λ and consider a marginal increase in θ. Suppose
further that firm 1 observes θ1 = λ. Before the increase in θ, firm 1, if it reports, provides an expected total
fine for both firms equal to (ρ∗ (λ) + λ)F . After the increase in θ, firm 1 is no longer accepted in the leniency
program, but firm 2 is and provides an expected total fine of (E [ρ∗ (θ)] + E [θ])F . By excluding firm 1, the
AA gains (E [θ]− λ)F as more evidence is submitted but loses (ρ∗ (λ)− E [ρ∗ (θ)])F as the applicant has to
be granted a more favorable fine discount.16 However, since ρ∗ (λ) = E [θ] and E [ρ∗ (θ)] > λ, a comparison
of the two terms reveals that the gain outweighs the loss. In effect, it is optimal to exclude firms holding
evidence of a value close to λ from the leniency program.17
This second finding has the same flavor as a result in Harrington (2008) in the sense that eligibility into
the leniency program is restricted. In Harrington’s model, a leniency application is not accepted if the AA
16Recall from Proposition 2 that ρ∗ (λ) > E [ρ∗ (θ)] since ρ∗ (θ) is decreasing.
17Note the similarity to the private value auction model in which it is optimal for the seller to set a reservation price above
the seller’s valuation of the auctioned good. Doing this, the seller increases the risk that the good will remain unsold but if sold,
the expected price will be higher.
50
Asymmetric Evidence and Optimal Leniency Programs
is already in possession of vast evidence. In my model, the crucial factor is not the evidence already in the
hands of the AA but instead the new evidence the applicant can provide. It is important to note that the
rejection of applications from low-evidence firms is not a direct consequence of the firms submitting evidence
of low value. Instead, it comes from the fact that other firms may have more evidence. Hence, evidence
asymmetry is the crucial feature for this result to arise.
To get a feeling for the results, I conclude this section by presenting a specific example. An interesting
special case arises when θ is uniformly distributed on the interval [λ, 1]. In the uniform case, the optimal
leniency program is particularly simple.
Example 1 Let θ be uniformly distributed on the interval [λ, 1] such that g (θ) = 11−λ for all θ. Proposition
1 and (7) imply that
ρ∗ (θ) =
 1 if θ < θ1
2 + λ− 12θ if θ ≥ θ
.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that θ is in the interior of [λ, 1]. Hence, the first-order condition is a necessary
condition. Taking the derivative of Φ
(
θ, ρ∗
)
with respect to θ and solving for θ yield the unique solution
θ ≈ 0.15 + 0.85λ,
i.e. the optimal cut-off θ enforced by the AA is a weighted average of λ and 1.
5 Destruction and Creation of Evidence
The model has so far treated evidence as something exogenous which the cartel cannot affect. However, it
seems plausible that cartel members themselves decide on how much evidence is created in the cartel by
settling on a level of cooperation and communication. Less communication creates less evidence that can
be passed on to the authorities but it is also likely to reduce the profitability of the cartel. In addition, the
firms decide individually which pieces of evidence to keep and which to destroy. This section serves as a first
attempt to extend the model by endogenizing the firms’ endowments of evidence in the last-mentioned sense,
and I show that the results of Section 3 are robust to this extension.
In this section, the evidence created by the cartel’s activities is still something which the firms cannot
affect, but I allow each firm to destroy all or parts of its evidence. The firms face a trade-off in this respect:
more evidence can be beneficial when applying for leniency but, on the other hand, the evidence can be found
by the authorities’ own inquiries, i.e. it increases the probability of being convicted when no firm reports to
the authorities. Furthermore, I allow the firms to create additional evidence on a unilateral basis. The idea
is that each firm might choose to keep journals about the cartel’s activities and submit them as evidence if
applying for leniency.
As in the previous sections, let the evidence endowment of firm i, θi, be drawn from the distribution
G in step 1 of the game. Prior to step 2, the firm can now either destroy parts of this evidence or add to
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θi by creating new evidence. Thus, let firm i choose θ̂i ∈ [λ, θi + φi (1− θi)] and let this number be firm
i’s evidence when entering step 2 where φi ∈ [0, 1] measures firm i’s ability to create new evidence. This
parameter is assumed to be stochastic and independently distributed with full support on the unit interval.
The distribution is the same for both firms. The parameter λ represents the base risk of conviction; even
when firm i has destroyed all its evidence, its testimony still enables the authorities to convict the other firm
with probability λ. Define Ĝ as the distribution of θi +φi (1− θi). Then, Ĝ has full support on [λ, 1] and no
point masses.
The more evidence that is kept by the cartel members, the higher is the risk that the cartel is convicted
when no firms apply for leniency. Let λ̂
(
θ̂1, θ̂2
)
denote this probability and let it be increasing in both
arguments. If both firms have destroyed all evidence possible, this probability is equal to the base risk, i.e.
λ̂ (λ, λ) = λ. This indicates that there is always some evidence for the authorities to find.
As a first observation, note that the optimal leniency program, ρ∗
(
θ̂
)
, must be decreasing such that
more evidence qualifies a firm for a larger fine discount. If not, the firms will destroy evidence, and the AA
has no interest in facilitating this. In fact, the chance of obtaining a smaller sanction is the only factor that
potentially discourages the firms from destroying all their evidence.
An implication of this first observation is that if a firm plans to report, it will retain all its evidence and
create as much additional evidence as it possibly can. In this way, it will get the largest fine discount if
it reaches the courthouse in first position. Formally, let Θ̂ be the common reporting plan in this extended
set-up such that firm i reports if and only if θi + φi (1− θi) ∈ Θ̂. In this case, θ̂i = θi + φi (1− θi). On the
other hand, a firm planning not to report will destroy all evidence in order to minimize the probability of
conviction, i.e. θ̂i = λ if θi + φi (1− θi) /∈ Θ̂.
Firms report if and only if they can qualify for a fine discount above some threshold. This implies, since
ρ∗
(
θ̂
)
is decreasing, that the cartel employs a cut-off type reporting plan as in Lemma 1, i.e. Θ̂PD (ρ∗) =[
θ, 1
]
. In effect, the model is exactly as in equations (6) and (7) if one replaces G with Ĝ. This leads to the
following conclusion.
Proposition 4 Even when firms unilaterally can destroy or create evidence, Propositions 1 through 3 still
hold true.
I final issue to explore is how the opportunities to destroy or create evidence affect the optimal fine
discounts. If firms can destroy but not create evidence, G = Ĝ and the optimal leniency program remains
the same. However, if firms are allowed to create new evidence, firms will on average provide more evidence
when they report and, as a consequence, a less lenient policy is needed to induce firms to come forward since
the risk of not reporting increases. This is proven formally in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 When firms can create new evidence, fine discounts in the optimal leniency program are
lower.
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6 A Dynamic Model
Thus far, it has been assumed that the firms in the cartel interact only once. To comply with the fact that
collusion most often occurs repeatedly, I now extend the model to a dynamic setting where firms interact in
an infinite number of periods.18 When a firm applies for leniency, it must now take into account how this
will affect the prospects of earning future cartel profits.
It is necessary to be more explicit about the market interaction in a dynamic model. Firms can either
compete or collude in each period. If both firms collude, each firm realizes cartel profits piC . If both firms
compete, they receive Nash profits, which are normalized to zero. Finally, if one firm competes while the
other colludes, the former gets deviation profits piD > piC .
Three additional assumptions are needed to make the model tractable. First, I assume that cartel activity
has a one period statute of limitations implying that firms cannot be convicted for past collusion. In effect,
the firms risk the same sanction in every period of collusion no matter how long time the cartel has been
operating. Second, each firm’s evidence is redrawn in each period. This reflects the first assumption in the
way that the only relevant evidence relates to the current period’s activities. Third, it is assumed that if a
firm reports or if the cartel is convicted for some other reason, the firms are precluded from making a new
cartel in all subsequent periods. One can justify this assumption by presuming that the AA closely monitors
the industry in the future, making resumed collusion impossible.19
Also, it is necessary to introduce the parameter ω ∈ (0, 1) which denotes the probability that the cartel
is investigated by the AA in a given period. In the static model, it was implicitly assumed that ω = 1.
This choice was without loss of generality as the investigation probability did not affect the optimal leniency
program. In the dynamic model, however, the optimal leniency program depends on the value of future
collusion and, hence, ω. With the introduction of ω, λ now measures the probability that an investigation
concludes in a conviction of the cartel.
To make the task of designing the leniency program non-trivial, I make the parameter assumption that
the gain of collusion exceeds the expected fine. Otherwise, collusion is deterred without the help of leniency.
Formally, it is assumed that
piC ≥ ωλF ⇔ F ≤ pi
C
ωλ
≡ F ,
i.e. antitrust fines are assumed to be modest.
Before any actions take place, the AA commits to a leniency program. Observing this, the two firms
decide collectively whether or not to form a cartel. If a cartel is formed, the firms engage in a repeated game
with the following stage game:
1. Each firm decides simultaneously whether to collude or compete.
2. The AA launches an investigation of the cartel with probability ω. If an investigation starts, the game
18In this section, I again treat evidence as something exogenously generated, i.e. I leave aside the issues of destruction and
creation of evidence. Nevertheless, I conjecture that the results in this section are robust to such extensions as in Proposition 4.
19This assumption is fairly standard in the literature. Alternatively, the model can be extended with a probability σ ∈ (0, 1)
that the cartel re-establishes itself in each of the ensuing periods upon conviction. Bearing in mind the theory of dynamic games,
I suspect the model to reach the same results whether σ is zero or positive. See for example Harrington (2008).
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moves on to step 3. If not, the stage game ends and the game moves on to the next period.
3. The firms play the reporting game from the static model. That is, they observe their evidence and
decide whether to report.
4. If none of the firms report and the cartel is not convicted, the stage game ends and the game moves on
to the next period.
This game structure opens up for a wide range of possible strategies. However, I shall restrict attention
to symmetric trigger strategies of the following kind:
Collude in the first period and in subsequent periods if no firm has competed in the past. Otherwise,
compete. If the AA initiates an investigation, follow the reporting plan Θ; that is, report if and
only if θ ∈ Θ.
I now consider an arbitrary reporting plan Θ and investigate when it constitutes an equilibrium if part
of the strategy above. Given Θ and some leniency program ρ, the value to each firm in the cartel is
V (Θ, ρ) = piC + (1− ω) δV (Θ, ρ) + ω (1− Pr (θ ∈ Θ))2 ((1− λ) δV (Θ, ρ)− λF )
−ω
(
1− (1− Pr (θ ∈ Θ))2
) 1
2
E [θ + ρ (θ) |θ ∈ Θ]F (8)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the common discount factor. Each firm earns collusive profits piC and avoids an
investigation with probability 1− ω in which case the cartel continues in the next period. With probability
ω (1− Pr (θ ∈ Θ))2, the cartel is investigated but no firms report. The cartel is detected and each firm pays the
full fine F with probability λ, while with probability 1−λ the cartel is not convicted and remains operating.
Finally, the cartel is investigated and at least one firm reports with probability ω
(
1− (1− Pr (θ ∈ Θ))2
)
.
Each firm has, ex ante, an equal chance of either obtaining leniency and paying the reduced fine ρ (θ)F or
facing the increased expected fine θF . Solving (8) for V (Θ, ρ) yields
V (Θ, ρ) =
piC
F −
(
1− ∫
Θ
dG (θ)
)2
ωλ− 12ω
(
2− ∫
Θ
dG (θ)
) ∫
Θ
(θ + ρ (θ)) dG (θ)
1− δ (1− ω)− δω (1− λ) (1− ∫
Θ
dG (θ)
)2 F. (9)
For the reporting plan Θ to be a collusive equilibrium, the firms must firstly be discouraged from compet-
ing; secondly, firms must find it optimal to comply with Θ. To begin with the latter, consider firm 1 which in
the event of an investigation must prefer to report whenever it holds evidence θ1 that is part of the reporting
plan Θ. That is,
Pr (θ2 ∈ Θ)
(
1
2
ρ (θ1) +
1
2
E [θ2 |θ2 ∈ Θ]
)
F + (1− Pr (θ2 ∈ Θ)) ρ (θ1)F ≤
Pr (θ2 ∈ Θ)E [θ2 |θ2 ∈ Θ]F + (1− Pr (θ2 ∈ Θ)) (λF − δ (1− λ)V (Θ, ρ)) (10)
if θ1 ∈ Θ. The left-hand side is the expected fine from attempting to report, whereas the right-hand side is
the expected fine from not attempting. The condition is similar to (1) with the only exception that if firm
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1 does not report, it achieves the cartel value in the next period with probability (1− Pr (θ2 ∈ Θ)) (1− λ).
Rearranging gives
ρ (θ) ≤ λ− δ (1− λ) V (Θ, ρ)
F
+
∫
Θ
(
θ − λ+ δ (1− λ) V (Θ,ρ)F
)
dG (θ)
2− ∫
Θ
dG (θ)
≡ η (Θ, ρ) for all θ1 ∈ Θ. (11)
If δ = 0, the future is not assigned any value and (11) is identical to (2). The report-adjusted detection risk
on the right-hand side is in the dynamic model a function of the leniency program as this affects the future
value of collusion.
Also, firms must find it optimal to refrain from reporting when they hold evidence not part of the reporting
plan Θ. That is in the case of firm 1,
ρ (θ1) ≥ η (Θ, ρ) for all θ1 /∈ Θ. (12)
If η (∅, ρ) < 0, fine discounts in excess of 100 percent are needed to induce firms to report. But since I
do not allow for reward schemes of this kind, I specifically assume that
η (∅, ρ) = λ− δ (1− λ) V (∅, ρ)
F
≥ 0 ⇔ F ≥ 1− λ
λ
δ
1− δ (1− ω)pi
C ≡ F < F.
If F < F , the AA does not have the means to induce reporting and leniency has no role to play in the
fight against cartels. Hence, leniency is only powerful if it is complemented by fairly high penalties. In the
following, it is assumed that F ∈ [F , F ].
If more than one reporting plan satisfy (11) and (12), I assume that the cartel chooses the Pareto dominant
reporting plan, which is the plan that maximizes V (Θ, ρ). As previously, denote this plan ΘPD (ρ) and define
V PD (ρ) ≡ V (ΘPD (ρ) , ρ). This value is the highest achievable when firms collude.
Another equilibrium condition ensures that firms in fact collude in each period. A firm that deviates by
competing instead of colluding gains in terms of deviation profits in the current period but loses in terms of
foregone cartel profits in future periods. The cartel can be sustained if this trade-off is not favorable, i.e. if
V PD (ρ) ≥ piD. (13)
The left-hand side is the value of collusion, whereas the right-hand side is deviation profits in the given
period. I follow Motta and Polo (2003) and assume that the deviating firm is not subject to sanctions. Since
the AA wishes to encourage deviations, it should avoid penalizing deviators. A cartel is sustainable if and
only if (13) holds.
The main goal of the AA is to prevent that cartels are established. Hence, any leniency program such
that (13) is violated can be labelled optimal. If no program can deter collusion completely, it is optimal for
the AA to make the cartel as short-lived as possible by maximizing the probability that firms self-report.
For simplicity, I ignore this secondary objective and focus solely on deterrence. Still, a wide array of leniency
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programs can provide complete deterrence. To be able to give a meaningful characterization of the optimal
program ρ∗, I let this minimize the value of the cartel. That is,
ρ∗ ∈ arg min
ρ
V PD (ρ) .
To justify this notion, suppose piD is unknown to the AA. One can interpret piD as an (inverse) measure of the
cartel’s internal stability. It seems reasonable to assume that this stability is not observed by the authorities.
From (13), minimizing the cartel value makes it most likely that collusion is rendered unsustainable.
I now proceed in a way similar to the approach taken in the static model. It is straight-forward to
show that Lemma 1 also applies to the dynamic case, and I allow myself to take this result for granted. As
demonstrated in Lemma 1, the Pareto dominant reporting rule given the optimal leniency program can be
described by a cut-off θ implying that firms report if and only if they observe evidence above this cut-off. I
shall write V
(
θ, ρ
)
and η
(
θ, ρ
)
instead of V
([
θ, 1
]
, ρ
)
and η
([
θ, 1
]
, ρ
)
. In effect, (9) becomes
V
(
θ, ρ
)
=
piC
F −G
(
θ
)2
ωλ− 12ω
(
1 +G
(
θ
)) ∫ 1
θ
(θ + ρ (θ)) dG (θ)
1− δ (1− ω)− δω (1− λ)G (θ)2 F, (14)
and, from (11), η can be written as
η
(
θ, ρ
)
= λ− δ (1− λ) V
(
θ, ρ
)
F
+
∫ 1
θ
(
θ − λ+ δ (1− λ) V (θ,ρ)F
)
dG (θ)
1 +G
(
θ
) . (15)
Equivalent to Proposition 1, Proposition 6 derives the optimal leniency program.
Proposition 6 Let θ be the cut-off induced by the optimal leniency program. Then, this program is
ρ∗ (θ) =
 1 if θ < θη (θ, ρ∗) if θ ≥ θ .
As in the static model, the optimal (inverse) fine discount is equal to the report-adjusted detection risk
calculated as if the firms’ reporting plan is to report only when they hold evidence above θ. The dynamic
model counterpart to Proposition 2 is:
Proposition 7 The optimal leniency program, ρ∗ (θ), is strictly decreasing for all θ ≥ θ.
Thus, it is optimal to offer higher fine discounts in return for more evidence also when a dynamic framework
is applied. The intuition is thoroughly explained in connection to the static model.
The next question is whether the results in Proposition 3 also apply to the dynamic model. It was shown
in the static model that leniency should be granted to firms submitting large amounts of evidence, i.e. θ < 1,
and that firms with little evidence should be denied access to the leniency program, i.e. θ > λ. Proposition
8 reveals that these findings almost generalize to the dynamic model.
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Proposition 8 At the optimal policy,
(i) θ < 1, and
(ii) there exists an F̂ < F such that θ > λ if and only if F > F̂ .
The new element in Proposition 8 is that low-evidence firms are only excluded from the leniency program
if the fine level is sufficiently high. If not, it can be optimal to grant leniency to a firm that offers no additional
evidence, i.e. offers θ = λ. The argument is the following. Suppose the cut-off θ = λ is implemented by
the AA. This implies that firms report no matter their endowments of evidence and, for that reason, the
cartel ceases with certainty if an investigation begins. If, say, firm 1 observes θ1 = λ and is first to apply for
leniency, the total expected fine paid by the cartel is (λ+ ρ∗ (λ))F . If firm 1 instead is excluded from the
program, the number is (E [θ] + E [ρ∗ (θ)])F which is the total, expected fine extracted from an application
by firm 2. Since ρ∗ (λ) = E [θ], the crucial comparison is between and λ and E [ρ∗ (θ)]. So far, everything is
as in the static model. In that model, the expected value of ρ∗ (θ) always exceeds λ; the reason is that each
firm faces a risk of detection above λ if it expects the other firm to report with some positive probability.
Hence, the firms are willing to report in order to obtain a reduced fine despite this being greater than λF . In
the dynamic model, however, fine discounts must also compensate self-reporting firms for the loss of future
cartel profits, and fine discounts are for this reason higher. In fact, when the fine is low, future cartel profits
are high such that large fine discounts are needed to induce firms to come forward. Put differently, when
the fine is sufficiently low, E [ρ∗ (θ)] is below λ implying that it is optimal to accept any firm in the leniency
program no matter how much evidence this firm can submit. In conclusion, denying firms access to leniency
is optimal only in jurisdictions where collusion is punished harshly.
To illustrate the optimal leniency programs for high and low fines, respectively, Example 2 derives the
programs for a uniform distribution. Contrary to Example 1, a closed-form solution cannot be obtained in
the dynamic framework. Instead, I have to solve the model numerically.
Example 2 Let θ be uniformly distributed on the interval [λ, 1] such that g (θ) = 11−λ for all θ. Consider
an example with parameters λ = .6, ω = .2, δ = .95, and piC = 1. In the case where F = 3, one gets θ = .6.
That is, every firm, no matter its evidence endowment, is eligible for leniency. If instead F = 8, then θ = .68
implying that a firm must increase the conviction probability by at least 8 percentage points to qualify for
leniency. Figure 4 displays the optimal leniency programs in the two cases.
7 Concluding Remarks
A growing literature has dealt with the design of optimal leniency programs. My paper complements this
work by addressing the issue of how fine discounts should depend on the evidence submitted by the firm
applying for leniency.
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Figure 3: The optimal leniency program given a uniform distribution, dynamic model.
First, I show that the optimal fine discounts offered to eligible firms depend positively on the evidence
submitted. This result ensures that the fines paid on average are maximized. Also, it provides incentives for
firms not to conceal any evidence, although this issue is not part of the model.
Second, I find that if the antitrust fines are sufficiently high, only firms that can add a substantial amount
of evidence to the evidence already in the hands of the authorities should be allowed access to the leniency
program. Such a scheme makes it more likely that high-evidence firms win the race to the courthouse when
firms are asymmetric in terms of evidence. The result is valid for any level of antitrust sanctions if one
considers a one-period cartel instead of a dynamic model.
In order to obtain fine reductions in the leniency program hosted by the European Union, the added
value of the submitted evidence must be ”significant” and the actual reduction depends on this added value.
Hence, my model finds support for such a policy. In contrast, the US corporate leniency program is a pure
immunity program without a variety of discount rates. However, a firm must ”advance” the investigation of
the cartel to qualify for immunity. This wording may be interpreted to be in line with the conclusions in this
paper. Moreover, issues like verifiability, transparency, and commitment problems have not been addressed
in the paper, and including such factors might have an impact in favor of the US policy. In particular, the
less discretionary nature of the US system seems to be an advantage.
This paper has only taken a first step to investigate the role of evidence in optimal leniency programs. In
more complicated models, the quality of evidence is correlated across firms. Also, in a more realistic model,
the firms are better informed about their rivals’ evidence than the authorities. Finally, it seems natural to
endogenize the generation of evidence. That is, the cartel members themselves decide on how much evidence
is created in the cartel by settling on a level of cooperation and communication. Less communication creates
less evidence that can be passed on to the authorities but it is also likely to reduce the profitability of the
cartel. Future research along these lines is needed.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is organized in three steps.
Step 1 ΘPD (ρ∗) is the unique reporting equilibrium given ρ∗.
On the contrary, suppose there exist other equilibria and let Θ˜ denote the equilibrium of these with
the lowest expected fine. By definition, ΦPD (ρ∗) ≤ Φ
(
Θ˜, ρ∗
)
. Since, by assumption, ρ∗ (θ) = 1 for all
θ /∈ ΘPD (ρ∗), it must be that Θ˜ ⊂ ΘPD (ρ∗) such that Θ˜ has the lowest probability of reporting. This
implies that ΦPD (ρ∗) < Φ
(
Θ˜, ρ∗
)
due to the tie-breaking assumption imposed in section 3. Now, construct
an alternative leniency program ρ such that ρ (θ) = ρ∗ (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ˜ and ρ (θ) = 1 for all θ /∈ Θ˜. Under ρ,
ΘPD (ρ∗) is no longer an equilibrium but Θ˜ is. In fact, Θ˜ is Pareto dominant given ρ such that
ΦPD (ρ) = Φ
(
Θ˜, ρ
)
= Φ
(
Θ˜, ρ∗
)
> ΦPD (ρ∗) .
This contradicts ρ∗ being optimal.
Step 2 If ΘPD (ρ∗) is not a cut-off equilibrium given ρ∗, the AA can construct another program ρ that yields
a higher expected fine if ΘPD (ρ) =
[
θ, 1
]
where θ is some cut-off.
Suppose ΘPD (ρ∗) is not a cut-off equilibrium such that there exists θ′, θ′′ where θ′ ∈ ΘPD (ρ∗), θ′′ /∈
ΘPD (ρ∗), and θ′ < θ′′. Let the bijective function f :
[
θ, 1
]→ ΘPD (ρ∗) be such that
∫ θ
θ
dG (z) =
∫
ΘPD(ρ∗)∩[λ,f(θ)]
dG (z) ∀θ ≥ θ. (16)
That is, f preserves the probability distribution when moving from
[
θ, 1
]
to ΘPD (ρ∗). A consequence
of (16) is that f is strictly increasing and that f (θ) ≤ θ. Differentiation of (16) with respect to θ gives
g (θ) = g (f (θ)) f ′ (θ), and evaluating (16) at θ = 1 provides
∫ 1
θ
dG (θ) =
∫
ΘPD(ρ∗)
dG (θ) . (17)
Thus, θ is uniquely defined given ρ∗.
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As an alternative to ρ∗, construct ρ such that ρ (θ) = ρ∗ (f (θ)) if θ ≥ θ and ρ (θ) = 1 if θ < θ. This yields
∫ 1
θ
ρ (θ) dG (θ) =
∫ 1
θ
ρ∗ (f (θ)) g (f (θ)) f ′ (θ) dθ =
∫ 1
θ
ρ∗ (f (θ)) dG (f (θ)) =
∫
ΘPD(ρ∗)
ρ∗ (θ) dG (θ) . (18)
Due to (17) and the fact that ΘPD (ρ∗) cannot be described by a cut-off, one gets20
∫ 1
θ
θdG (θ) >
∫
ΘPD(ρ∗)
θdG (θ) . (19)
If (17), (18), and (19) are plugged into (4), it follows that Φ
([
θ, 1
]
, ρ
)
> ΦPD (ρ∗).
Step 3 ΘPD (ρ) =
[
θ, 1
]
.
To argue that the AA prefers ρ to ρ∗, it suffices to show that
[
θ, 1
]
is the unique equilibrium under ρ.
Insert (17) and (19) into (2) to get that η
([
θ, 1
])
> η
(
ΘPD (ρ∗)
)
. Hence, since ρ is a projection of ρ∗ and
ΘPD (ρ∗) is an equilibrium under ρ∗, it follows that ρ (θ) ≤ η ([θ, 1]) if and only if θ ≥ θ. That is, [θ, 1] is
an equilibrium under ρ. To prove uniqueness, suppose that given ρ there exists another equilibrium Θ and
define Θ̂1 ≡ {f (θ)| θ ∈ Θ}. Hence, ∫
Θ̂1
dG (θ) =
∫
Θ
dG (θ) ,
and since f (θ) ≤ θ, ∫
Θ̂1
θdG (θ) ≤
∫
Θ
θdG (θ)
such that η
(
Θ̂1
)
≤ η (Θ) due to (2). If ρ∗ (θ) ≤ η
(
Θ̂1
)
for all θ ∈ Θ̂1, then Θ̂1 is an equilibrium under ρ∗.
If not, define Θ̂2 ≡
{
θ ∈ Θ̂2
∣∣∣ ρ∗ (θ) ≤ η (Θ̂1)}. If ρ∗ (θ) ≤ η (Θ̂2) for all θ ∈ Θ̂2, then Θ̂2 is an equilibrium.
If not, construct Θ̂3 and so on. Eventually, one will reach an equilibrium (it might be the empty set) under
ρ∗ distinct from ΘPD (ρ∗). However, this contradicts the uniqueness under ρ∗ as proved in step 1. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To be precise, the correct optimal leniency program is ρ∗ (θ) = η (θ) − ε where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small
number. However, I allow myself to assume ε = 0 unless it is of importance that it is positive. The proof is
organized in two steps.
Step 1 θ is the cut-off of the Pareto dominant equilibrium given ρ (θ) = η (θ)− ε for all θ ≥ θ and ρ (θ) = 1
otherwise.
I show formally in the proof of Proposition 2 by means of differentiation that η (θ) is a strictly decreasing
function. This implies, firstly, that
[
θ, 1
]
is an equilibrium under ρ (as the function is given above) since
20A technical remark is justified here. If the set ∆ ≡
[
θ, 1
]
\ΘPD (ρ∗) has a zero measure with respect to G, then (19) holds
with equality. However, to make the notion of a cut-off reporting plan interesting, I implicitly assume that ∆ has a positive
measure such that (19) holds with strict inequality. In later proofs, similar remarks apply.
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ρ (θ) ≤ η (θ) if and only if θ ≥ θ and, secondly, that any other potential equilibrium must be a cut-off
equilibrium as well. Consider an alternative equilibrium with the cut-off θ
′
> θ. This cannot, however, be
an equilibrium since
ρ
(
θ
′ − γ
)
= η
(
θ
′ − γ
)
− ε < η (θ′)
for γ > 0 sufficiently close to zero. That is, firms report at θ
′− γ. In conclusion, the equilibrium represented
by θ is unique and therefore Pareto dominant.
Step 2 ρ∗ (θ) = η (θ) for all θ ≥ θ.
Let the bijective function f :
[
θ, 1
] → [θ, 1] be such that Pr (θ ≤ x) = Pr (f (θ) ≤ x) for any x ∈ [θ, 1].
That is, f is a permutation of the set
[
θ, 1
]
in such a way that the probability distribution G is maintained.
Given f define the set Θf (x) ≡
{
θ ∈ [θ, 1] |f (θ) ≤ x}. Also define ηf (x) ≡ η (Θf (x)) where η (·) is the
report-adjusted detection risk given from (2).
Given f , consider a leniency program ρf such that ρf
(
f−1 (x)
)
is increasing in x. Since f is bijective,
the inverse f−1 is well-defined. If ρ is to be a candidate for the optimal leniency program that implements
θ as the cut-off of the Pareto optimal equilibrium, it must be that ρf
(
f−1 (x)
)
< ηf (x) for all x ∈
[
θ, 1
]
. If
not, there exists an equilibrium other than the one represented by θ and that violates the uniqueness proved
in step 1 in the proof of Lemma 1. In order to maximize the expected fine, fix ρf
(
f−1 (x)
)
= ηf (x)− ε for
all x ∈ [θ, 1] . However, I shall in the remainder of the proof assume that ε = 0.
Now consider the specific permutation f∗ defined as a decreasing function and compare this with some
arbitrary permutation f . Since any permutation maintains G,
∫
Θf (x)
dG (θ) =
∫
Θf∗ (x)
dG (θ)
[
= 1−G (f∗−1 (x))] for all x ∈ [θ, 1] (20)
where the term in the square brackets is due to f∗ being decreasing. Also since f∗ is decreasing,∫
Θf (x)
θdG (θ) ≤
∫
Θf∗ (x)
θdG (θ) for all x ∈ [θ, 1] . (21)
If (20) and (21) are inserted in (2), it follows that ρf
(
f−1 (x)
)
= ηf (x) ≤ ηf∗ (x) = ρf∗
(
f∗−1 (x)
)
for all
x ∈ [θ, 1]. This implies that
∫ 1
θ
ρf (θ) dG (θ) =
∫ 1
θ
ηf (x) dG
(
f−1 (x)
) ≤ ∫ 1
θ
ηf∗ (x) dG
(
f∗−1 (x)
)
=
∫ 1
θ
ρf∗ (θ) dG (θ) . (22)
Hence, from (6), ΦPD (ρf ) = Φ
(
θ, ρf
) ≤ Φ (θ, ρf∗) = ΦPD (ρf∗).
Any candidate for the optimal leniency program can be constructed on the basis of some permutation f .
Therefore, p∗ = ρf∗ where ρf∗ (θ) = ηf∗ (f∗ (θ)) = η (θ).
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Differentiation of (7) yields
∂η (θ)
∂θ
= −g (θ) (θ − λ) (1 +G (θ)) +
∫ 1
θ
(z − λ) dG (z)
(1 +G (θ))2
< 0.
The negative sign is due to g (θ) > 0. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The derivative of (6) with respect to θ is
Φ
(
θ, ρ
)
∂θ
= 2g
(
θ
)
G
(
θ
)
λF +
1
2
g
(
θ
) [∫ 1
θ
(θ + ρ (θ)) dG (θ)− (1 +G (θ)) (θ + ρ (θ))]F.
Given the leniency program ρ∗ (θ) = η (θ) for θ ≥ θ as given from (7), the derivative can be written as
Φ
(
θ, ρ∗
)
∂θ
=
1
2
g (λ)F
[∫ 1
θ
∫ 1
θ
(z − λ) dG (z)
1 +G (θ)
dG (θ)− (θ − λ) (1 +G (θ))] . (23)
If θ = λ, (23) becomes
Φ
(
θ, ρ∗
)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣∣
θ=λ
=
1
2
g (λ)F
∫ 1
λ
∫ 1
θ
(z − λ) dG (z)
1 +G (θ)
dG (θ) > 0
since g (λ) > 0. The positive derivative implies that in the optimal solution, θ > λ. Instead, if θ = 1, (23)
can be simplified to
Φ
(
θ, ρ∗
θ
)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
θ=1
= − (1− λ) g (1)F < 0
since G (1) = 1 and g (1) > 0. The negative derivative implies that in the optimal solution, θ < 1. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Due to Proposition 1, the optimal fine discount when no new evidence can be created is ρ∗ (θ) = η (θ)
whenever θ ≥ θ. From (6), integration by parts yields
ρ∗ (θ) = λ+
1− λ− (θ − λ)G (θ)− ∫ 1
θ
G (z) dz
1 +G (θ)
. (24)
When new evidence can be created, the discount is
ρ∗ (θ) = λ+
1− λ− (θ − λ) Ĝ (θ)− ∫ 1
θ
Ĝ (z) dz
1 + Ĝ (θ)
. (25)
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Since φi > 0 with positive probability, Ĝ (z) < G (x) for all z ∈ (λ, 1). Hence, (25) exceeds (24) for all
θ ∈ [θ, 1). 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Step 1 and most of step 2 in the proof of Proposition 1 are still valid in this dynamic framework, although
the notation of η has changed slightly. Still, (22) needs to be proved from scratch.
Fix ρf
(
f−1 (x)
)
= ηf (x, ρf ) for all x ∈
[
θ, 1
]
. From (11), ρf
(
f−1 (x)
)
= ηf (x, ρf ) ≤ ηf∗ (x, ρf∗) =
ρf∗
(
f∗−1 (x)
)
if and only if
(
1− δ (1− ω)− δω (1− λ)G (f−1 (x)))(∫
Θf∗ (x)
zdG (z)−
∫
Θf (x)
zdG (z)
)
+δω (1− λ)G (f−1 (x)) (1 +G (f−1 (x)))(∫
Θf∗ (x)
ρ∗ (z) dG (z)−
∫
Θf (x)
ρ (z) dG (z)
)
≥ 0 (26)
where I have used (20) and inserted the definition of V from (9). Due to (21), (26) is positive for some x. It
then follows that it is positive for all x ∈ [θ, 1]. In effect,
∫ 1
θ
ρf (θ) dG (θ) ≤
∫ 1
θ
ρf∗ (θ) dG (θ) .
Hence, from (9), V
(
θ, ρf∗
)
< V
(
θ, ρf
)
; that is, ρ∗ = ρf∗ . 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
It is convenient to define ρ̂ (θ) ≡ η (θ, ρ̂). This implies ρ̂ (θ) = ρ∗ (θ) for all θ ≥ θ and for any cut-off θ. Given
this definition, the proof is organized in four steps.
Step 1 V (θ,ρ̂)F is strictly decreasing in F .
Taking the derivative of V (θ,ρ̂)F from (14) yields
∂ V (θ,ρ̂)F
∂F
= −
piC
F 2 +
1
2ω (1 +G (θ))
∫ 1
θ
∂ρ̂(z)
∂F dG (z)
1− δ (1− ω)− δω (1− λ)G (θ)2 . (27)
which is negative for θ close to 1. Using (15), the derivative of ρ̂ (θ) with respect to F is
∂ρ̂ (θ)
∂F
= −2δ (1− λ)G (θ)
1 +G (θ)
∂ V (θ,ρ̂)F
∂F
. (28)
Hence, ∂ρ̂(θ)∂F ≥ 0 for θ close to 1. Repeated use of (27) and (28) demonstrates that
∂
V (θ,ρ̂)
F
∂F < 0 for all θ.
Step 2 12
(
θ̂ + ρ̂
(
θ̂
))
≥ λ− δ (1− λ) V (θ̂,ρ̂)F for any θ̂ such that ∂V (θ,ρ̂)∂θ
∣∣∣
θ=θ̂
≥ 0.
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Differentiation of V (θ, ρ̂) from (14) yields
∂V (θ, ρ̂)
∂θ
=
[
2δ (1− λ)G (θ) V (θ, ρ̂)
F
− 2G (θ)λ− 1
2
∫ 1
θ
(z + ρ̂ (z)) dG (z)
+
1
2
(1 +G (θ)) (θ + ρ̂ (θ))
]
ωg (θ)F
1− δ (1− ω)− δω (1− λ)G (θ)2 (29)
= W (θ)
ωg (θ)F
1− δ (1− ω)− δω (1− λ)G (θ)2
where W (θ) is defined as the expression in the square brackets. This definition will prove useful in step 3.
Let θ̂ be such that ∂V (θ,ρ̂)∂θ
∣∣∣
θ=θ̂
≥ 0. Rewriting this inequality using (29) produces
1
2
(
θ̂ + ρ̂
(
θ̂
))
≥
2G
(
θ̂
)
1 +G
(
θ̂
)
λ− δ (1− λ) V
(
θ̂, ρ̂
)
F
+
1− 2G
(
θ̂
)
1 +G
(
θ̂
)
 1
2
E
[
θ + ρ̂ (θ)| θ ≥ θ̂
]
where E [·] as previously is the expectations operator. To prove this step, it is sufficient to show that
1
2
E
[
θ + ρ̂ (θ)| θ ≥ θ̂
]
≥ λ− δ (1− λ)
V
(
θ̂, ρ̂
)
F
. (30)
The original inequality to be proved in this step can be rewritten using ρ̂ (θ) = η (θ, ρ̂) and (15) as
1
2
(
1 +G
(
θ̂
))
θ̂ +
1
2
(
1−G
(
θ̂
))
E
[
θ| θ ≥ θ̂
]
≥ λ− δ (1− λ)
V
(
θ̂, ρ̂
)
F
.
Due to step 1, this condition holds true for any F ≤ F if it is satisfied at F . Hence, I can in this step without
loss of generality assume F = F ≡ piCωλ . Now, insert V
(
θ̂, ρ̂
)
from (14) and F = F in (30) to get
1
2
E
[
θ + ρ̂ (θ)| θ ≥ θ̂
]
≥ λ. (31)
To prove that (31) is true, consider the leniency program
ρ˜ (θ) =
 1 if θ < θλ− ε if θ ≥ θ
where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small number. When F = F , V
(
θ, ρ˜
)
can be written approximately as
V
(
θ, ρ˜
) ≈ 1
2
ω
(
1−G (θ)2)F λ− E [θ| θ ≥ θ]
1− δ (1− ω)− δω (1− λ)G (θ)2 ≤ 0
for ε sufficiently small. From (15), this implies that η
(
θ, ρ˜
)
> λ. Also, η (1, ρ˜) = λ since V (1, ρ˜) = 0.
Now, due to the definition of ρ˜, the cut-off θ represents the unique equilibrium under ρ˜. Since ρ∗ minimizes
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V
(
θ, ρ
)
, it follows that V
(
θ, ρ∗
)
= V
(
θ, ρ̂
) ≤ V (θ, ρ˜) ≤ 0 such that η (θ, ρ̂) = ρ̂ (θ) ≥ λ for any cut-off
θ ≥ λ whether this is the optimal cut-off or not. Thus, (31) must hold which completes the step.
Step 3 V (θ, ρ̂) is strictly decreasing in θ for all θ < θ and strictly increasing in θ for all θ > θ.
Suppose that the statement is not true. Then, due to continuity of V , there exits a θ̂ 6= θ such that
∂V (θ,ρ̂)
∂θ
∣∣∣
θ=θ̂
= 0 and ∂
2V (θ,ρ̂)
∂θ2
∣∣∣
θ=θ̂
≤ 0. Differentiation of W (θ) from step 2 yields
∂W (θ)
∂θ
= 2δ (1− λ) g (θ) V (θ, ρ̂)
F
+ 2δ (1− λ) 1
F
G (θ)
∂V (θ, ρ̂)
∂θ
− 2g (θ)λ
+g (θ) (θ + ρ̂ (θ)) +
1
2
(1 +G (θ))
(
1 +
∂ρ̂ (θ)
∂θ
)
Insert the derivative of ρ̂ (θ) (which is derived in step 4 below) and the definition of W (θ) from step 2 and
rearrange to get
∂W (θ)
∂θ
=
1
2
g (θ)
(
θ + ρ̂ (θ)− 2
(
λ− δ (1− λ) V (θ, ρ̂)
F
))
+
1
2
(1 +G (θ))
+g (θ)
δω (1− λ)G (θ)
1− δ (1− ω)− δ (1− λ)G (θ)2W (θ) . (32)
At θ = θ̂, where W
(
θ̂
)
= 0 and ∂W (θ)∂θ
∣∣∣
θ=θ̂
≤ 0, (32) implies that
1
2
(
θ̂ + ρ̂
(
θ̂
))
< λ− δ (1− λ)
V
(
θ̂, ρ̂
)
F
which contradicts step 2.
Step 4 ρ∗ (θ) is strictly decreasing in θ for all θ ≥ θ.
Taking the derivative of ρ∗ (θ) for θ ≥ θ using (15) gives
∂ρ∗ (θ)
∂θ
=
∂ρ̂ (θ)
∂θ
=
∂η (θ, ρ̂)
∂θ
= −
g (θ)
(
θ + ρ̂ (θ)− 2
(
λ− δ (1− λ) V (θ,ρ̂)F
))
+ 2G (θ) δ (1− λ) 1F ∂V (θ,ρ̂)∂θ
1 +G (θ)
which is negative for all θ ≥ θ due to steps 2 and 3. 
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Part (i) The proof of Proposition 7 defines ρ∗ (θ) ≡ ρ̂ (θ) for all θ ≥ θ. The derivative of V (θ, ρ̂) with
respect to θ is given from (29). Since G (1) = 1, the derivative evaluated at θ = 1 is
V
(
θ, ρ̂
)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣∣
θ=1
=
[
2δ (1− λ) V (1, ρ̂)
F
− 2λ+ 1 + ρ̂ (1)
]
ωg (1)F
1− δ (1− ω)− δω (1− λ) .
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From (15), ρ̂ (1) = η (1, ρ̂) = λ− δ (1− λ) V (1,ρ̂)F . Insert this and simplify to get
∂V
(
θ, ρ̂
)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣∣
θ=1
=
[
1 + δ
V (1, ρ̂)
F
]
(1− λ)ωg (1)F
1− δ (1− λ)− δω (1− λ) > 0.
The sign is due to g (1) > 0 and V (1, ρ̂) ≥ 0 for all F ≤ F . Hence, at the optimal cut-off, θ < 1.
Part (ii) Since G (λ) = 0, the derivative evaluated at θ = λ can be reduced to
∂V
(
θ, ρ̂
)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣∣
θ=λ
=
[
−1
2
∫ 1
λ
(θ + ρ̂ (θ)) dG (θ) +
1
2
(λ+ ρ̂ (λ))
]
ωg (λ)F
1− δ (1− ω) .
Use, from (15), that ρ̂ (λ) = η (λ, ρ̂) =
∫ 1
λ
θdG (θ) to get
∂V
(
θ, ρ̂
)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣∣
θ=λ
=
1
2
[
λ−
∫ 1
λ
ρ̂ (θ) dG (θ)
]
ωg (λ)F
1− δ (1− ω) . (33)
Since g (λ) > 0, (33) demonstrates that at the optimal cut-off, θ > λ if and only if λ <
∫ 1
λ
ρ̂ (θ) dG (θ) where
the ”only if” statement follows from step 3 of the proof of Proposition 7 which finds that V
(
θ, ρ̂
)
is strictly
quasiconvex in θ. Let the threshold F̂ be such that λ =
∫ 1
λ
ρ̂ (θ) dG (θ). From (28), one gets
∂ρ̂ (θ)
∂F
= −2δ (1− λ)G (θ)
1 +G (θ)
∂ V
C(θ,ρ̂)
F
∂F
. (34)
Step 1 in the proof of Proposition 7 finds that V
C(θ,ρ̂)
F is strictly decreasing in F ; hence, due to (34), ρ̂ (θ)
is strictly increasing in F . This implies that λ <
∫ 1
λ
ρ̂ (θ) dG (θ) if and only if F > F̂ . Left is to show that
F̂ < F . In doing so, I use that ρ̂ (θ) > λ for all θ < 1 at F = F . This result was shown as part of step 2 in
the proof of Proposition 7. In effect, λ <
∫ 1
λ
ρ̂ (θ) dG (θ) when F = F . This proves that F̂ < F . 
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Optimal Leniency Programs with Case-Dependent Fine
Discounts
Frederik Silbye
Abstract
Contrary to the existing literature, this paper allows leniency programs to contingent the offered fine
discounts on the strength of the authorities’ case. I derive the optimal rule for determining fine discounts,
i.e. the rule that minimizes the extent of cartel activity. It is found that modest fine reductions should
be given even in the strongest case. This contradicts the US Corporate Leniency Program but favors
a European-style policy. Also, though it can be optimal to be more lenient the stronger the case is, I
show that reasonable parameter values provide the opposite conclusion. Likewise, it is optimal to apply
a less lenient policy, the stricter the enforcement environment is. Finally, the model demonstrates that if
antitrust sanctions are soft, it is optimal for authorities to disclose the strength of their case to the firms
allegedly colluding.
JEL Classification: K21; K40; L41
Keywords: Antitrust; Leniency; Cartels
1 Introduction
The fight against cartels took major leaps forward with the introduction of the US Corporate Leniency
Program in 1978 and its revision in 1993. The program allows the Department of Justice to exempt firms
which have been engaged in illegal cartel activity from government sanctions. The premise for immunity is
that the applicant submits information that incriminates itself and its fellow cartel members. The European
Commission followed suit and launched its own leniency program in 1996, revising the program in 2002. At
present, leniency is an integrated part of the antitrust legislation in most industrialized countries.
In recent years, leniency applications have unraveled a vast number of international cartels. A prominent
example is the vitamin cartel, which was prosecuted in the United States as well as under the auspices of
the European Union due to evidence provided by French cartel member, Rhoˆne-Poulenc. In the light of
the extensive usage of leniency programs, antitrust attorneys on both sides of the Atlantic have praised the
introduction of these programs as an absolute success.1 Still, one cannot leave out the possibility that the
1Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General at the Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice declares that ”the
Antitrust Division’s leniency program continues to be our greatest source of cartel evidence” (Barnett (2007)), and EU Com-
missioner Neelie Kroes states that ”The Commission leniency programme is proving to be an efficient and successful tool to
detect and punish cartels, destabilising those that exist and preventing those that might otherwise be created” (Kroes (2005)).
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high number of leniency applications is caused by enhanced cartel activity due to leniency programs’ reducing
expected sanctions. This calls for profound analyses of firms’ incentives when faced with a leniency program
and, ultimately, studies of the optimal policy design.
Recent contributions in the literature have gone a long way to shed light on these issues. The literature
identifies two major benefits of leniency: deterrence and desistance. A leniency program can deter collusion
by increasing expected sanctions and, thereby, making cartels unsustainable. In situations where deterrence
cannot be obtained, a leniency program can cause collusion to desist by increasing the probability that, in
the future, the cartel will make use of the program and end its activities.
The work most related to this paper is Harrington (2008). In a dynamic model with the detection
probability drawn in each period from a continuous distribution, he finds that full immunity granted to the
first self-reporting firm is optimal for most distributions. Moreover, he shows that leniency should not be
provided when the antitrust authorities’ case is sufficiently strong. However, the model presumes that a
cartel is always established, thus ignoring the deterrence element.
This paper searches for the optimal leniency policy by extending the work of Harrington in two ways.
First, contrary to most of the literature,2 I take both the deterrence effect and the desistance effect into
account. That is, I seek an optimal policy that renders collusion unsustainable or, if this cannot be achieved,
that minimizes the duration of the cartel. Second, I allow the leniency program to take into consideration
the strength of the authorities’ case prior to any assistance from leniency applications. Harrington (2008)
maintains a fixed fine discount when firms can qualify for leniency; in contrast, I consider much more general
leniency programs in which the fine discounts can be any function of the evidence that the authorities already
hold.
This sort of generality is needed when one wishes to compare the European and the US leniency programs.
Under US policy, a condition for a firm to obtain immunity is that ”The [Antitrust] Division, at the time the
corporation comes in, does not yet have evidence against the company that is likely to result in a sustainable
conviction”.3 If this condition is not fulfilled, the firm is not accepted in the program. The US program can
be seen as an immunity program, and Harrington (2008) finds support for exactly such a scheme. The EU
policy is much more complex. First of all, the European Commission stresses that a firm qualifies for leniency
as long as the evidence it provides ”represents significant added value with respect to the evidence already in
the Commission’s possession,”4 even when the evidence already in the hands of the Commission is sufficient
to convict the cartel with a high probability. Moreover, the concrete fine reduction offered depends on the
added value and, therefore, on the Commission’s evidence. In effect, to evaluate a European-style program
one has to consider fairly general leniency programs.
The issue of the optimal leniency design was first addressed by Motta and Polo (2003). They set up
a simple model with just two possible realizations of the detection probability. In their model, leniency is
capable of reducing the expected number of periods in which the cartel is active, but it cannot deter collusion
completely. This is due to the assumption that all firms qualify for the same degree of leniency no matter
2An exception is Chen and Rey (2006). However, they do not reach conclusive results for general distributions.
3See litra B.2 in the Coperate Leniency Policy, United States Department of Justice (1993).
4See litra 24 in the leniency notice, European Commission (2002).
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the order of self-reporting. They find that either full immunity or no leniency at all is optimal. Spagnolo
(2004) shows that full deterrence can be achieved if the antitrust authorities are allowed to reward whistle-
blowers. The first-best solution where the authorities exert no monitoring efforts at all can be obtained,
even without the reward exceeding the fines paid by the other cartel members, if the fine level is sufficiently
high. Other contributions are Hinloopen (2005) and Motchenkova (2004). The innovation of the former is
detection probabilities that change over time. The latter sets up a game in continuous time to better cope
with the ”race to the courthouse”. Finally, Aubert, Kovacic and Rey (2006) follow a completely different
approach and focus on leniency to individual managers and the agency problem within the firm.
I follow Harrington (2008) and consider a dynamic model where the probability that the authorities
themselves are able to establish a breach of competition law in court is drawn in each period from a continuous
distribution. This probability measures the strength of the authorities’ case. But contrary to Harrington
(2008), I allow for a richer leniency structure where the authorities can contingent the fine reduction on the
present conviction probability.
The main finding of the paper is to derive the optimal rule for determining fine discounts as a function of
the evidence collected in the investigation. This rule has two important implications. The first implication is
that it is optimal to accept leniency applications even then the evidence collected is sufficient to convict the
cartel with a high probability. In such cases additional evidence from the leniency program only strengthens
the authorities’ case, and the authorities just have to come up with a very modest fine reduction to make
firms report. This favors a European-style program and contradicts the US policy and the conclusions in
Harrington (2008). The second implication is that it can be optimal, depending on the distribution of
detection probabilities, to let the fine discounts depend positively on the amount of collected evidence. This
result is somewhat counter-intuitive; one would normally expect lower discount when the authorities hold a
stronger case. Still, I show that the relationship is globally negative in examples with reasonable parameter
values. Comparative statics reveal that in the optimal solution, the fine reductions depend negatively on the
strictness of the enforcement environment. That is, less leniency is needed the more collusion is investigated
and punished. Also, lower fine discounts are needed when the cartel includes more firms. Finally, I show that
it is beneficial for the antitrust authorities to disclose information about the outcome of their investigations
if the fines are low. If the information is not disclosed, the expected punishment is not sufficiently severe to
induce firms to make use of the leniency program.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a generalized leniency model in a repeated game setting.
Section 3 derives the collusive equilibrium, and Section 4 characterizes the optimal leniency program. A few
comparative statics are provided in Section 5. In Section 6, I analyze whether authorities should disclose
information about the outcome of their investigation, while Section 7 concludes. All proofs are collected in
the Appendix.
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2 The Model
This section introduces a model where n identical firms repeatedly interact in the market. The firms con-
template forming a cartel in which case they are subject to government sanctions if caught. In each period
of collusion, the cartel risks being investigated, taken to court, and possibly convicted.
The Antitrust Authority (AA) investigates the industry with probability ω ∈ (0, 1). An investigation
implies that the AA collects evidence on the alleged infringement of competition law and presents this
evidence in court. The strength of the AA’s case is measured by λ which is the probability that the collected
evidence is sufficient to lead to a conviction of the cartel. If the cartel is convicted, each firm pays the fine
F > 0 which can be perceived as the sum of all losses derived from a conviction.
As in Harrington (2008), λ is stochastic to account for the fact that investigations can have a variety
of different outcomes. A high realization of λ is a result of the AA finding large amounts of incriminating
evidence. The investigation outcome, λ, is distributed on the unit interval according to the cumulative
distribution function G : [0, 1]→ [0, 1].5
If investigated, colluding firms can apply for leniency instead of awaiting the court’s decision. A leniency
applicant confesses its own involvement in the cartel, and, furthermore, the firm’s testimony enables the
authorities to convict the other firms. The firm applying for leniency pays the reduced fine ρF while the
n − 1 remaining firms pay the full fine. Only the first firm to come forward is eligible for leniency, and, if
more than one firm decide to report, each has an equal chance of getting the reduced fine.
Contrary to Harrington (2008), I allow the reduced fines to depend on λ. The idea is that the AA might
wish to be less lenient if it hold a strong case, i.e. if its own investigation has found valuable evidence.
Therefore, a leniency program is a function that to every λ assigns a fine discount, i.e. ρ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]. Note
that ρ (λ) measures the ”inverse” fine discount associated with a given λ. The actual discount is 1 − ρ (λ).
Since ρ is required to be non-negative, firms cannot be literally rewarded for testifying. In contrast, Spagnolo
(2004) analyzes the effects of such rewards schemes.
If a firm reports or if the cartel is convicted for some other reason, the firms are precluded from making
a new cartel in all subsequent periods. One can justify this assumption by presuming that the AA closely
monitors the industry in the future, making resumed collusion impossible. In comparison, Motchenkova (2004)
assumes that the cartel is re-started right after a conviction, whereas Motta and Polo (2003) introduce a
one-period lag before re-start. As I do, Harrington (2008) also does not allow the cartel to be continued.
Firms choose in each period either to collude or to compete. In periods of mutual collusion, each firm
realizes gross profits piC > 0, whereas profits to each firm are normalized to zero if all firms compete. The
latter situation is assumed to be the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game. The best response if all
other firms collude yields profits piD > piC .
Before any actions take place, the Antitrust Authority (AA) commits to a leniency program. Observing
this, the n firms decide collectively whether or not to form a cartel. If a cartel is formed, the firms engage in
a repeated game with the following stage game:
5The only structure put on G is that it is required to be twice differentiable and strictly increasing. This means that the
distribution has no point masses and has full support on the unit interval.
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1. Each firm decides simultaneously whether to collude or compete.
2. The AA initiates an investigation of the industry with probability ω. If an investigation starts, the
game moves on to step 3. If not, the game restarts.
3. The probability that the cartel is convicted as a result of the investigation, λ, is realized. The realization
is common knowledge.
4. The firms decide individually, but simultaneously, whether to report to the AA when observing λ. If at
least one firm reports, the game ends. If no firm reports, the game moves on to step 5.
5. The investigation concludes in the cartel being found guilty with probability λ. If the cartel is convicted,
all n firms pay F , and the game ends. If the cartel is not convicted, the game restarts.
I assume above that the outcome of a potential investigation λ, is observed by the AA as well as the
colluding firms. That also the firms observe λ can be justified in two ways. Either because the firms know,
after having interacted in the market, how much evidence there is to be found, or because the AA discloses
the outcome of the investigation, voluntarily or involuntarily. I further discuss this issue in Section 6.
3 A Collusive Equilibrium
This section characterizes a collusive subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Firms have to make two decisions:
whether to collude or compete in step 1 and, given λ, whether to report in step 4. The latter decision can
be formalized by a so-called reporting plan which determines for every possible λ whether a firm reports or
not. If firm i is the typical firm, denote its reporting plan Λi. In fact, Λi is a subset of [0, 1] in such a way
that firm i reports given λ if and only λ ∈ Λi.6
In equilibrium, all firms must comply with the same reporting plan. To see why, note that if one firm
reports, it is optimal for all other firms to do the same in order to have a chance of getting the reduced fine.
Hence, Λi = Λ for all i = 1, ..., n. The value of collusion V (Λ, ρ) given a reporting plan Λ and a leniency
program ρ is for each firm
V (Λ, ρ) = piC + (1− ω) δV (Λ, ρ)− ω
∫
Λ
(
1
n
ρ (λ)F +
n− 1
n
F
)
dG (λ) +
ω
∫
[0,1]\Λ
((1− λ) δV (Λ, ρ)− λF ) dG (λ) (1)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the common discount factor. The first two terms on the right-hand side are per-
period collusive profits piC and discounted future net profits when an investigation is not initiated. The third
term is expected fines when there is an investigation and firms report. One firm pays the reduced fine ρ (λ)F ,
whereas the other n− 1 firms all pay the full fine F . The fourth term is discounted future net profits when
6Since no restrictions is put on ρ (λ), it is necessary to stick to this generalized formulation where a reporting plan is any
subset of the unit interval.
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the cartel does not report during an investigation. With probability λ, the cartel is detected and each firm
pays F . With probability 1− λ, the cartel continues in the next period.
The sign of V (Λ, ρ) might differ depending on Λ. However, the following inequality, which will be useful
later, must hold true:
V (Λ, ρ) + F > 0 for all Λ. (2)
To see that (2) is true, consider the worst-case scenario where the cartel is convicted right away, and no
firms apply for leniency. In this case, the cartel value is piC − F . That is, (2) is fulfilled even under such
unfortunate conditions.
For a given reporting plan Λ to be supported as a collusive equilibrium, the firms must have sufficient
incentives to collude in step 1. I restrict firms to follow standard grim trigger strategies.7 Thus, firms collude
until one or more firms compete; in response, the cartel is dissolved and the firms compete in all future
periods. No firm will compete given that all firms have colluded thus far whenever
V (Λ, ρ) ≥ piD. (3)
A colluding firm gets the cartel value V (Λ, ρ), while a deviating firm receives piD in the period of deviation
followed by zero profits in all future periods. I follow Motta and Polo (2003) and assume that the deviating
firm is not subject to sanctions. Since the AA wishes to encourage deviations, it should avoid penalizing
deviators. Though it is not explicitly modeled, suppose that firms can also apply for leniency before an
investigation has been launched. The firms will use this option if and only if they are deviating, and it is
optimal for the AA to give full immunity in such cases. In fact, all penalties are waived for firms applying
spontaneously in the US and in the EU on condition that the authorities have not yet received information
about the cartel from other sources.
Additionally, the firms must find it individually rational to comply with the reporting plan Λ. As argued
above, all firms automatically report for any λ ∈ Λ given the belief that all other firms do the same. To
deter firms from reporting when the reporting plan dictates firms not to do so, the following condition must
be satisfied:
(1− λ) δV (Λ, ρ)− λF > −ρ (λ)F for all λ /∈ Λ. (4)
The left-hand side is the ex post cartel value; the right-hand side is the value of reporting and obtaining
leniency. I apply the tie-break rule that firms report in case of indifference. This choice ensures that an
optimal policy exists, but it is not in any other way crucial for the results. Solving (4) for ρ (λ) gives
ρ (λ) > λ− δ (1− λ) V (Λ, ρ)
F
≡ η (λ; Λ, ρ) . (5)
It is instructive to interpret η (λ; Λ, ρ) as the risk of not reporting. This risk consists of two parts. The first
part, λ, is the immediate risk of being fined; the remaining part is expected and discounted future profits.
7This is in line with Motta and Polo (2003) and Harrington (2008). Spagnolo (2004), on the other hand, focuses on optimal
penal codes. In my model, optimal punishment will complicate matters considerably since the value of the punishment paths
will depend on ρ. For this reason, I only consider simple trigger strategies.
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Since this is a gain, it must be deducted from the risk. Note that η (λ; Λ, ρ) increases with λ due to (2). This
is not surprising; firms will demand a smaller fine discount in return for testifying when the risk of conviction
is higher.
Any reporting plan Λ that satisfies (3) and (4) can be supported as a collusive equilibrium. However, a
wide range of reporting plans can potentially be supported. To resolve this problem, I assume that firms in
case of multiple collusive equilibria coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium which is the reporting
plan that maximizes the value of collusion. Given an arbitrary leniency program ρ, let Λ (ρ) be the Pareto
dominant reporting plan. Formally,
Λ (ρ) ∈ arg max
Λ
V (Λ, ρ) st. (4)
No matter the leniency program, at least one reporting plan satisfies (4): the one where firms report for all
λ. If any reporting plan satisfies (3) in addition to (4), Λ (ρ) will do so as well. Hence, a cartel is formed if
and only if
V
(
Λ (ρ) , ρ
) ≡ V (ρ) ≥ piD. (6)
where V (ρ) is the highest value obtainable if firms always collude in step 1.
Lemma 1, which makes use of the convenient short form η (λ; ρ) ≡ η (λ; Λ (ρ) , ρ), characterizes the Pareto
dominant reporting plan.
Lemma 1 λ ∈ Λ (ρ) if and only if ρ (λ) ≤ η (λ; ρ).
The ”only if” statement, which is the most interesting, demonstrates that the cartel reports only if firms
would have reported anyway. To put it differently, the cartel avoids using the leniency program if it is not
forced to do so. The intuition behind the result is that the leniency program inflicts a negative externality
on the cartel, and the impact of this externality is minimized when the program is used as little as possible.
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the cartel’s preferred reporting plan given some arbitrary leniency
program.
4 The Optimal Leniency Program
The objective of the AA in the model is to minimize the extent of collusion, in other words, to minimize
the expected duration of the cartel. This objective is twofold. First of all, the AA seeks to render collusion
unsustainable by committing to a leniency program such that (6) is violated. However, if cartels cannot be
completely deterred, the AA seeks to make them as short-lived as possible. The latter is the desistance effect
of leniency.
Let T (ρ) denote the expected duration of the cartel if firms always collude in step 1. Then,
T (ρ) =
1
ω
(∫
[0,1]\Λ(ρ) λdG (λ) +
∫
Λ(ρ)
dG (λ)
) > 0 (7)
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η (λ; ρ)
ρ (λ)
Λ (ρ)
Figure 1: Illustration of the Pareto dominant reporting plan.
where the denominator is the per-period probability that the cartel is detected, either by means of the
leniency program or due to the AA’s own investigation efforts. Note that T (ρ) decreases when the cartel
applies a reporting plan that involves more frequent reporting.
Recalling the criterion for sustainability in (6), the factor to be minimized by the AA, i.e. the expected
equilibrium cartel duration, is
T (ρ) =
 0 if V (ρ) < piDT (ρ) if V (ρ) ≥ piD . (8)
When collusion is unsustainable, the duration is zero. When collusion is sustainable, the duration follows
from (7). Thus, the optimal leniency program, ρ∗, is defined as
ρ∗ ∈ arg min
ρ
T (ρ) .
It is indeed possible that multiple programs lead to T (ρ) = 0. In order to get a unique solution also
in situations like this, let the optimal leniency program be the one of these that minimizes the value of
collusion, V (ρ). To justify this choice, suppose piD is unknown to the AA. One can interpret piD as an
(inverse) measure of the cartel’s internal stability, and it seems reasonable to assume that this stability is
not always observed by the authorities. As Lemma 2 will reveal below, by minimizing the cartel value, one
also minimizes the cartel duration when the cartel cannot be fully deterred. Hence, by minimizing the cartel
value, the AA optimizes no matter the cartel’s internal stability.
In order to derive ρ∗, let me first discuss in brief the effects of a leniency program. Larger fine discounts
affect V (ρ) directly but also indirectly through the cartel’s choice of reporting plan, Λ (ρ). Firstly, for a fixed
reporting plan, V (Λ, ρ) increases when the leniency program, ρ, becomes more generous. This is the direct
effect reflecting the fact that the cartel expects to make use of the leniency program in the future. Secondly,
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keeping the second argument in V (Λ, ρ) fixed, a more lenient policy induces reporting and, thus, narrows
down the range of incentive compatible reporting plans from which the cartel can choose. This indirectly
reduces V (Λ, ρ) by forcing the cartel members to choose a less favorable reporting plan with more frequent
reporting. The intuition is that the leniency program creates a Prisoners’ Dilemma in which it is a dominant
strategy for each firm to report even though this inflicts a negative externality on the other firms. Balancing
these the two effects leads to the optimal leniency.
Before deriving ρ∗, a preliminary result is needed. At the very first, define λ̂ (ρ) as the solution to
η (λ; ρ) = 0. Since η (λ; ρ) is linear and increasing, this equation has a unique solution. Also, λ̂ (ρ) < 1
since η (1; ρ) = 1. As λ̂ (ρ) can be negative, define λ∗ (ρ) ≡ max
{
0, λ̂ (ρ)
}
. The verbal interpretation is that
reporting can be induced only for λ ≥ λ∗ (ρ) without violating the constraint that ρ cannot assume negative
values. Now, Lemma 2 characterizes the optimal leniency program,
Lemma 2 The optimal leniency program ρ∗
(i) minimizes the value of a sustainable cartel, V (ρ),
(ii) minimizes the duration of a sustainable cartel, T (ρ),
(iii) induces the cartel to apply the reporting plan Λ (ρ∗) = [λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1].
Results (i) and (ii) reveal that the optimal leniency rule is optimal in terms of deterrence as well as in
terms of desistance. In other words, no conflict exists between these two objectives. Seeing reporting as
a negative externality, the finding is not really surprising. The AA can minimize the value of collusion by
inducing reporting whenever this can be done; i.e. as long as η (λ; ρ) is non-negative. Recall from Lemma
1 that ρ (λ) must be set equal to or below η (λ; ρ) to force the cartel to report. When λ < λ∗ (ρ∗), η (λ; ρ∗)
is negative and the AA does not have the means to induce reporting. This last argument provides the
intuition for result (iii) which states that the cartel reports if and only if λ exceeds the cut-off value λ∗ (ρ∗).
The existence of such a cut-off demonstrates that the cartel only reports when the probability of conviction
is sufficiently high. To illustrate results (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 2, Figure 2 shows two different leniency
programs, ρ1 and ρ2. According to the Lemma, only ρ1 is a candidate for the optimal rule.
Lemma 2 allows me to ignore desistance and solely concentrate on minimizing the value of collusion.
Proposition 1 provides the solution.
Proposition 1 At the optimal leniency policy,
ρ∗ (λ) = λ− δ (1− λ) V ([λ, 1] , ρ
∗)
F
for all λ ≥ λ∗ (ρ∗) (9)
where 0 ≤ λ∗ (ρ∗) < 1.
The Proposition presents a simple rule for determining the optimal fine discount. If the AA holds a case
corresponding to λ′, (9) states that the discount should be set such that the firms are just willing to report
if it was the case that the cartel in the future would report only for λ ≥ λ′. In reality, the cartel reports for
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Figure 2: Two leniency programs: only ρ1 satisfies Lemma 2.
all λ ≥ λ∗ (ρ∗); therefore, the firms are only indifferent between reporting and not when λ = λ∗ (ρ∗). For
all λ > λ∗ (ρ∗), reporting is strictly preferred to not reporting. But if firms are not indifferent, what keeps
the AA from reducing the fine discounts? The answer is that if the AA reduces the fine discount for some
λ′′ > λ∗ (ρ∗), then it suddenly becomes incentive compatible for the cartel to report only when λ > λ′′, and
such a leniency program allows the cartel to report less and obtain a higher cartel value.
0 1
0
1
λ
λ1 λ2
ρ∗ (λ1)
ρ∗ (λ2)
η (λ; {λ2} , ρ∗)
η (λ; ∅, ρ∗)
Figure 3: Construction of the optimal leniency program.
Figure 3 illustrates how ρ∗ is constructed if, for the sake of the argument, it is assumed that λ is restricted
to be either λ1 or λ2. First, the AA ensures that the cartel cannot refrain from using the leniency program
at all, i.e. that the cartel cannot maintain the reporting plan Λ = ∅. This is ensured by the choice of ρ∗ (λ2)
Second, by determining ρ∗ (λ1), the AA ensures, that the cartel cannot restrict itself to reporting only at λ2.
78
Optimal Leniency Programs with Case-Dependent Fine Discounts
The procedure continues like this, if more possible realizations of λ are added.
In Figure 3, the AA first ensures that the cartel will report at λ2, then at λ1. However, it is not trivial
that it is optimal to ”start backwards”. Perhaps, the cartel value will be lower if the sequence instead is
λ1 first and λ2 second? Nevertheless, the proof of Proposition 1, though it is rather elaborate, shows that
the ”reversed sequence” is optimal for all possible parameter values. Although many effects are in play, the
dominating effect is this. When the AA enforces the cartel to report at some λ, it decreases the future value
of collusion implying that firms are more willing to report at some other λ′. In effect, the AA can offer a
lower fine discount at λ′ and still achieve reporting. The lower λ′ is, the greater is the extent to which the
fine discount can be decreased since any reduction in the value of future collusion has more impact on the
incentive to report when the probability that the cartel survives and lives to see the future, 1− λ′, is bigger.
Thus, this argument states that in Figure 3 the AA should first enforce reporting at λ2, then at λ1.
With a well-defined solution for ρ∗ in hand, Proposition 2 lists two properties of the optimal leniency
program.
Proposition 2 For all λ ∈ (λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1),
(i) ρ∗ (λ) < 1,
(ii) ∂ρ
∗(λ)
∂λ Q 0 if and only if G′ (λ) R
(
1 + 1−δδω −
∫ λ
0
(1− z) dG (z)
)
n
n−1
1
(1−λ)2 .
Result (i) in Proposition 2 states that the optimal leniency program grants fine discounts even when λ
is close to 1. In other words, firms are eligible for leniency no matter how strong a case the AA holds. Even
when its case is strong, the AA can improve it by obtaining evidence through the leniency program, and the
firms are willing to report in return for very modest fine discounts. The result contradicts Harrington (2008).
He restricts the leniency program to be of the form
ρ (λ) =
 ρ if λ < λ1 if λ ≥ λ
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant and λ ∈ [0, 1] is some threshold also determined by the AA. Harrington (2008)
finds that restricted eligibility, λ < 1, is optimal given reasonable assumptions on the distribution of λ. This
favors a US-style policy. In my model, the AA can contingent the fine discount on λ and, thus, it is optimal
to offer a small degree of leniency even when λ is close to one. This result supports an EU-style policy.
The result in (ii) is more subtle. One will, at first, suppose that it must be optimal to offer a larger
fine reduction (lower ρ∗ (λ)) in return for firm testimonies when the AA holds a weaker case (lower λ). The
argument is this. When λ is low and the cartel faces only a modest risk of detection, more leniency is
necessary to induce firms to come forward. Indeed, this is the dominant effect in most situations, and the
leniency program will be as depicted in Figure 3. However, as (ii) reveals, there are exemptions. For some
λ-distributions where the probability density, G′ (λ), is high in certain regions, it is optimal, locally, to offer
higher fine discounts in stronger cases.
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The reason why this slightly counter-intuitive situation can occur is given in Figure 4, which is identical
to Figure 3 except that λ2 has been moved closer to λ1. It is evident from Figure 4 that ρ∗ (λ) is locally
decreasing. Also, λ1 and λ2 being close together corresponds to a high density in this region. Two effects
are present. First, when λ becomes lower, the pressure to report is less immense and larger fine discount are
needed. This is the intuitive effect described above, and it follows from (9) if one keeps V fixed. Second,
when λ becomes lower, ρ∗ (λ) is constructed such as to make the firms indifferent between reporting and not
reporting given that the cartel will report more frequently in the future, i.e. given a lower future cartel value.
This tends to make firms more willing to report, and, hence, a lower fine discount is needed. Mathematically,
this second effect arises from (9) if one keeps λ fixed and only changes V . In regions where the probability
density is high, a slight reduction in λ will have a big impact on V and the second effect dominates. Figure
4 provides an example of this.
0 1
0
1
λ
λ1 λ2
ρ∗ (λ1)
ρ∗ (λ2)
η (λ; {λ2} , ρ∗)
η (λ; ∅, ρ∗)
Figure 4: Example of downward-sloping leniency program.
It is of interest to analyze when something like Figure 4 is likely to happen. One can show from Proposition
2, result (ii), that ρ∗ (λ) is globally increasing given a uniform distribution. However, if the probability mass
is less dispersed; that is, if there is little variety in the quality and the outcomes of antitrust investigations,
the result might be different. To shed some light on this issue, I compute a few numerical examples of
the optimal leniency program using beta distributions which cover a wide range of distributions on the
unit interval. Figure 5 illustrates ρ∗ (λ) for beta distributions with different means and variances and the
parameter values n = 4, piC = 1, δ = .95, ω = .2, and F = 2. If one period is equivalent to one year, δ = .95
reflects approximately a 5 percent annual discount rate. Moreover, most empirical evidence suggests that ω
is in the interval .1 to .2 whereas the mean value of λ is between .5 and .8.8 Finally, a fine level of twice the
annual gain of collusion is in line with the US Sentencing Guidelines.9 To allow for an even higher penalty
if one adds private damages and loss of reputation, I also consider F = 4.
8See Connor (2003).
9See United States Sentencing Commission (2007), §8C. The European Commission can impose fines not exceeding 10 per
cent of firm turnover (European Commission (2003)).
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Figure 5: Optimal leniency programs given beta distributions.
A comparison of panels (a) and (b) in Figure 5 indicates that a very low variance is required to make ρ∗ (λ)
locally decreasing. This can be interpreted as if investigations always are of almost the same quality. However,
one would expect to see a great deal of variation in terms of quality and outcomes across investigations. Hence,
a very low variance does not seem particularly plausible. If the mean is increased to .8 as in panels (c) and (d),
ρ∗ (λ) is globally increasing. The reason is that the right-hand side in (ii) goes to infinity when λ approaches
1. Also, panel (b) indicates that the fine level must be fairly high to produce the downward slope. If, in
contrast, F is low, the incentive for the firms to stay in the cartel is stronger and larger fine discounts are
needed. However, this is likely to collide with the constraint that negative values of ρ are not allowed.
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5 Comparative Statics
The optimal level of fine discounts depends on the antitrust enforcement environment reflected in the fine
level F and the efforts put into monitoring industries. The monitoring efforts of the AA is measured by
ω, which can be interpreted as the fraction of industries investigated each period. I take F and ω to be
exogenous. The size of cartel penalties are in general determined by political and moral concerns, whereas
the fine in the specific case is in most jurisdictions based on the severity of the cartel’s activities. The
number of investigations in a given period is to a large extent decided by the budget allocated to antitrust
enforcement. Proposition 3 demonstrates how changes in these parameters, along with the number of firms
n and the discount factor δ, affect the optimal leniency program.
Proposition 3 For all λ ∈ [λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1), the optimal fine discount, 1− ρ∗ (λ), decreases whenever
(i) F increases,
(ii) ω increases,
(iii) n increases,
(iv) δ decreases and λ∗ (ρ∗) > 0.
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 demonstrate that a less lenient policy is needed, the more strict the
enforcement environment is in itself. This emphasizes that leniency is a substitute to traditional enforcement
remedies such as punishment and monitoring. The underlying intuition is basically the same in both parts.
Harsher punishment or a bigger chance of being investigated decrease the future gains of collusion. Hence,
firms are more willing to report as the resulting loss of future profits is less severe.
Part (iii) finds that smaller fine discounts are needed when the cartel includes more firms. The reason
is that only one firm can obtain leniency. Thus, if the cartel expects to make use of the leniency program
in the future, it will be harder for the individual firm to get the fine discount when more firms are present.
This decreases future cartel profits which reduces the fine discount.
Finally, as showed in part (iv), the optimal fine discount decreases when firms are less patient. In such a
case, the cartel places less value on future cartel profits. For that reason, reporting is less costly and a lower
fine discount is needed to induce firms to come forward. However, one caveat in this context is that if the
future net cartel profits are negative because of a very efficient leniency program, the conclusion is reversed.
The condition that λ∗ (ρ∗) > 0 is sufficient to ensure that net cartel profits are positive.
It is instructive to get a feeling for the results by considering a specific example in which the size of the
fine varies. Table 1 derives the optimal leniency rule and a few other endogenous variables for different fine
levels. The example considers the uniform distribution and parameter values n = 4, δ = .95, ω = .2, and
F/piC ∈ {2, 4, 6}.
If F/piC = 2, a sustainable cartel survives on average more than 9 periods. Also worth noting is that
even if the AA holds enough evidence to establish an infringement of the antitrust regulations with 80
percent probability, the optimal fine reduction is fairly generous; 71 percent of the penalty is waived for a
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Fine-gain ratio F/piC 2 4 6
Fine discount 1− ρ∗ (.2) − − .87
- 1− ρ∗ (.4) − − .73
- 1− ρ∗ (.6) − .74 .53
- 1− ρ∗ (.8) .71 .39 .28
Cartel value V (ρ∗) 5.22 2.91 −.23
Report cut-off λ∗ (ρ∗) .71 .41 0
Cartel duration T˜ (ρ∗) 9.23 7.41 5
Table 1: Example with uniform distribution.
reporting firm. In this light, the EU program in which the first reporting firm only obtains a reduction in
the interval 30 to 50 percent seems insufficient. In the two right-most columns, the fines are doubled and
trebled, respectively. As found in Proposition 3, higher fines lead to lower fine discounts. In addition, and
not surprisingly, cartel values shrink and cartel durations fall. In the treble-case, the cartel value is negative;
that is, collusion is unprofitable and, therefore, unsustainable no matter the value of piD.
A reservation needs to be mentioned at this point. The model does not consider damages which in most
cartel cases account for a large part of the penalty. In the United States, a reporting firm also gets some
reduction in damage liabilities; in the EU, this is so far not possible. Hence, damages are likely to influence
the behavior of firms and have an impact on the numbers in Table 1.
6 Disclosure of the Investigation Outcome
So far, I have assumed that the firms observe the outcome of the AA’s investigation before deciding on
reporting. It seems plausible that the firms obtain some hint about λ, but that they do not observe λ
perfectly. In this section, I consider the opposite extreme where the firms have no posterior information
about λ. If this is the case, the previous analysis can be interpreted as if the AA credibly discloses the
outcome of its investigation to the firms. In effect, a comparison can bring insights on whether antitrust
authorities should provide the firms on trial with information about the conducted investigations before
going to court.
Assume that the firms (still) observe if an investigation is launched, but that they do not observe the
outcome, λ. Such a setting makes the firms’ strategy space particularly simple; they can either report or not
which in the previous notation corresponds to the reporting plans [0, 1] and ∅. For this reason, the AA have
nothing to gain from letting the fine discount depend on λ. Instead, a leniency program is hereafter just a
single number ρ ∈ [0, 1].
When the cartel does not report, i.e. when it chooses the reporting plan Λ = ∅, (1) becomes
V (∅, ρ) = piC + (1− ω) δV (∅, ρ) + ω
∫ 1
0
((1− λ) δV (∅, ρ)− λF ) dG (λ) = pi
C − ωλMF
1− δ (1− ωλM )
where λM ≡ ∫ 1
0
λdG (λ) is the mean λ. The value when the cartel reports, i.e. when it chooses the reporting
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plan Λ = [0, 1], is
V ([0, 1] , ρ) = piC + (1− ω) δV ([0, 1] , ρ)− ω
∫ 1
0
(
1
n
ρF − n− 1
n
F
)
dG (λ) =
piC − ω ( 1nρ+ n−1n )F
1− δ (1− ω) .
Given Λ = [0, 1], no firm wishes to deviate in the sense that they refrain from reporting whenever the cartel
is investigated. The underlying argument is thoroughly explained in section 3. When Λ = ∅, firms do not
report if and only if
ρ > λM − δ (1− λM) V (∅, ρ)
F
, (10)
which is an equilibrium condition equivalent to (5). Due to Lemma 1, the cartel chooses the reporting plan
Λ = ∅ if and only if (10) is fulfilled. Hence, since ρ by assumption cannot be negative, reporting can only
be implemented if the right-hand side of (10) is non-negative. This occurs when
F ≥ 1− λ
M
λM
δ
1− δ (1− ω)pi
C ≡ F ,
i.e. reporting can only implemented if the fine exceeds a minimum threshold. If F < F , leniency programs
are without effect. In the complementary case where F ≥ F , Proposition 4 derives the optimal leniency
program when λ is not observed by the firms and not disclosed by the AA.
Proposition 4 If the outcomes of investigations are not disclosed, the optimal leniency program is
ρ∗ = λM − δ (1− λM) V (∅, ρ)
F
whenever F ≥ F .
The advantage for the AA of keeping the outcome of its investigation secret is that the cartel might report
even in situations where the investigation has not produced much evidence and λ therefore is low. A major
disadvantage is that when λ is high and the AA holds a strong case, the AA cannot use its advantageous
position to offer only very low fine discounts. In jurisdictions where the fine level is low, disclosing the
investigation outcome when λ is high can be the only way to induce firms to come forward, whatsoever.
Firms only report if the expected fine is sufficiently high; thus, if F is low, the firms must be informed that
λ is unusually high to induce them to report. This last effect is formally described in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 If F < F , it is optimal to disclose the outcomes of investigations.
To conclude on Proposition 5: when antitrust penalties are soft and investigation results are kept secret,
the expected risk of conviction is not sufficient to induce reporting, and leniency has no impact on cartel
activity. On the contrary, when investigation results are disclosed, firms will find it optimal to report when
they are informed that the AA holds a strong case against them.
The next question is whether this conclusion changes when F ≥ F . Here, things become a bit more
blurred. If λ is not disclosed, firms report no matter λ. If a cartel is formed, the cartel therefore ceases to
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exist in a given period with probability ω. In contrast, firms might not report given a low value of λ in the
disclosure regime and, for this reason, the probability of ending a sustainable cartel in a given period is less
than ω. In effect, it is optimal for the AA to keep λ secret when only the desistance objective is taken into
account.
Comparing the two regimes in terms of deterrence requires a comparison of the cartel values. In this
context, Figure 6 considers a specific example. The Figure maps the relationship between fine levels and
cartel values. As in the example reported in Table 1, λ is uniformly distributed and the relevant parameters
are n = 4, piC = 1, δ = .95, and ω = .2.
2 4 6 8
−2
0
2
4
6
8
F
V (ρ∗)
Disclosure
No disclosure
Figure 6: The effect on cartel values of disclosing investigation outcomes.
For F < F = 3.96, the result in Proposition 5 is verified. However, when fines are of medium size, i.e.
when 3.96 < F < 5.75, the conclusion is reversed and it is optimal to keep investigation results secret. The
main effect behind this is that the secrecy forces the cartel to report even when λ is low. Finally, when
fines are high (F > 5.75) the conclusion flips once again in the favor of disclosure. When F increases, the
effect just mentioned becomes less important; instead, another effect favoring disclosure gains traction. Since
the fine discount in the no-disclosure regime is calculated on the basis of the cartel value when firms never
report, while the fine discount in the disclosure regime are calculated on the basis of the cartel value when
firms report for some λ’s, the latter will on average be lower. And when F is sufficiently large, firms report
sufficiently frequently to make this effect the dominating effect.
A related issue in this context, which remains to be touched upon, is whether the AA can credibly keep
the outcome of their investigations secret. In the model thus far, it has been assumed that the AA is able
to commit to a certain policy, but suppose for the moment that such commitment is not possible as regards
the disclosure of λ. Suppose further that the authorities try to pursue a no-disclosure policy. However, if the
AA observes λ > λM , it will have an incentive to reveal λ since the revelation will enable it to offer a smaller
fine discount and still make the firms report. Now, the firms know that whenever λ is not disclosed, it is
below the mean. Therefore, if the AA observes a λ only slightly below λM , disclosure will increase the firms’
expectation of λ such that a smaller fine discount can be offered. Repeated use of this argument demonstrates
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that the AA will disclose the outcome of its investigations, regardless of the outcome, if it cannot credibly
commit to a no-disclosure policy.
A leniency program is in its essence a way to institutionalize the plea bargaining process, and it can as
such be seen as a commitment device. By setting up the program, the authorities commit themselves to
grant reduced sanctions to firms that report their involvement in a cartel. It seems more difficult to extend
the commitment to investigation secrecy. It is easy to imagine government officials dropping a hint to the
lawyers of the indicted firms if the investigations have found large amounts of incriminating evidence.
Even if commitment is possible, more general disclosure policies than the two compared in this section
can be constructed. As a cross between the two extremes, the decision to disclose can be a function of λ
itself. A simple family of such disclosure rules is that λ is revealed if and only if it is above some cut-off,
λD. One can show that λD must be below one such that it is always optimal to disclose λ if it is sufficiently
large. To see why, note that it can only be optimal never to disclose λ, i.e. λD = 1, if firms report whenever
investigated. If the AA decreases λD marginally, the firms will still report when investigated. If λ < λD and
undisclosed, the optimal value of ρ is
ρ∗
(
λ < λD
)
= λM
(
λD
)− δ (1− λM (λD)) V ([λD, 1] ρ∗)
F
where
λM
(
λD
)
=
∫ λD
0
λdG (λ)
G (λD)
is the expected value of λ conditioned on λ < λD. Whenever λ ≥ λD, ρ∗ (λ) is given from (9). The expected
fine paid by the first-comer in the race to the courthouse is
E [ρ∗ (λ)F ] = G
(
λD
)
ρ∗
(
λ < λD
)
F +
∫ 1
λD
ρ∗ (λ) dG (λ)F.
Evaluating the derivative of this at λD = 1 yields
∂E [ρ∗ (λ)F ]
∂λD
∣∣∣∣
λD=1
= −δ 1− λ
M
F
∂V
([
λD, 1
]
ρ∗
)
∂λD
∣∣∣∣∣
λD=1
< 0.
The negative sign10 shows that the AA can increase the fines paid, and reduce the value of collusion, by
committing to a strategy where λD < 1. In other words, the AA should reveal the outcome of its investigations
whenever it holds a sufficiently strong case. Still, it is left for future research to determine the optimal
disclosure rule when also rules that cannot be represented by a cut-of is considered.
10Condition (21) in the Appendix verifies that
∂V ([λD,1]ρ∗)
∂λD
> 0
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7 Concluding Remarks
A growing literature has dealt with the optimal design of leniency programs. This paper complements this
work by adding a new dimension to leniency programs. The innovation of the paper is to allow fine discounts
to depend on the strength of the authorities’ case without firms testifying. In fact, this scheme is practised
in a handful of jurisdictions, e.g. in Europe.
I derive the best possible rule for determining fine discounts. This rule implies that it can be optimal to
be more lenient, the more incriminating evidence the authorities’ investigations have provided; however, the
optimal solution calls for lower fine discounts given reasonable parameter values. Also, a less lenient policy
is optimal, the stricter the enforcement environment is. On the other hand, a modest discount should be
granted even in cases where the authorities hold a strong case that is likely to lead to conviction. Hence,
not even the strongest case justifies denying firms access to the leniency program. These results supports an
EU-style leniency program compared to a US-style program. However, issues like verifiability, transparency,
and commitment problems have not been addressed in the paper, and including such factors might have an
impact in favor of the US policy.
Another policy dimension yet to be explored in the literature is whether the authorities should disclose
information about the strength of its case before going to court. If antitrust sanctions are low, this is
unambiguously optimal. When fines are high, the conclusions are more blurred. Nevertheless, the findings
indicate that total secrecy is not always to be preferred.
As a topic for further research, one might let the cartel members themselves decide on how λ is distributed.
For instance, if the cartel communicate less, there is less evidence to be found and probability mass is moved
to the left. The drawback of this could be a less efficient cartel and lower piC . When faced with a leniency
program, I conjecture that the cartel will be willing to give up cartel profits in order reduce the risk of getting
caught.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proving the ”if”-part, consider some λ /∈ Λ (ρ). Then, from (5), ρ (λ) > η (λ; ρ). Thus, if instead λ is such
that ρ (λ) ≤ η (λ; ρ), one gets λ ∈ Λ (ρ).
Next, consider the ”only if”-part. Let V˜
(
Λ, Λ˜, ρ
)
denote the value of following the reporting plan Λ
in the first period and the plan Λ˜ in all future periods. The problem of maximizing V (Λ, ρ) subject to Λ
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satisfying (4) is equivalent to
max
Λ
V˜
(
Λ,Λ (ρ) , ρ
)
st. ρ (λ) > η (λ; Λ, ρ) for all λ /∈ Λ. (11)
That is, Λ (ρ) solves problem (11). As a proof of contradiction, suppose there exists a set L ⊆ Λ (ρ) that has
a positive Lebesgue measure wrt. G11 and such that ρ (λ) > η (λ; ρ) for all λ ∈ L. Rearranging the latter
inequality gives
(1− λ) δV (ρ)− λF + ρ (λ)F > 0 for all λ ∈ L. (12)
Consider an alternative reporting plan Λ′ = Λ (ρ) \ L. This plan satisfies the constraint in problem (11). As
Λ (ρ) solves (11), the expected gain of following Λ′ for one period cannot be positive, i.e. it must hold that
V˜
(
Λ′,Λ (ρ) , ρ
)− V (ρ) = ∫
L
(
(1− λ) δV (ρ)− λF + 1
n
ρ (λ)F +
n− 1
n
F
)
dG (λ) ≤ 0. (13)
But (13) now contradicts (12) which completes the proof. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
I begin by proving (iii). Suppose on the contrary there exists a set L ⊆ [λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1] that has a positive
Lebesgue measure wrt. G and such that ρ∗ (λ) > η (λ; ρ∗) for all λ ∈ L. It then follows from Lemma 1 that
Λ (ρ∗) and L are disjoint. Construct the leniency program ρ such that ρ (λ) = η (λ; ρ∗) for all λ ∈ L and
ρ (λ) = ρ∗ (λ) for all λ /∈ L. Three cases can now occur.
First, suppose V (ρ) > V (ρ∗) such that η (λ; ρ) < η (λ; ρ∗) for all λ < 1. Then, given ρ and with the use
of Lemma 1, Λ (ρ) and L are disjoint which implies that Λ (ρ) satisfies (5) also when the cartel faces ρ∗. But
this contradicts Λ (ρ∗) being a maximizer given ρ∗ since Λ (ρ) is better.
Second, suppose that V (ρ) = V (ρ∗) such that η (λ; ρ) = η (λ; ρ∗) for all λ. From Lemma 1, Λ (ρ) =
Λ (ρ∗) ∪ L. Using (5), V (ρ) = V (ρ∗) must imply that
V (ρ∗)− V (ρ) =
∫
L
(
(1− λ) δV (ρ∗)− λF + 1
n
η (λ; ρ∗)F +
n− 1
n
F
)
dG (λ) =
n− 1
n
(
δV (ρ∗) + F
) ∫
L
(1− λ) dG (λ) = 0. (14)
However, since δV (ρ∗) + F > 0 due to (2), (14) cannot be not true.
Third, suppose that V (ρ) < V (ρ∗). If T (ρ∗) = 0, then this implies that also T (ρ) = 0. However, due to
the definition of optimality, the AA prefers ρ to ρ∗ since the former ensures the lowest cartel value. Therefore,
it must be that T (ρ∗) = T (ρ∗) > 0. The fact that V (ρ) < V (ρ∗) also implies that η (λ; ρ) > η (λ; ρ∗) for all
λ < 1 which yields Λ (ρ) ⊇ Λ (ρ∗) ∪ L. But now T (ρ) ≤ T (ρ) < T (ρ∗) = T (ρ∗). This again contradicts ρ∗
being optimal.
11In this and later proofs, all deviations are assumed to have a positive Lebesgue measure since zero measure deviations, per
definition, do not affect the value of collusion.
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The three cases show that a set like L cannot exist, i.e. ρ∗ (λ) ≤ η (λ; ρ∗) for all [λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1]. For all
[0, λ∗ (ρ∗)), ρ∗ (λ) ≥ 0 > η (λ; ρ∗) since ρ∗ cannot be negative and η is increasing in λ. From Lemma 1, it
then follows that Λ (ρ∗) = [λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1]. This proves (iii).
Finally, suppose that (i) holds and consider some arbitrary leniency rule ρ′. Due to (i), V (ρ′) ≥ V (ρ∗)
and, hence, η (λ; ρ′) ≤ η (λ; ρ∗) for all λ. Now, from the definition of λ∗ (ρ∗), one gets Λ (ρ′) ⊆ [λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1]
and, consequently, T (ρ′) ≥ T (ρ∗). This means that ρ∗ satisfies (ii). Hence, a leniency program that satisfies
(i), i.e. minimizes V (ρ), must be optimal since (i) and (ii) together are sufficient for optimality. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove the Proposition, two preliminary definitions are useful:
Definition Given G, divide the unit interval into m subintervals such that for subinterval i defined as
[λi, λi+1], G (λi+1)−G (λi) = 1m , i = 1, ...,m. Now define the discrete distribution Gm such that
Gm (λ) =
1
m
max {i ∈ {1, ...,m} |λi ≤ λ} .
In words, Gm puts probability mass 1m on each of the values λ1, λ2, ..., λm. The notation implies that
λ1 = 0 and λ1 < λ2 < ... < λm. Given Gm, the domain of ρ can be restricted to the discrete set {λ1, ..., λm}
and reporting plans Λ can be restricted to subsets of {λ1, ..., λm}. However, it will implicitly be assumed
that ρ (λ) = ρ (λi) for all λ ∈ [λi, λi+1).
Definition Let r : {1, ...,m} → {1, ...,m} be a bijective mapping. Given r, define Λr (z) = {λi| r (i) ≤ z}.
That is, r can be interpreted as a ranking of the elements in {1, ...,m}. Consequently, Λr (z) is the set of
λ’s having a rank in r not exceeding some number z. The proof proceeds in four steps.
Step 1 Let ρ∗m be the optimal leniency program given G
m. Ignoring the constraint that ρ ≥ 0 , there exists
a ranking r∗ such that
ρ∗m (λi) = η (λi; Λr∗ (r
∗ (i)− 1) , ρ∗m) for all i = 1, ...,m.
Due to Lemma 2, part (ii),
Λ (ρ∗m) = {λ1, ..., λm} (15)
if the constraint that ρ∗m cannot assume negative values is ignored. That is, the cartel must be forced to report
for all λ as this minimizes the duration of the cartel. Hence, there exists a j such that ρ∗m (λj) ≤ η (λj ;∅, ρ∗m).
If not, the cartel would not report for any λ due to Lemma 1. The AA puts ρ∗m (λj) = η (λj ;∅, ρ∗m) as
this minimizes V (ρ). Likewise, and from a similar argument, there exists a k 6= j such that ρ∗m (λk) =
η (λk; {λj} , ρ∗m). The same reasoning can be applied for all other λ’s such that one obtains a complete
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mapping ρ∗m. If r
∗ determines the sequence of this iterative process, ρ∗m (λi) = η (λi,Λr∗ (r
∗ (i)− 1) , ρ∗m) for
all i = 1, ...,m.
Step 2 r∗ (i) = m− i+ 1 for all i = 1, ...,m.
Consider a ranking r and a random pair j, k ∈ {1, ...,m} such that r (k) = r (j) + 1. That is, j is right
before k in the ranking. Using (5), define for all i = 1, ...,m
ρr (λi) = η (λi,Λr (r (i)− 1) , ρr) = λi − δ (1− λi) V (Λr (r (i)− 1) , ρr)
F
. (16)
If r = r∗, this is the optimal leniency program according to step 1. Recalling (1), the cartel value for some
i = 1, ...,m when the reporting plan Λr (r (i)) is applied is
V (Λr (r (i)) , ρr) = piC + (1− ω) δV (Λr (r (i)) , ρr)− ω 1
m
r(i)∑
z=1
(
1
n
ρr
(
λr−1(z)
)
F +
n− 1
n
F
)
+
1
m
ω
m∑
z=r(i)+1
(
1− λr−1(z)
)
δ
(
V (Λr (r (i)) , ρr)− λr−1(z)F
)
. (17)
Note that I use sums instead of integrals to cope with the discrete set of λ’s. From (17), V (Λr (r (j)) , ρr)
and V (Λr (r (j) + 1) , ρr) can be constructed. If V (Λr (r (j)) , ρr) ) as well as ρr (λj) and ρr (λk) from (16)
are plugged into V (Λr (r (j) + 1) , ρr), one gets after some rearranging that
V (Λr (r (j) + 1) , ρr) = V (Λr (r (j)− 1) , ρr)−
ω
n− 1
nm
δV (Λr (r (j)− 1) , ρr) + F
γr (j)
(
1− λk − (1− λj)
ωδ n−1nm (1− λk)− γr (j)
γr (j)− 1mωδ (1− λk)
)
(18)
where γr (j) ≡ 1− (1− ω) δ − 1mωδ
∑m
z=r(j)+2
(
1− λr−1(z)
)
.
As an alternative to r, I construct the alternative ranking r such that r (j) = r (k), r (k) = r (j), and
r (z) = r (z) for all z 6= j, k. The difference between r and r is that j and k have swapped positions. Note
first that V (Λr (r (k)− 1) , ρr) = V (Λr (r (j)− 1) , ρr) and γr (k) = γr (j). Then,
V (Λr (r (j) + 1) , ρr) = V (Λr (r (j)− 1) , ρr)−
ω
n− 1
nm
δV (Λr (r (j)− 1) , ρr) + F
γr (j)
(
1− λj − (1− λk)
ωδ n−1nm (1− λj)− γr (j)
γr (j)− 1mωδ (1− λk)
)
(19)
where, compared to (18), only λj and λk have been swapped. Now, put r = r∗. Since ρr∗ minimizes the
cartel value, i.e.
V (ρr) = V (Λr (m) , ρr) ≥ V (Λr∗ (m) , ρr∗) = V (ρr∗) .
Since r∗ and r are identical beyond j and k, this inequality is fulfilled if and only if V (Λr (r∗ (j) + 1) , ρr) ≥
V (Λr∗ (r∗ (j) + 1) , ρr∗). Using (18), (19), and (2), the latter inequality can be shown to be true if and only
if λj ≥ λk. By assumption, λj 6= λk. Hence, one have j > k for any j and k where r∗ (k) = r∗ (j) + 1.
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Iterative use of this conclusion implies that j > k for any j and k where r∗ (k) > r∗ (j). This proves that
r∗ (i) = m− i+ 1.
Step 3 Ignoring the constraint that ρ ≥ 0, the optimal leniency program given G is ρ∗ (λ) = λ−δ (1− λ) V ([λ,1],ρ∗)F .
Now, I return to the continuous distribution G. When m goes to infinity, Gm converges towards G in
distribution. Remember that ρ∗ minimizes V (ρ) given G. Hence, from (5) as well as steps 1 and 2,
ρ∗ (λ) = lim
m→∞ ρ
∗
m (λ) = η (λ; [λ, 1] , ρ
∗) = λ− δ (1− λ) V ([λ, 1] , ρ
∗)
F
.
Step 4 Taking the constraint that ρ ≥ 0 into account, ρ∗ (λ) = λ− δ (1− λ) V ([λ,1],ρ∗)F for all λ ≥ λ∗ (ρ∗).
The optimal leniency rate derived in step 3, ρ∗ (λ), is non-negative only for λ ≥ λ∗ (ρ∗). Hence, ρ∗ (λ)
is only a valid solution for these λ’s. For λ < λ∗ (ρ∗), is it not possible to induce reporting; hence, ρ∗ (λ)
can be any number in the unit interval. The question is now whether ρ∗ (λ) is still optimal for λ ≥ λ∗ (ρ∗)
when the constraint is applied. However, it is easily seen that this is in fact the case. Note that ρ∗ (λ′) for
any λ′ ≥ λ∗ (ρ∗) is a function of ρ∗ (λ) evaluated in the range (λ′, 1] and ρ∗ (λ) > 0 in this range. Hence, the
non-negativity constraint is not impacting ρ∗ for λ ≥ λ∗ (ρ∗). 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i) Since V ([λ, 1] , ρ∗) + F > 0 due to (2), it follows directly from (9) that ρ∗ (λ) < 1 for all λ ∈
(λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1).
Part (ii) Taking the derivative of (9) with respect to λ yields
∂ρ∗ (λ)
∂λ
= 1 + δ
V ([λ, 1] , ρ∗)
F
− δ 1− λ
F
∂V ([λ, 1] , ρ∗)
∂λ
. (20)
To get the last term in (20), I derive from (1),
∂V ([λ, 1] , ρ∗)
∂λ
=
ωG′ (λ)
1− δ (1− ω)− δω ∫ λ
0
(1− z) dG (z)
[
(1− λ) δV ([λ, 1] , ρ∗)− λF + 1
n
ρ∗ (λ)F +
n− 1
n
F
]
=
(1− λ)ωG′ (λ)
1− δ (1− ω)− δω ∫ λ
0
(1− z) dG (z)
n− 1
n
(δV ([λ, 1] , ρ∗) + F ) (21)
where (9) is used to obtain the last expression. Inserting (20) in (21) and rearranging gives
∂ρ∗ (λ)
∂λ
=
(
1− n− 1
n
(1− λ)2 δωG′ (λ)
1− δ (1− ω)− δω ∫ λ
0
(1− z) dG (z)
)
δV ([λ, 1] , ρ∗) + F
F
(22)
Hence, since δV ([λ, 1] , ρ∗) + F > 0 due to (2), (ii) now follows directly from (22). 
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i) Rearranging (1) when Λ = [λ, 1] gives
V ([λ, 1] , ρ∗)
F
=
piC
F − ω
∫ λ
0
zdG (z)− ω ∫ 1
λ
(
1
nρ
∗ (z) + n−1n
)
dG (z)
1− (1− ω) δ − ωδ ∫ λ
0
(1− z) dG (z)
. (23)
Taking the derivative of ρ∗ (λ) from (9) with respect to F yields
∂ρ∗ (λ)
∂F
= −δ (1− λ)
[
dV ([λ,1],ρ
∗)
F
dF
+
∫ 1
λ
∂ V ([λ,1],ρ
∗)
F
∂ρ∗ (z)
∂ρ∗ (z)
∂F
dG (z)
]
for all λ ≥ λ∗ (ρ∗) . (24)
It is easily seen from (23) that d
V ([λ,1],ρ∗)
F
dF < 0 for all λ ∈ [λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1] and
∂
V ([λ,1],ρ∗)
F
∂ρ∗(z) < 0 for all λ ∈ [λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1).
Thus, for λ sufficiently close to 1, ∂ρ
∗(λ)
∂F > 0. Now, it follows from repeated use of (24) that
∂ρ∗(λ)
∂F > 0 for
all λ ∈ [λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1).
Part (ii) The derivative of ρ∗ (λ) with respect to ω is
∂ρ∗ (λ)
∂ω
= −δ (1− λ)
[
dV ([λ,1],ρ
∗)
F
dω
+
∫ 1
λ
∂ V ([λ,1],ρ
∗)
F
∂ρ∗ (z)
∂ρ∗ (z)
∂ω
dG (z)
]
for all λ ≥ λ∗ (ρ∗) . (25)
Differentiation of (23) yields
dV ([λ,1],ρ
∗)
F
dω
= −
(1− δ)
(∫ λ
0
zdG (z) +
∫ 1
λ
(
1
nρ
∗ (z) + n−1n
)
dG (z)
)
+ δ pi
C
F
(
1− ∫ λ
0
(1− z) dG (z)
)
(
1− (1− ω) δ − ωδ ∫ λ
0
(1− z) dG (z)
)2
which is negative for all λ ∈ [λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1]. Thus, for λ sufficiently close to 1, ∂ρ∗(λ)∂ω > 0. Repeated use of (25)
now proves that ∂ρ
∗(λ)
∂ω > 0 for all λ ∈ [λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1).
Part (iii) Differentiation of ρ∗ (λ) with respect to n gives
∂ρ∗ (λ)
∂n
= −δ (1− λ)
[
dV ([λ,1],ρ
∗)
F
dn
+
∫ 1
λ
∂ V ([λ,1],ρ
∗)
F
∂ρ∗ (z)
∂ρ∗ (z)
∂n
dG (z)
]
for all λ ≥ λ∗ (ρ∗) . (26)
It can be seen from (23), since ρ∗ (λ) < 1 for λ < 1 as shown in Proposition 2, that d
V ([λ,1],ρ∗)
F
dn < 0 for all
λ ∈ [λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1). Repeated use of (26) now proves that ∂ρ∗(λ)∂n > 0 for all λ ∈ [λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1).
Part (iv) The derivative of ρ∗ (λ) with respect to δ is
∂ρ∗ (λ)
∂δ
= − (1− λ)
[
V ([λ, 1] , ρ∗)
F
+ δ
(
dV ([λ,1],ρ
∗)
F
dδ
+
∫ 1
λ
∂ V ([λ,1],ρ
∗)
F
∂ρ∗ (z)
∂ρ∗ (z)
∂δ
dG (z)
)]
for all λ ≥ λ∗ (ρ∗) .
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I consider the case where λ∗ (ρ∗) > 0 which implies that
ρ∗ (λ∗ (ρ∗)) = λ∗ (ρ∗)− δ (1− λ∗ (ρ∗)) V ([λ
∗ (ρ∗) , 1] , ρ∗)
F
= 0
such that V ([λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1] , ρ∗) > 0. Since, as can be seen from (21), V ([λ, 1] , ρ∗) is increasing in λ, V ([λ, 1] , ρ∗) >
0 for all λ ≥ λ∗ (ρ∗). Given this, it is easily seen from (23) that d
V ([λ,1],ρ∗)
F
dδ > 0 for all λ ∈ [λ∗ (ρ∗) , 1]. Then,
by the same argument as in part (i), ∂ρ
∗(λ)
∂δ > 0 for all λ ≥ λ∗ (ρ∗). 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
If the AA wants to implements reporting, it is necessary and sufficient to set ρ such that
ρ ≤ λM − δ (1− λM) V (∅, ρ)
F
.
where the right-hand side is non-negative whenever F ≥ F . Since V ([0, 1] , ρ) is decreasing in ρ, this
constraint must be binding at ρ∗. The AA wants to implement reporting whenever V ([0, 1] , ρ∗) < V (∅, ρ∗).
Rearranging this inequality yields
piC > −1− δ
δ
F.
which holds true. 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Let the subscript DIS refer to the case where λ is disclosed and let subscript SEC refer to the case where
λ is kept secret. If F < F , then ΛSEC = ∅, i.e. V SEC (ρ∗SEC) = V (∅, ρ∗SEC). It follows from (21) that
∂VDIS ([λ, 1] , ρ∗DIS)
∂λ
> 0 for all λ ∈ [λ∗ (ρ∗DIS) , 1) .
Hence,
V SEC (ρ∗SEC) = V (∅, ρ∗SEC) = V ([1, 1] , ρ∗DIS) > V ([λ∗ (ρ∗DIS) , 1] , ρ∗DIS) = V DIS (ρ∗DIS) .
That is, disclosure improves deterrence. Also, since firms in the disclosure regime report for some realizations
of λ, desistance is improved. 
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Behavior-Based Price Discrimination when Firms are
Asymmetric
Frederik Silbye
Abstract
Under EC competition law, price discrimination is regulated in markets where one or more under-
takings hold a dominant position. Based on this observation, this paper studies behavior-based price
discrimination in a two-period model that allows firms to be asymmetric. The asymmetry is either due to
differences in quality or differences in marginal costs. Only when firms are asymmetric, they actively seek
to affect the outcome in the first period in order to gain information about brand preferences that can be
used to discriminate between consumers in the second period. Hence, allowing for asymmetry adds new
dynamic effects to the model. I find that price discrimination benefits all firms if these are sufficiently
asymmetric. Also, price discrimination improves social welfare for intermediate levels of asymmetry.
JEL Classification: L11; L13; M31.
Keywords: Price discrimination; asymmetric firms; differentiated products.
1 Introduction
Firms in numerous industries charge different prices to customers with different purchasing patterns. These
patterns reveal useful information about the preferences of the customers, and the information can be ex-
ploited to develop targeted pricing strategies. In its simplest form, such behavior-based price discrimination
can be an introductory discount. Newspapers, telecommunication providers, and bookmakers are examples
of companies pursuing pricing strategies like this. In the other end of the spectrum, firms might provide
discounts to loyal customers which is the case in frequent flyer programs offered by many airlines. With
the rapid development of internet technology it has never been easier to keep track of customers’ purchasing
patterns and offer them targeted prices conditioned on their behavior.
Behavior-based price discrimination consists of two important parts. First, information is generated by
the consumers’ initial purchasing choices. Second, this information is used by the firms to discriminate
between different groups of consumers. Traditional models of third-degree price discrimination only focus
on the second part. They do not have consumers self-selecting into the different groups. The endogenous
formation of consumer groups gives rise to interesting dynamic effects. For example, firms can have an
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interest in affecting the initial consumer choices to gain more preference information that can be exploited at
a later stage. An emerging literature has sought to map these dynamic affects in an attempt to understand
the welfare implications of behavior-based price discrimination. This paper contributes to the literature by
removing the standard assumption that firms are symmetric.
Price discrimination is in the EC Treaty regulated by Article 82 which is aimed at preventing undertakings
who hold a dominant position in a market from abusing that position. This motivates the focus on settings
where one firm has a larger market share than its rivals. Models in which firms are symmetric are less suitable
for markets where Article 82 applies, i.e. markets where one or more firms are dominant.1 The purpose of
condemning price discrimination under the auspices of Article 82 is mainly to prevent major market players
from excluding their minor competitors. Based on this view, the European Commission prohibited Akzo,
a dominant firm in the market for flour additives, from giving selective discounts to the customers of its
rival ECS.2 Another example is the Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti case in which the Commission found that the
discriminatory pricing strategy implemented by dominant firm Hilti was aimed at excluding its competitors.3
To analyze cases like these and to address the question of exclusion, one needs a model of asymmetric firms.
In fact, Chen (2005) in a survey article on the issue of price discrimination by purchase history calls for more
research on asymmetric markets.
This paper extends the symmetric model of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) to asymmetric markets. I
consider two firms that are allowed to be asymmetric either on the supply side in the shape of different
marginal costs or on the demand side corresponding to one firm having a brand that is commonly perceived
to be of better quality. In a two-period model, firms can in the second period discriminate between consumers
according to the choices of supplier in the first. The firms sell products that are imperfect substitutes, and
consumers are heterogeneous with respect to brand preferences. Firms actively try to direct the outcome in
first period to their advantage in the second. However, the direction rests on the level of the asymmetry, and
I find that the implications of behavior-based price discrimination can be very different depending on whether
firms are almost symmetric or highly asymmetric. In particular, firms behave as if they were myopic only in
the special case where they are fully symmetric. This suggests that the conclusions made in Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000) do not apply to markets with dominant firms.
When the asymmetry becomes sufficiently large, the small firm is excluded from the market in one or
both periods. I find that price discrimination facilitates this exclusion in the second period; however, it is
anti-exclusive in the first period. The intuition behind the latter result is that the large firm has an incentive
to keep the small firm in the market since its presence creates information about consumer preferences that
can be used in a price discrimination scheme in the second period. In total, price discrimination has the
potential to improve profits and harm consumers when firms are very asymmetric.
Introducing asymmetry adds new dimensions to the analysis of social welfare since the simple, no-
discrimination equilibrium becomes inefficient in the sense that the firm with lower quality, by charging
1One reservation in this respect is that both firms in a symmetric duopoly might be ruled dominant. In Akzo, the Court of
Justice considered that a stable market share of 50 per cent or more raised a rebuttable presumption of market dominance.
2See European Commission (1985).
3See European Commission (1988).
96
Behavior-Based Price Discrimination when Firms are Asymmetric
a lower price, persuades some consumers to buy from their least preferred supplier. Price discrimination
has the potential to mitigate this welfare loss. For example, when the asymmetry is modest, the firm with
better quality has an incentive to increase its market share in the first period in an attempt to be in a better
position in the next period. Price discrimination is shown to improve social welfare when the asymmetry is
neither too small nor too large.
The consumers in this paper have brand preferences that are organized on a Hotelling line. This set-up
has been used to investigate third-degree price discrimination in static models like Thisse and Vives (1988)
and Bester and Petrakis (1996). Firms can divide the consumer mass into sub-groups based on various
criteria and offer targeted prices to each group. This segregation of the market intensifies competition and
reduces profits. Shaffer and Zhang (2000) generalize the static approach and consider asymmetric firms that
have different initial market shares. These market shares are exogenously given. Price discrimination favors
one or all firms if the initial allocation of market share is sufficiently unequal. The formation of market
shares is endogenized by Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) in the symmetric case. The second period of their
model is identical to Bester and Petrakis (1996); here, price discrimination creates a Prisoners’ Dilemma that
decreases profits. Also in the second period, some consumers switch to their least preferred supplier creating
a welfare loss. When consumers are forward-looking, prices and profits increase in the first period. This is
contrary to another strand in the literature on behavior-based price discrimination which departs from the
setting of differentiated products. In Chen (1997), firms produce homogeneous goods but consumers obtain a
preference for one firm in the second period due to switching costs. The result is that firms compete fiercely
in the first period to build a base of loyal customers.
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) consider a general distribution of consumers on the Hotelling line, but they
reach their strongest results using the uniform distribution. I follow this approach. In contrast, Esteves
(2007) let consumers be bunched together in two locations. Forward-looking firms in this set-up have an
incentive to let one firm have all demand in the first period such that consumers cannot be recognized in the
second period and costly price discrimination is rendered impossible. Chen and Zhang (2009) consider three
segments of consumers where two are loyal to opposite firms while the last segment consists of switchers who
are indifferent. Firms have an incentive in the first period to charge high prices in order not to capture the
switchers. This will enable the firm to distinguish between loyals and switchers in the second period such
that a targeted pricing strategy can be pursued.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 considers
the benchmark case where price discrimination is not possible, whereas the case with price discrimination
is analyzed in Section 4. In Section 5, the two cases are compared. Section 6 discusses the scenario where
consumers are sophisticated and forward-looking, and Section 7 concludes. The technical derivations can be
found in the Appendix.
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2 The Model
Two firms, L and S, produce competing brands of the same product at zero costs. The labeling follows as
firm L will prove to be the large firm in equilibrium and firm S the small. Consumers have unit demand, and
they are heterogenous with respect to their brand preferences. Let x ∈ [− 12 , 12] be a uniformly distributed
measure of a given consumer’s preference for firm S’s brand relative to firm L’s. This consumer receives net
utility v + d − x − pL if she buys from firm L and v + x − pS if she buys from firm S where pL and pS are
the prices charged by the two firms. The parameter d ≥ 0 reflects a commonly perceived quality advantage
of firm L’s brand.4 It is assumed that v is large such that consumers always buy from one of the firms. The
mass of consumers is normalized to one.
The firms compete in two periods. In the first period, the firms have no information about the brand
preference of the individual consumer, and each firm charges a fixed price pi1, i ∈ {L, S}. In the second
period, the same continuum of consumers makes another purchase. By observing the consumers’ purchasing
behavior in the first period, the firms are able to group the consumers into two segments: L’s turf and S’s
turf. Consequently, different pricing strategies can be pursued on the two turfs in the second period. Let pi2
be the price charged by firm i on its own turf and p˜i2 be the price charged on the rival’s turf. For simplicity,
firms do not discount profits earned in period 2. In the main part of the paper, I consider the case where
consumers are myopic in the sense that they do not foresee the impact in period 2 of their choice of supplier in
period 1. This simplification reduces the complexity of the model considerably and allows me to focus solely
on the dynamic effects that comes from firms being forward-looking. Moreover, forward-looking consumers
has to be highly sophisticated. If they observe a price change in period 1, they must be able to figure out
the response by all other consumers and how this will affect prices in the future. Based on this observation,
consumer myopia seems fairly realistic.5 However, I discuss the issue of non-myopic consumers in Section 6.
One should not put too much emphasis on the particular numerical values of d. The scale of d is ultimately
determined by the range of x.6 Still, to get a hunch for the scale, one may use d = 1 as a point of reference.
This is the lowest level of asymmetry such that every consumer prefers firm L to firm S. I assume that
the asymmetry is not too large; in particular, I assume that d ≤ 5. Otherwise, as the analysis will reveal,
the equilibrium is trivial because firm S has no sale in either period whether or not price discrimination is
possible.
4I model firm asymmetry as a difference in quality. Alternatively, the firms might be asymmetric with respect to marginal
costs. The results, however, will remain the same.
5All though in a different setting, Hall (2003) reports that almost all printer owners had no clue about the printing costs
when they bought their inkjet printer. This example indicates that consumers pay little attention to the future impacts of their
choice of brand.
6Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) follow a more general approach where x is uniformly distributed on
[− 1
2
θ, 1
2
θ
]
, and θ can be
seen as an inverted measure of how close substitutes the two brands are. In such a framework, all bounds on d and all prices
will be multiples of θ. All comparative conclusions are unaffected by the choice of θ, and I assume without loss of generality
that θ = 1.
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3 Pricing without Price Discrimination
As a benchmark, consider the situation where discrimination between a firm’s own past customers and the
rival’s past customers is not possible. There will be no dynamic links between period 1 and period 2 as
any information gained in the first period about consumers’ brand preferences cannot be embodied in the
pricing strategy of the second period where only one price is allowed. For this reason, the equilibria in the
two periods are identical to the model’s static equilibrium.
It is a basic textbook exercise to derive the equilibrium prices of this asymmetric Hotelling model. These
are listed in Table 1.
d p̂L p̂S
[0,3] 1 + 13d 1− 13d
[3,5] d− 1 0
Table 1: Equilibrium prices with no price discrimination.
I use the hat-notation, here and henceforth, to denote the equilibrium where there is no price discrimi-
nation. It is easily verified that firm L’s share of the market is 12 +
1
6d. Firm S charges a price above its
marginal costs only if d < 3. If instead d ≥ 3, firm S is excluded from the market as it cannot sell at a viable
price. In that case, firm L will offer the highest price that induces all consumers to buy from L even when
firm S prices at marginal costs. This price is pL = d− 1. Hence, if d > 3, the market is virtually a monopoly
though a constrained one since the competitive pressure exerted by firm S prevents firm L from charging
monopoly prices.7
4 Pricing with Price Discrimination
In this section, firms are able to discriminate between its own past customers and the rival’s. Price discrim-
ination boils down to charging different prices, pi2 and p˜i2, on the two turfs in period 2. The relative sizes
of the turfs are determined by the prices offered in period 1. This creates a dynamic link between the two
periods and a firm may find it optimal to forego profits in period 1 to make the allocation of turfs in period
2 more advantageous from its perspective.
The model is easily solved by means of backwards induction. One may consult Appendix A for details.
Let x1 be defined as the brand preference of the indifferent consumer in period 1. That is, consumers buy
from firm L in this period if and only if x ≤ x1. In period 2, the firms take x1 for given when they determine
their prices on each turf separately. Compared to the prices in Table 1, each firm will price lower on its rival’s
turf since these consumers on average have a higher preference for the rival. This forces the rival to decrease
its price in response. Thisse and Vives (1988), Bester and Petrakis (1996), and several other contributions
7To further elaborate on the analogy to a monopoly, suppose that choosing S is the same as not buying anything, i.e. v = 0.
Then, L is a monopoly facing valuations uniformly distributed on [d− 1, d]. When d ≥ 3, it is optimal for the monopoly firm to
serve the entire market at the price d− 1.
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find similarly that increased segmentation of the market intensifies competition and reduces prices. In period
1, each firm maximizes the total profits earned in both periods while recognizing that x1 depends on the
first-period prices. In the case of firm L,
piL =
(
1
2
+ x1
)
pL1 + piL2 (x1) ,
is maximized with respect to pL1.
A complicating factor is that firm S risks being excluded from one or both second-period turfs when the
asymmetry gets large. In effect, the profit functions are kinked and have multiple peaks. Two consequences
of this is that the equilibrium prices are not continuous in d and that a pure-strategy equilibrium does not
always exist for all values of d. In case of the latter, I solve for the equilibrium in mixed strategies and report
the expected prices which are displayed in Table 2.
—– Period 1 —– —————– Period 2 —————–
d pL1 pS1 pL2 p˜S2 pS2 p˜L2
[0,1.15] 1 + 17d 1− 17d 23 + 47d 13 + 17d 23 − 47d 13 − 17d
[1.15,2.06] 13 +
35
51d
4
3 − 2251d 1 + 517d 1− 717d 0 d− 1
[2.06,2.2] 14135 d− 22935 45d− 65 3835d− 2235 3314 − 1514d 0 d− 1
[2.2,5] 1 + 35d 1− 15d 45d 0 0 d− 1
Table 2: Equilibrium prices (expected) with price discrimination.
When d ≤ 1.15, both firms are active on both turfs in period 2. However, when 1.15 < d ≤ 2.06, firm L
finds it optimal to exclude firm S from this firm’s own turf by reducing pL1. This price-cut shrinks the turf
of firm S, committing firm L to charge a really low price on that turf in period 2. In the end, firm S is shut
out of its own turf. Firm S is, in addition, shut out of firm L’s turf when the asymmetry gets even bigger.
This happens when d > 2.2. In the interval d ∈ [2.06, 2.2], only a mixed strategy equilibrium exists. In this,
S is excluded from firm L’s turf with positive probability.
To provide an intuition for the equilibrium prices and the dynamic incentives involved, I shall focus on
two cases. First, suppose that d ≤ 1.15. I refer to this situation as the oligopoly case since both firms are
active on both turfs in period 2. Table 2 shows that the first-period price of the large firm is below the
static equilibrium price in Table 1 while the same price of the small firm is above. The reason is that at
the static equilibrium prices, both firms will benefit if the large firm gets an even larger turf. Intuitively, a
more unequal division of the market carries less information about consumers preferences for which reason
price discrimination is less harmful to the firms. To enlarge its turf, firm L charges a lower price, while
firm S charges a higher price to obtain a smaller turf. In effect, x1 increases in the two-period equilibrium.
This dynamic effect hinges on the asymmetry; it cancels out in the extreme case where the firms are fully
symmetric. When d = 0, the turf size has no first-order effect on the second-period profits of either firm.
Second, suppose that 2.2 < d ≤ 5 and denote this the monopoly case as firm S is fully excluded from
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the market in period 2. Contrary to the oligopoly case, firm L’s second-period profit can be shown to be
decreasing in x1 and, thus, firm L benefits from a smaller turf. The reason is that when firm L holds a
smaller turf, it is able to charge a higher price on its own past costumers knowing that they on average has
a higher preference for L’s brand. Turfs more equal in size carry more information and this information can
be exploited by firm L when it is price discriminating. The same logic applies to a real monopolist. On the
contrary, information about brand preferences is pro-competitive in an oligopoly when both firms are active
in the market. In conclusion, firm L prices in period 1 above the price of the static equilibrium as this reduces
its turf. Firm S only cares about first-period profit and increases its price in this period relative to the static
level in response to the higher price of its opponent.
As regards the prices in the second period, it is of interest whether firms charge the lowest price on
their own turf or on their rival’s turf. The former can be said to reward loyalty whereas the latter rewards
switching. Alternatively, the distinction is between loyalty rebates and introductory rebates. It is possible
to show from the prices in Table 2 that only the small firm offers loyalty rebates (pS2 < p˜S2) and only when
its brand is of sufficiently low quality. The argument is that since firm S has a disadvantage in terms of
brand quality, it holds a small turf going into period 2. In effect, it gives up little profit by offering a low
price to its past customers since these are few. In contrast, it captures a respectable share of its rival’s
customer base and a price cut here to obtain incremental sales will be costly. Hence, a higher price offered
to these consumers is optimal. Shaffer and Zhang (2000) have a similar result. When their one-period model
is adjusted to the notation of this paper,8 they find that firm S rewards loyalty if and only if d > 13 . The
threshold is lower than in the present model which can be shown to be d = 0.47. This is a consequence of
the one-period structure of Shaffer and Zhang (2000). In my paper, firm S will charge the lowest price of the
two firms in period 1, thus holding a larger turf than in Shaffer and Zhang (2000). This increases prices on
firm S’s turf and loyalty discounts become less likely.
As a final remark, note that firm S is excluded completely from the market in period 2 when d ∈ [2.2, 3]
if and only if price discrimination is possible. In other words, price discrimination is pro-exclusive in the
second period. This is straightforward; under price discrimination, firm L does not have to offer the low
price, which excludes firm S, to all its customers. Hence, it is more willing to pursue an excluding pricing
strategy. On the other hand, firm S is excluded from the market in period 1 when d ∈ [3, 5] only when price
discrimination is not possible. That is, price discrimination is anti-exclusive when firms do not yet have the
information about consumers needed to discriminate. The intuition is that if firm L excludes firm S in period
1, it obtains no information about the brand preferences of the customer base, and no price discrimination
can be exerted in period 2. If instead firm L increases its price in period 1 giving firm S access to the market,
it can discriminate between the two turfs in period 2.
8The model by Shaffer and Zhang (2000) contains the parameters θ, lα, and lβ . When θ =
1
2
+ 1
2
d, lα = 1+d, and lβ = 1−d,
consumers in the two models have identical preferences. However, Shaffer and Zhang (2000) assume that lα, lβ ≥ 0 implying
that the two models can only be compared when d ≤ 1.
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5 Effects of Price Discrimination
This section investigates what the possibility of price discrimination implies for measures like profits, social
welfare, and consumers’ surplus. I begin with the profits in period 2. In this period, the market is mature in
the sense that firms have information about purchasing behavior of the consumers making price discrimination
a feasible strategy. When d = 0, the intuition from Thisse and Vives (1988) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)
applies; competition intensifies when the market can be divided into separate submarkets and prices and
profits fall. However, when d > 0, things change. Figure 1 shows the expected profits9 of the two firms for
various values of d.10
d
1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
Firm L:
piL2
piL
d
1 2 3 4 5
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Firm S:
piS2
piS
Figure 1: Second-period profits (expected) under price discrimination and no price discrimination.
Proposition 1 Price discrimination increases the expected second-period profit of the large firm if and only if
d > 2.07. The expected second-period profit of the small firm decreases when d < 3; otherwise, it is unchanged
and equal to zero.
Proposition 1 finds that the intuition of the d = 0 case can be generalized to situations of moderate levels
of asymmetry. Price discrimination makes competition fiercer and profits lower. However, firm L gains from
price discrimination in period 2 when the asymmetry becomes sufficiently large. When one firm has a brand
that is highly superior, this firm acts more like a monopolist, and a monopolist gains from price competition
as it can offer prices that are more tailored to the willingness-to-pay of the individual consumer.
The first period can be seen as a market in its infancy where firms besides making profits care about
collecting information about consumers that can be used later on. The profits of this period are illustrated in
9Recall that the equilibrium is one of mixed strategies when d ∈ (2.06, 2.2). Hence, profits are shown as averages.
10All figures of this section are constructed on the basis of derivations in Appendix B. Likewise, Proposition 1 and all
following propositions in this section are easily verified using Appendix B. As a minor detail, note that the propositions does
not all cover the special case of d = 0.
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Figure 2, and the comparison to the case without price discrimination is given in Proposition 2. When firms
are asymmetric, an unambiguous result is that firm L always gain in the first period from price discrimination.
Though several effects play a role, the dominating factor is that the price of its rival increases in both the
oligopoly case and the monopoly case. The profit of the small firm increases when the asymmetry is sufficiently
large. When d is large as in the monopoly case, firm L increases its first-period price in an attempt to obtain
a smaller turf and firm S, only caring about period 1, takes advantage of this price increase.
d
1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
Firm L:
piL1
piL
d
1 2 3 4 5
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Firm S:
piS1
piS
Figure 2: First-period profits (expected) under price discrimination and no price discrimination.
Proposition 2 Price discrimination increases the expected first-period profit of the large firm. The expected
first-period profit of the small firm increases if and only if d > 2.00.
Adding up profits from the two periods, Proposition 3 finds that both firms profit from price discrimination
when they are sufficiently asymmetric even though the threshold is significantly lower for the large firm.
Proposition 3 Price discrimination increases the expected total profit of the large firm if and only if d >
1.04. The total expected profit of the small firm increases if and only if d > 2.10.
From an authorities’ perspective, social welfare is the main objective. However, one should exercise
caution when interpreting the welfare effects of the model since, by assumption, every consumer buys no
matter the price. Hence, there is no deadweight loss associated with the growing market power of the large
firm when d increases. Instead, welfare losses solely stem from consumers’ buying their least preferred brand.
Since both firms produce at no costs, the social welfare created from each unit sold is the net utility of the
buyer plus the transfer to the seller. In the symmetric case, d = 0, there is no loss of welfare in the first
period where the market is split evenly. Due to poaching, welfare is reduced by price discrimination in the
second period. Poaching implies that a subset of consumers buy their least preferred brand. For d > 0, the
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comparison of social welfare with and without price discrimination is conducted in Figure 3 and Proposition
4.
d
1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
Period 1:
W1
Ŵ
d
1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
Period 2:
W2
Ŵ
Figure 3: Social welfare (expected) under price discrimination and no price discrimination, v = 1.
Proposition 4 Price discrimination improves first-period social welfare if and only if d < 2.08. Second-
period social welfare improves if and only if 1.20 < d < 3; there is no welfare effect in the second period for
d ≥ 3. When added up for both periods, social welfare improves if and only if 0.65 < d < 2.16.
Starting in the second period, welfare is reduced when firms are reasonably symmetric for the same
reasons as in the fully symmetric case. However, for intermediate levels of asymmetry, there is a welfare
gain. The reason is simply that price discrimination allows firm L a bigger slice of the market and that is
welfare enhancing as firm L has the better brand. This effect dominates the welfare reducing poaching effect
if d > 1.20. When the asymmetry becomes very large (d ≥ 3), no consumer ever buys from firm S in the
second period whether or not price discrimination can be exerted; hence, there is no impact on social welfare.
In period 1, the no-price-discrimination regime is inefficient for d > 0 since some consumers buy from the
small firm but prefers the brand of the large firm. They do so because the small firm sells at a lower price,
thus bribing consumers to accept a product of lower quality. To put it in numbers, the indifferent consumer
when price discrimination cannot be exterted is x1 = 16d, but x1 =
1
2d is socially optimal.
11 In the oligopoly
case where the asymmetry is modest, price discrimination induces both firms to enlarge the turf of firm L,
thus, reducing the inefficiency associated with the excessive number of consumers buying from firm S. In
the monopoly case where the asymmetry is large, firm L increases its first-period price and reduces its turf.
This reverses the argument and diminishes social welfare. The total effect for both periods is that price
discrimination is welfare enhancing for intermediate levels of asymmetry.
11To see why, note that the gross utility of the consumer at x = 1
2
d is v + 1
2
d at both firms.
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From a consumers’ point of view, consumers’ surplus is the measure of interest. Consumers’ surplus
is easily calculated as social welfare minus profits of both firms. Figure 4 and Proposition 5 reveal that
consumers gain in either period when d is low. When the asymmetry becomes too high, firm L behaves more
like a monopolist in period 2 and increases its price in period 1; both elements hurt consumers.
d
1 2 3 4 5
0.5
1
1.5
2
Period 1:
CS1
ĈS
d
1 2 3 4 5
0.5
1
1.5
2
Period 2:
CS2
ĈS
Figure 4: Consumers’ surplus (expected) under price discrimination and no price discrimination, v = 1.
Proposition 5 Price discrimination improves consumers’ surplus in period 1 if and only if d < 1.81. In
period 2, consumers’ surplus improves if and only if d < 2.41. When added up for both periods, consumers’
surplus improves if and only if d < 2.08.
6 Forward-Looking Consumers
This section removes the assumption that consumers are myopic. Instead, they foresee that their choices of
supplier in period 1 affect the prices they are offered in period 2. To identify the effect of foresight, I let
consumers discount period 2 utility with the discount factor δC . I do not strive to uncover all special cases
when consumers are forward-looking. Keeping things simple, I only discuss two leading cases.
First, consider the case where d is small as in the oligopoly case. Each consumer is atomistic and take
the period 1 equilibrium represented by x1 as given. For this reason, each consumer also takes the period 2
prices as given, even though the consumer can control which of the two pairs of prices she is offered in period
2. Consumers with a brand preference x slightly below x1 buys from firm L in period 1 but switches to firm
S in period 2. For consumers where x is slightly above x1 the opposite holds. In effect, x1 is given from
v + d− x1 − pL1 + δC (v + x1 − p˜S2) = v + x1 − pS1 + δC (v + d− x1 − p˜L2)
105
Behavior-Based Price Discrimination when Firms are Asymmetric
where the left-hand side is the total utility of the indifferent consumer if she buys from L and then switches
to S in the next. The right-hand side covers the opposite choice. The period 2 prices as functions of x1 are
derived in Appendix A.1.
Consider the situation where one of the firms, e.g. firm L, lowers its first-period price. Firm L’s turf will
increase in size which implies that the prices offered on that turf in period 2 increases as well. Due to the
latter effect, consumers become more reluctant to shift to firm L in period 1. To put it generally, consumers
are less price sensitive when they are forward-looking. This triggers less fierce competition and both firms
charge higher first-period prices.
When firms are asymmetric, consumer foresight also affects the division of the market. The indifferent
consumer knows that if she chooses firm S in period 1, she will get the extra quality d in the next period
where she switches to firm L. Thus, firms S holds a larger turf in the first period compared to the myopic
case. To put it formally, one can show that
x1 =
5
14
d− 33d
63δC + 49
δC ,
where the first term is the market split when consumers are myopic. Note that δC only matters when d > 0.
Since x1 has decreased, more information about brand preferences can be extracted, and this harms both
firms in the oligopoly case in period 2 as argued in Section 4. In period 1, the effect of consumer foresight
on the large firm’s profit is ambiguous as its price increases but its demand falls. In contrast, the small firm
as better off as both price and demand go up. The demand effects hinge crucially on the asymmetry.
Social welfare decreases in period 1 when consumers become forward-looking since the firm with the poor
quality captures more demand. As argued in Section 5, x1 is already inefficiently low in the myopic case.
On the contrary, welfare improves in period 2 since the extent of inefficient switching is reduced. Also the
welfare effects are driven by asymmetry.
Second, consider the case where d is large as in the monopoly case. Then, all consumers buy from firm L
in period 2 and the equation determining x1 becomes
v + d− x1 − pL1 + δC (v + d− x1 − pL2) = v + x1 − pS1 + δC (v + d− x1 − p˜L2) ,
where pL2 = d− 2x1 and p˜L2 = d− 1 as demonstrated in Appendix A.1. Again, consider a first-period price
cut by firm L. This attracts additional consumers. Since x1 increases, the price offered on L’s turf in period
2 goes down and this provides an extra incentive for the consumers to shift to firm L in period 1. Hence,
consumers are more price sensitive when they are forward-looking. As a consequence, competition intensifies
and the first-period prices of both firms decline. And since firm demand is more elastic, the quality difference
between the brands has a greater impact for which reason firm L captures a larger share of the market in
period 1. Formally,
x1 =
1
10
d+
1
10
3d− 5
5− 3δC δC ,
where the first term is the market split when consumers are myopic. Since d is large, the second term is
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positive.
Due to the increase in x1 when consumers become forward-looking, the outcome in period 1 is less
informative as regards the consumer’s brand preferences and this makes price discrimination less profitable
for the only active firm in period 2: firm L. In period 1, the effect on L’s profit is once again ambiguous as
its demand increases but it is forced to lower its price. The small firm is always worse off since it achieves
a smaller turf. Social welfare improves in period 1 because the large firm with the better brand enlarges its
market share. There is no welfare effect in period 2.
In conclusion, note that the effect of consumer foresight depends on the level of asymmetry. If firms are
fairly symmetric, competition weakens in the first period when consumers are forward-looking. In contrast,
the effect is turned upside down when the asymmetry is substantial, and consumer foresight leads to more
intense competition.
7 Concluding Remarks
The contribution of this paper is to study the implications of behavior-based price discrimination in a two-
period model with asymmetric firms. The asymmetry arises from either a difference in quality or a difference
in costs. Introducing asymmetry adds new dynamic effects to the analysis as firms now actively seek to affect
the outcome of period 1 in order to achieve a better position in period 2. This effect is absent in the fully
symmetric case. In effect, conclusions depend crucially on the level of asymmetry in the market, thus urging
competition authorities to pay close attention to this level when investigating price discrimination schemes.
Contrary to the symmetric case, I find that both firms benefit from price discrimination when they are
significantly asymmetric; that is, when there are substantial quality or cost differences in the market. This
occurs at the expense of consumers. Based on this conclusion, we should expect to see trade organizations
or other industry-wide bodies representing the interests of the firms be eager to impose restrictions imped-
ing price discrimination only in markets that are fairly symmetric. In symmetric markets and in markets
where firms are highly diverse, social welfare decreases because of price discrimination. This speaks in favor
of authorities’ upholding a critical view on price discrimination in markets where dominance is prevalent.
However, it is shown that price discrimination can improve welfare for intermediate levels of asymmetry as
it limits the possibilities for the low-quality firm to capture demand by lowering its price.
Still, the model makes some rather crude assumptions that seem relevant for further investigation. Con-
spicuously, consumers are assumed to be myopic. All though this might be the case for many real-world
customers, it is of interest to investigate the impact of introducing forward-looking consumers into the model.
A much more thorough scrutiny of this matter than the one given in Section 6 seems fruitful.
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A Appendix: Equilibria for all d
This appendix derives equilibrium prices and conditions for all values of d. Their are numerous potential
deviations to consider. However, one can verify that only deviations by firm L constitute binding constraints;
when firm L does not want to deviate, the same is true for firm S. Thus, to keep the length of this appendix
to a minimum, I only go over firm L deviations.
A.1 Equilibrium when d ≤ 1.15
This subappendix derives the equilibrium when S is active on both turfs in period 2. In this period, the
prices on firm L’s turf given some x1 are
pL2 =
2
3
+
2
3
x1 +
1
3
d and p˜S2 =
1
3
+
4
3
x1 − 13d.
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A similar exercise produces the prices on firm S’s turf. These are
pS2 =
2
3
− 2
3
x1 − 13d and p˜L2 =
1
3
− 4
3
x1 +
1
3
d.
Profits in period 2 then become
piL2 (x1) =
5
18
+
10
9
x21 −
2
9
x1d+
1
3
d+
1
9
d2 (1)
and
piS2 (x1) =
5
18
+
10
9
x21 −
2
9
x1d− 13d+
1
9
d2. (2)
From a standard Hotelling approach, the indifferent consumer can be found to be
x1 =
1
2
d+
pS1 − pL1
2
≡ x (pL1, pS1) .
Now, the firms’ first-period problems are easily solved and the resulting prices are
pL1 = 1 +
1
7
d and pS1 = 1− 17d.
Using these prices, the indifferent consumer is x1 = 514d and firm L’s total profit can be written as
piL =
11
49
d2 +
16
21
d+
7
9
. (3)
As a first potential deviation, firm L might want to lower its period 1 price to shrink firm S’s turf such
that it will be profitable in period 2 to exclude firm S from this firm’s own turf by charging a really low price
here. This happens when pS2 becomes negative, i.e. when
d > 2− 2x1. (4)
Suppose that this is the case when the firms enter period 2. In the equilibrium of this period, prices on L’s
turf are unchanged while prices on S’s turf are p˜L2 = d − 1 and pS2 = 0. The profit of firm L in period 2
becomes
piL2 (x1) =
1
18
d2 − 7
9
dx1 +
13
18
d+
2
9
x21 +
13
9
x1 − 518 . (5)
Given this period 2 profit and the period 1 price charged by firm S, the best response by firm L can be shown
from the first-order condition to be
pL1 =
3
16
+
13
16
d.
This price satisfies condition (4) if and only if
d >
133
117
' 1.137 > 0
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and yields the total profit
piL =
177
3136
d2 +
265
224
d+
33
64
.
This term exceeds (3) only if
d >
1981
1581
− 112
1581
√
2 ' 1.153.
Second, consider a deviation where firm L raises its period 1 price to shrink its own turf in order to
exclude firm S from this turf in period 2. This happens when p˜S2 becomes negative which occurs when
d > 1 + 4x1. (6)
On S’s turf, prices are unchanged while prices are pL2 = d− 2x1 and p˜S2 = 0 on L’s turf. Firm L’s profit in
period 2 becomes
piL2 (x1) =
1
18
d2 +
5
9
dx1 +
11
18
d− 10
9
x21 −
13
9
x1 +
1
18
. (7)
Given this period 2 profit and the period 1 price charged by firm S, the best response by firm L can be shown
to be
pL1 =
41
28
+
79
196
d
which yields the total profit
piL =
1185
5488
d2 +
279
392
d+
81
112
.
This term can be shown to be below (3) for all d ≥ 0.
In conclusion, the equilibrium derived in this subappendix is valid if and only if d ≤ 1.153.
A.2 Equilibrium when 1.15 < d ≤ 2.06
This subappendix derives the equilibrium when S is excluded from its own turf in period 2. The prices in
this period are stated in connection to the first deviation in Appendix A.1. Firm L’s second-period profit is
given from (5) while for firm S it is
piS2 (x1) = 2
(
2
3
x1 − 16d+
1
6
)2
. (8)
Solving for the prices in period 1 yields
pL1 =
1
3
+
35
51
d and pS1 =
4
3
− 22
51
d
such that x1 = 12 − 117d which produces a total profit for firm L of
piL =
107
1734
d2 +
46
51
d+
5
6
. (9)
The first deviation to consider is firm L increasing its price to improve its profit in period 1 even though
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this will let in firm S on both turfs in period 2, i.e. condition (4) no longer holds. Prices in period 2 will be
as in the equilibrium of Appendix A.1. The optimal period 1 price by firm L is
pL1 =
23
24
+
73
408
d.
At this price, condition (4) reduces to
d >
221
189
' 1.169
and the total profit is
piL =
4019
27744
d2 +
557
816
d+
281
288
.
This term exceeds (9) whenever
d <
3043
2307
− 272
2307
√
2 ' 1.152.
Hence, there is a small interval d ∈ [1.152, 1.153] where two different equilibria can be sustained. In this case,
I assume that the firms coordinate on the equilibrium where firm S is active on both turfs in period 2.
The second deviation to consider is firm L increasing its price to shut out firm S completely in period 2
which occurs when (6), in addition to (4), is satisfied. This effect from a price increase is possible when d is
large. Prices in period 2 then become, pL2 = d− 2x1 and p˜L2 = d− 1 while firm S prices at marginal costs
on both turfs. The period 2 profit of firm L is
piL2 (x1) = d− 12 − 2x
2
1 (10)
from which the optimal deviation price can be calculated as
pL1 =
5
4
+
29
68
d
such that condition (6) becomes
d >
119
73
' 1.630
while (4) is satisfied whenever
d >
391
233
' 1.678.
The deviation profit is
piL =
841
41 616
d2 +
1601
1224
d+
25
144
which exceeds (9) if and only if
d >
323
157
' 2.057.
In conclusion, the equilibrium derived in this subappendix is valid if and only if d ∈ [1.152, 2.057].
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A.3 Equilibrium when d > 2.2
This subappendix derives the equilibrium when all consumers in the second period buys from firm L. The
prices of this period are stated in connection to the second deviation in Appendix A.2. Firm L’s profit in
period 2 is given in (10) while firm S makes no profit in this period. From this, period 1 first-order conditions
can be derived and solved for the equilibrium prices which are
pL1 = 1 +
3
5
d and pS1 = 1− 15d
such that x1 = 110d. The total profit becomes
piL =
1
25
d (35 + d) . (11)
The first deviation to consider is firm L decreasing pL1 in order to make firm S active on L’s turf in
period 2, i.e. such that (6) is no longer satisfied. Then, firm L’s period 2 profit is given from (5) and the
optimal price to charge is
pL1 =
3
16
+
63
80
d.
With this price, condition (6) is violated as required when
d <
35
13
' 2.692,
and the total profit is
piL =
89
1600
d2 +
181
160
d+
33
64
.
This term exceeds (11) if and only d < 115 = 2.2.
The second deviation to consider is firm L increasing pL1 in order to make firm S active on S’s turf in
period 2, i.e. such that (4) is no longer satisfied. The profit in period 2 is given from (7) and the optimal
deviation price can be shown to be
pL1 =
41
28
+
51
140
d
which yields the total profit
piL =
569
2800
d2 +
39
56
d+
81
112
.
This term exceeds (11) whenever
d <
985
457
− 80
457
√
7 ' 1.692.
In conclusion, the equilibrium derived in this subappendix is valid if and only if d ≥ 2.2.
A.4 Equilibrium when 2.06 ≤ d < 2.2
Left is to derive the equilibrium when 2.06 < d ≤ 2.2. In this region, no equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
If firm S sets a price in period 1 expecting to be active on L’s turf in period 2, firm L will charge a higher
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first-period price and shut out S completely. And if firm S in period 1 optimizes given the expectation that
it will face no demand in period 2, firm L finds it optimal to decrease its price making firm S active in
the second period. Instead, I search for an equilibrium where S is active in period 2 with some probability
between zero and one. More specifically, I search for an equilibrium where firm L randomizes between the
optimal price that makes S active on L’s turf and the optimal price that shuts out S completely. Firm S
charges the price that makes firm L indifferent between these two prices, and the probability in firm L’s
randomization strategy is constructed so to make the price that S has to charge optimal.
Let firm S charge some price pS1 in period 1. If L wants S to face positive demand on L’s turf, its period
2 profit is given from (5) which generates the best-response price
pL1 =
7
16
pS1 +
7
8
d− 1
4
and total profit
piL =
9
64
p2S1 +
1
16
d2 +
5
8
pS1 +
5
4
d+
1
16
dpS1 − 14 .
If instead L wants to eliminate S completely, it gets the period 2 profit in (10) and the best-response price is
pL1 =
3
4
pS1 +
3
4
d+
1
4
.
The total profit becomes
piL =
1
16
p2S1 +
1
16
d2 +
3
8
pS1 +
11
8
d+
1
8
dpS1 − 716 .
Equating these two profits generates pS1 which is
pS1 =
4
5
d− 6
5
.
At this price charged by firm S, firm L randomizes between the prices pL1 = 4940d− 3140 and pL1 = 2720d− 1320 .
Let α be defined as the probability put on the first price. At this price, the total profit of firm S given some
pS1 is
piS =
289
800
+
163
240
pS1 − 518p
2
S1 −
151
720
dpS1 − 4931200d+
841
7200
d2,
and at the latter price, it is
piS =
(
7
40
− 1
2
pS1 +
7
40
d
)
pS1.
Firm S gets the former profit with probability α and the latter with probability 1 − α. The first-order
condition to S’s profit-maximization problem can be solved for α as
α =
126d− 720pS1 + 126
277d− 320pS1 − 363 .
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When the equilibrium value of pS1 is inserted, α becomes
α =
24
28
55− 25d
1 + d
(12)
which equals 1 at 2.06 and 0 at 2.2. Now, the expected first-period price of firm L is easily derived as
pL1 =
141
35
d− 229
35
.
B Appendix: Profits, Welfare, and Consumers’ Surplus
This appendix lists profits, welfare, and consumers’ surplus as functions of d. Using these, Propositions 1
through 5 are easily verified.
B.1 Profits
Table 3 displays the profit of firm L. When no price discrimination can be exerted, the profits can be
calculated on the basis of the prices in Table 1. When price discrimination is possible, profits are derived
using the results in Table 2 and Appendix A. When d ∈ [2.06, 2.2], firm L randomizes according to α given
in (12). Firm L’s profit is in period 1
piL1 =
(
1
2
+ x1
)
pL1.
The period 2 profit can be derived from (1), (5), and (10).
d piL piL1 piL2
[0,1.15] 118 (3 + d)
2 5
98d
2 + 37d+
1
2
17
98d
2 + 13d+
5
18
[1.15,2.06] 118 (3 + d)
2 − 35867d2 + 23d+ 13 59578d2 + 417d+ 12
[2.06,2.2] 118 (3 + d)
2 − 822311200d2 + 228575600 d− 60091600 1049111200d2 − 149895600 d+ 47331600
[2.2,3] 118 (3 + d)
2 3
50d
2 + 25d+
1
2 − 150d2 + d− 12
[3,5] d− 1 350d2 + 25d+ 12 − 150d2 + d− 12
Table 3: Firm L’s profits (expected) for various values of d.
Table 4 shows the profit of firm S. Here, the profit in period 1 is
piS1 =
(
1
2
− x1
)
pS1
whereas the profit in period 2 follows from (2) and (8). Recall that firm S makes no profit in the second
period when d ≥ 2.2.
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d piS piS1 piS2
[0,1.15] 118 (3− d)2 598d2 − 37d+ 12 1798d2 − 13d+ 518
[1.15,2.06] 118 (3− d)2 117d
(
4
3 − 2251d
)
2
(
1
2 − 734d
)2
[2.06,2.2] 118 (3− d)2 156175d2 − 538175d+ 456175 − 3112d2 + 9280d+ 33560
[2.2,3] 118 (3− d)2 150 (5− d)2 0
[3,5] 0 150 (5− d)2 0
Table 4: Firm S’s profits (expected) for various values of d.
B.2 Social Welfare
The social welfare is listed in Table 5. Social welfare equals the total utility of all consumers if the firms sell
at marginal costs, i.e. zero. In period 1, social welfare is
W1 =
∫ x1
− 12
(v + d− x) dx+
∫ 1
2
x1
(v + x) dx.
In period 2, the expression is slightly more complicated. Let xL2 be the indifferent consumer on L’s turf;
that is,
xL2 ≡ min {x (pL2, p˜S2) , x1} .
Likewise, the indifferent consumer on S’s turf is
xS2 ≡ min
{
x (pS2, p˜L2) ,
1
2
}
.
Then, social welfare in period 2 is
W2 =
∫ xL2
− 12
(v + d− x) dx+
∫ x1
xL2
(v + x) dx+
∫ xS2
x1
(v + d− x) dx+
∫ 1
2
xS2
(v + x) dx.
d Ŵ W1 W2
[0,1.15] v + 536d
2 + 12d+
1
4 v +
45
196d
2 + 12d+
1
4 v +
5
28d
2 + 12d+
7
36
[1.15,2.06] v + 536d
2 + 12d+
1
4 v − 18289d2 + 1817d v + 2171156d2 + 1534d+ 14
[2.06,2.2] v + 536d
2 + 12d+
1
4 v − 1071922400d2 + 1268111200d+ 3608122400 v + 27112d2 + 199280d− 297560
[2.2,3] v + 536d
2 + 12d+
1
4 v +
9
100d
2 + 12d+
1
4 v + d
[3,5] v + d v + 9100d
2 + 12d+
1
4 v + d
Table 5: Social welfare (expected) for various values of d.
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B.3 Consumers’ Surplus
Social welfare is the sum of both firms’ profits and consumers’ surplus. Hence, consumers’ surplus in period
t = 1, 2 can be calculated as
CSt = Wt − piLt − piSt.
The results are shown in Table 6.
d ĈS CS1 CS2
[0,1.15] v + 136d
2 + 12d− 34 v + 25196d2 + 12d− 34 v − 33196d2 + 12d− 1336
[1.15,2.06] v + 136d
2 + 12d− 34 v + 1289d2 + 1651d− 13 v + 11156d2 + 2134d− 34
[2.06,2.2] v + 136d
2 + 12d− 34 v − 1424122400d2 + 139911200d+ 6183922400 v − 749111 200d2 + 18 7895600 d− 39 73111 200
[2.2,2.3] v + 136d
2 + 12d− 34 v + 1100d2 + 310d− 34 v + 150d2 + 12
[3,5] v + 1 v + 1100d
2 + 310d− 34 v + 150d2 + 12
Table 6: Consumers’ surplus (expected) for various values of d.
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Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and R&D
Investments
Frederik Silbye
Abstract
Using a simple two-period model of behavior-based price discrimination, this paper studies how the
incentives to invest in R&D are affected by the possibility to discriminate. It is shown that price discrim-
ination reduces R&D investments when consumers are sufficiently forward-looking. The result unveils a
new mechanism of how price discrimination works against social welfare.
JEL Classification: L11; L13; L15.
Keywords: Price discrimination; R&D investment; Quality choice; Oligopoly.
1 Introduction
When antitrust authorities scrutinize a scheme of price discrimination, the effect on competition is likely to
be a major focus. Nevertheless, price discrimination has the potential to affect other market aspects relevant
to consumers and social welfare. This is recognized by EC competition law in Article 82(b) which states
that any market conduct by undertakings in a dominant position limiting technological development to the
prejudice of consumers is considered an abuse of that position.1 In that context, this paper studies the
relation between price discrimination and the incentives to invest in R&D. It is shown that the possibility
of price discrimination has the potential to impede R&D; thus, I bring forward an additional argument why
competition authorities ought to maintain a critical approach to firms that pursue discriminating pricing
strategies.
The model considers behavior-based price discrimination as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). The firms
produce differentiated brands and compete in two periods. Similar to Silbye (2010), firms are allowed to
differ in terms of the quality of their brands. In the first period, the firms collect information about brand
preferences based on the consumers’ choice of supplier. This information is then in the next period used to
discriminate between loyal customers and switchers.
Prior to any price competition, firms can invest in the quality of their brand. I show that firms, when
given the possibility to discriminate, have less incentives to invest if consumers behave strategically. The
reason is that forward-looking consumers are harder to attract with better quality as they foresee that they
will be offered higher prices in the second period if they initially choose the firm with the better brand. From
1See European Union (2010).
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a welfare perspective, quality is under-supplied. Hence, price discrimination reduces social welfare whenever
it provides less incentives to invest in quality.
In a recent paper, Ikeda and Toshimitsu (2010) investigate the relation between price discrimination and
quality in a monopoly setting. They show, contrary to my conclusion, that the monopolist improves the
quality of its product when it is allowed to engage in third-degree price discrimination. The oligopoly case
is studied in a related model by Pigaa and Poyago-Theotoky (2004) where firms can invest in R&D and
adopt spatial pricing as in Thisse and Vives (1988). It is shown that R&D investments increase the more
differentiated the products are.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the model, while the equilibrium of the two-period pricing
game for any levels of quality is derived in Section 3. By use of the profit functions, Section 4 determines the
quality level in the symmetric equilibrium and compare this to a setting where no price discrimination can
be exerted. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Two firms, A and B, produce competing brands of the same product at zero costs. Consumers have unit
demand, and they are heterogenous with respect to their brand preferences. Let x ∈ [− 12 , 12] be a uniformly
distributed measure of a given consumer’s preference for B’s brand relative to A’s. This consumer receives
net utility v+ qA−x− pL if she buys from firm A and v+ qB +x− pB if she buys from firm B where pA and
pB are the prices charged by the two firms. The parameter v represents the minimum quality the product
can possibly have, while qA and qB are additional quality added to v. It is assumed that v is large such that
consumers always buy from one of the firms. The mass of consumers is normalized to one.
The firms compete in two periods. In the first period, the firms have no information about the brand
preference of the individual consumer, and each firm charges a fixed price pi1, i ∈ {A,B}. In the second
period, the same continuum of consumers makes another purchase and price discrimination is now a feasible
strategy. Firm i charges the price pi2 on its own past customers and p˜i2 on its rival’s customers. The
consumers discount second-period utility with the factor δC , whereas the firms’ discount factor is δF .
Prior to the two periods of price competition, firms invest in the quality of their brand. The fixed, one-
time cost of obtaining quality qi is c (qi) = 12γq
2
i . I assume that investing is costly, i.e. γ is large, such that the
second-order condition is satisfied.2 Note that the investment can just as well be interpreted as an investment
in cost-reducing technology. Whether the firms differ in quality or in marginal costs, the conclusions of the
model are the same. For this reason, I shall also refer to the initial investment as R&D. In yet another
interpretation, qi is advertising.3 Production costs remain at zero no matter the quality of the brand.
2Also, this assumption deters any firm from investing in a quality level of such magnitude that it excludes the opponent
from the market.
3One needs be careful with this interpretation as regards the welfare conclusions. The tricky question in this respect is
whether advertising and branding truly increase the customer’s utility.
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3 Pricing Decisions
As a benchmark, consider the situation where price discrimination is not possible. For any levels of quality,
let di ≡ qi − qj denote the quality advantage of firm i. It is now a basic textbook exercise to derive the
equilibrium of this asymmetric Hotelling model. In either period, firm i charges the price
pNPDi = 1 +
1
3
di
and obtains the per-period profit
piNPDi =
1
18
(3 + di)
2
.
Superscript NPD refers to the case with no price discrimination.
Next, firms are allowed to discriminate between consumers in period 2. Let xA1 be a representation of
the outcome in period 1 in the sense that a consumer with a brand preference of x buys from firm A if and
only if x ≤ xA1. In the same vein, define xB1 ≡ −xA1. On firm i’s turf, i.e. the segment of firm i’s past
customers, the prices in period 2 as a function of xi1 are easily shown to be
pi2 =
2
3
+
2
3
xi1 +
1
3
di and p˜j2 =
1
3
+
4
3
xi1 − 13di,
and the second-period profit of firm i is
pii2 =
5
18
+
10
9
x2i1 −
2
9
xi1di +
1
3
di +
1
9
d2i .
In period 1, the brand preference of the indifferent consumer is xA1. Consumers with a brand preference
slightly below xA1 buy from firm A in period 1 but switch to firm B in period 2. For consumers where x is
slightly above xA1, the opposite holds. In effect, xA1 is given from
v + qA − xA1 − pA1 + δC (v + qB + xA1 − p˜B2) = v + qB + xA1 − pB1 + δC (v + qA − xA1 − p˜A2)
where the left-hand side is the total utility of the indifferent consumer if she buys from A and then switches
to B. The right-hand side covers the opposite choice. Solving for xA1 yields
xA1 =
3 (pB1 − pA1) + (3− δC) dA
6 + 2δC
.
Firm i maximizes in period 1 the discounted sum of profits pii1 + δFpii2 where pii1 =
(
1
2 + xi1
)
pi1. The
first-order conditions of this problem provide the equilibrium price
pPDi1 = 1 +
1
3
δC +
9− 8δF + 4δCδF − δ2C
27− 20δF + 9δC di.
When there is no difference in quality, the first-period price is 1 + 13δC as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
This price is above the static price of 1 since demand is more inelastic when consumers are forward-looking
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as they foresee that prices in period 2 will be higher on the larger turf. For this reason, a price cut in period
1 to attract additional customers is less effective. In other words, the consumers exhibit a sympathy for the
smaller firm. If firm i holds a quality advantage, it adds to the price. Firm i only displays dynamic incentives
in equilibrium when there is a quality difference, di 6= 0. If not, the firm chooses its price as if it is myopic,
i.e. as if δF = 0.
In order to understand the effect of di, I focus on two special cases. First, suppose that consumers are
myopic, i.e. δC = 0. Comparing pPDi1 and p
NPD
i demonstrates that the first-period price of the firm with
superior quality is higher when there is no price discrimination. The argument is that price discrimination
in period 2 intensifies competition and deteriorates profits. The damage is bigger when the market in period
1 is fairly evenly split as this outcome is more informative with respect to the consumers’ brand preferences.
If di > 0, firm i will be the larger firm in equilibrium, but both firms have an incentive to make it even larger
in order to mitigate the harmful effects of price discrimination in period 2. To do so, firm i decreases its
first-period price relative to pNPDi while the opponent increases its price relative to p
NPD
j .
Second, let the firms be the myopic part, i.e. δF = 0. The effect from di on the first-period price is lower
when price discrimination is possible. If firm i obtains superior quality, consumers tend to have a sympathy
for the opponent, the small firm, and this dampens the difference in prices as a result of a difference in quality
since the opponent does not need to cut its price very much in order to sustain a decent demand.
4 R&D Investments
When choosing its quality level, firm i takes qj as given and solves the problem
max
qi
pii1 (qi, qj) + δFpii2 (qi, qj)− c (qi)
where the profits are now explicitly written as functions of quality. In the benchmark case without price
discrimination, pii1 (qi, qj) = pii2 (qi, qj) = piNPDi . Searching for the symmetric equilibrium yields
qNPD =
1
3γ
(1 + δF ) .
In the price discrimination case, the profits are easily calculated from the derivations provided in the previous
section. In the symmetric equilibrium, the quality level becomes
qPD =
1
3γ
27 + 9δF − 20δ2F − 3δ2C + 13δCδF
27− 20δF + 9δC .
Proposition 1 compares qPD and qNPD and demonstrates that price discrimination decreases R&D invest-
ments when consumers are sufficiently forward-looking.
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Proposition 1 Price discrimination improves quality, i.e. qPD > qNPD, if and only if
δC <
2
3
δF − 32 +
1
6
√
81− 48δF + 16δ2F ≡ δC (δF )
where δC (0) = 0, δC (1) = 13 , δC (δF ) ≤ δF , and δ
′
C (δF ) > 0.
The Proposition finds that price discrimination always decreases the quality level when firms and con-
sumers are equally forward-looking or when the discount factor of the consumers exceeds 13 . This indicates
that the degree of myopia needed on the side of consumers must be considerable if price discrimination is to
improve quality.4
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is by no means straightforward. The incentive to invest depends on the
marginal effect of quality on the total, discounted profit. Inspections of piNPDi and pii2 reveal that the marginal
effect on the profit in period 2 in the symmetric equilibrium is the same whether or not price discrimination is
feasible. Therefore, only first-period profits matter for the difference between the two regimes. The marginal
effect for firm i in the situation where di = 0 is
dpii1
dqi
=
∂pii1
∂qi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect (+)
+
∂pii1
∂pj1
dpj1
dqi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Strategic effect (÷)
(1)
according to the envelope theorem.5 The direct effect is positive and reflects the fact that increased quality
attracts more demand. The strategic effect is negative as the rival decreases its price in response to the better
quality of firm i. Using (1), I provide the intuition in the special cases where either consumers or firms are
myopic.
First, consider the case where δC = 0. In this situation, only the strategic effect matters for the com-
parison. The rival’s price reduction
(
−dpj1dqi
)
is smallest in the case of price discrimination since the rival
wants firm i to have a large turf in period 2 as argued in the previous section. In other words, the gain of
having better quality is partly eroded due the opponent’s competing more fiercely in prices, but this erosion
is smaller when firms can price discriminate. Thus, price discrimination facilitates R&D.
Second, suppose that δF = 0. Price discrimination weakens the direct effect since consumers exhibit
sympathy for the smaller firm as argued in Section 3. This causes fewer consumers to shift supplier and
induces lower quality. Likewise, price discrimination weakens the strategic effect due to this sympathy for
the small firm. As a consequence of the sympathy, the rival can get away with a only a minor price cut
in response to the better quality of firm i. Moreover, the rival’s price cut has less of an impact on firm i’s
demand for the same reason. This induces higher quality under price discrimination. However, as Proposition
1 implies, the weakening of the direct effect dominates. That is, price discrimination decreases the quality
4Proposition 1 can be extended to include spillovers as in Pigaa and Poyago-Theotoky (2004). For instance, if firm A
improves the quality of its brand, this might enable firm B to imitate its rival and increase the quality of its own brand. If
s measures the extent of these spillovers, the effective quality improvement of firm i’s brand is qi + sqj . The effective quality
advantage of firm i becomes di = (1− s) (qi − qj). Investment levels decrease with s but the conclusion in Proposition 1 is
unaffected.
5In Section 2, it was argued that the firms behave as if they are myopic when they have the same quality. Hence, pi1
maximizes pii1 and the envelope theorem applies to period 1 in isolation.
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level since forward-looking consumers are harder to attract with better quality.
In order to gauge the welfare effects of the result in Proposition 1, I derive the socially optimal quality,
q∗, which solves the problem
max
q
(1 + δSP ) (v + q)− 2c (q) .
The continuum of consumers receive the gross utility v + q for two periods, where the second-period utility
is discounted with the factor δSP . I realistically assume that the social planner is not less patient than any
of the players in the market, i.e. δSP ≥ δF , δC . The total costs of both firms investing in the quality level q
is 2c (q). As long as both brands have the same quality, the size of q does not effect the consumers’ choice in
either period. Thus, any measure of ”transportation costs” does not need to be included in the maximization
problem. The solution is
q∗ =
1
2γ
(1 + δSP ) .
It is easily verified that q∗ > qNPD and q∗ > qPD such that firms underinvest in quality whether or not
price discrimination is possible. The reason is that a firm which unilaterally improves its quality faces lower
prices offered by its rival; hence, the firm does not fully capitalize on its investment. Proposition 2 states the
welfare effects.
Proposition 2 Price discrimination improves social welfare in terms of quality if and only if δC < δC (δF ).
In order to asses the total welfare effect of price discrimination, one needs to include the welfare loss
that arises in period 2 where some consumers switch to their least preferred brand. Adding this loss to the
comparison, the upper bound on δC decreases.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have studied how the incentives to invest in R&D are affected by the possibility to engage in
behavior-based price discrimination. The conclusions hinge on the sophistication level of consumers. When
consumers are as forward-looking as firms, price discrimination reduces the incentives to invest in R&D. On
the other hand, when consumers are completely myopic, the relation is reversed. In conclusion, factors like
quality and R&D are elements that should be included in any legal investigation of price discrimination.
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Price Discrimination when Firms Learn the Brand
Preferences of Their Customers
Frederik Silbye
Abstract
In line with the existing literature, this paper studies price discrimination in a two-period model with
differentiated products. The innovation of the paper is to let each firm have superior information on the
brand preferences of its own past customers. The idea is that a given customer’s supplier, contrary to
its rivals, learns about the preferences of the customer through personal interaction and negotiation. In
effect, the supplier is able pursue highly targeted price discrimination schemes where past customers are
offered individual prices. I find that this additional information decreases profits and benefits consumers.
Moreover, social welfare improves as the extent of inefficient poaching declines. Finally, I show that the
firms have an incentive to exchange their information on customer preferences if an appropriate commit-
ment device exists.
JEL Classification: L11; L13; M31.
Keywords: Price discrimination; brand preferences; differentiated products.
1 Introduction
In most markets, consumers have different tastes regarding various brands. Some emphasizes the design,
others proximity of the outlet, and others yet again have the environment as their main priority when
choosing which brand to buy. Companies, if they obtain knowledge about these brand preferences, are
capable of designing price offers that are targeted at the individual consumer or group of consumers.
Firms’ knowledge about brand preferences is often created in the market. When a consumer makes
her choice of brand, she automatically reveals information about her brand preferences. If the consumer
for instance subscribes to The Wall Street Journal instead of Financial Times, she demonstrates that she
prefers the former newspaper over the latter. The companies can exploit this information. Financial Times
might offer the consumer a discount in order to persuade her to buy her least preferred newspaper. In fact,
newspapers do so in the shape of introductory rebates targeted at new customers. The existing literature has
in depth studied this kind of behavior-based price discrimination, e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Esteves
(2007), and Chen and Zhang (2009).
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Nevertheless, firms may obtain preference information in a more indirect way than from the consumers’
choice of supplier. This alternative source of information is the one being investigated in this paper. The point
is that firms also derive information on brand preferences from the personal interaction with the customer. In
effect, the supplier chosen by the consumer holds superior knowledge about the preference of this consumer
compared to its rivals. To illustrate the concept in a simple example, consider a town with two car dealers
selling Volvo and Toyota, respectively. A consumer buying, say, a Volvo negotiates in person with the dealer.
From this negotiation, the dealer can extract valuable information about the consumer’s priorities in terms
of safety, design, performance etc. When the very same consumer on a later stage wishes to make another
purchase, the Volvo dealer knows, for example, that this consumer has an extraordinary strong preference
for a safe car and that she, for this reason, will buy another Volvo even at a very high price.1 Thus, the
Volvo dealer can charge a high price without fearing losing the order. The Toyota dealer, on the other hand,
only knows that the consumer gives priority to safety since she originally bought a Volvo and not an Toyota.
He does not know how strong this priority is and how favorable a price he needs to offer the consumer to
persuade her to buy his brand.
I set up a model that takes the framework of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) as its starting point. Brand
preferences are represented by a Hotelling line, and consumers make purchases in two periods. Based on the
purchases in the first period, the firms are able to separate the consumer segment into two turfs and different
prices can be charged on the two turfs in the second period. I extend this framework by letting each firm
observe the exact location (i.e. the brand preference) of each of its past customers but not the customers of
the rival. Hence, the observation is contingent on previous interaction between the firm and the consumer.
The firms can now pursue a pricing strategy where each consumer on their own turf is offered an individual
price. In contrast, the firms are forced to offer a uniform price on their rival’s turf.
It is of interest to study the effects of firms having access to information about the brand preferences
of their past customers. This is a direct comparison to Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). I find that profits
decrease in both periods while consumers benefit. Especially, the effect in period 1 is striking. In Fudenberg
and Tirole (2000), forward-looking consumers foresee that period 2 prices will be lower on the smaller turf.
Hence, ceteris paribus, they are inclined to choose the smaller firm. This reduces the price sensitivity in the
first period and pushes the price above the static equilibrium price. This ”sympathy-for-the-underdog” effect
is reversed in the set-up I consider. Instead, there is a ”follow-the-majority” effect where consumers has a
tendency to favor the larger firm as this will imply lower prices in the second period. The price sensitivity
increases while the price decreases. Another finding in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) is that some consumers
in the second period buy their least preferred brand and this causes a welfare loss. In contrast, the consumers
in my model always go to their preferred supplier, and, in this sense, the equilibrium is efficient. Finally,
I show that it is profitable for the firms to exchange customer information on brand preferences. However,
such an information exchange is not self-sustaining and requires an appropriate commitment device.
A few other papers have studied variations of the two-period framework in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
1Here I assume that Volvo is commonly perceived as a safer car than Toyota. Indeed, Volvo markets its XC60 vehicle as
”the safest car in the world”, but according to a Swedish court, Volvo has not presented any proof of this slogan. The case was
brought to court by no less than Toyota.
126
Price Discrimination when Firms Learn the Brand Preferences of Their Customers
Esteves (2007) and Chen and Zhang (2009) consider different distributions of consumers on the Hotelling
line. Another strand in the literature analyzes price discrimination in a one-period model and let the firms
have some unexplained knowledge about the preferences of the consumers. In Thisse and Vives (1988), firms
observe the exact location of every consumer. This intensifies competition, and price discrimination is shown
to lower profits. Bester and Petrakis (1996) present a less extreme version of the same idea in the sense that
firms only observe whether consumers are located to the left or to the right of the middle of the line. As a link
between these two, Lu and Serfes (2004) divide the Hotelling line into N subintervals, and the firms observe
in which subinterval each consumer is located. They find a u-shaped relationship between N and profits;
that is, profits do not decrease monotonically with the level of information available to the firms. In Chen
et. al. (2001), firms receive an imperfect signal about the preference of each consumer and, on the contrary,
the relationships between profits and accuracy of the signal is shown to be inversely u-shaped. They also
demonstrate, as I do, that exchange of preference information benefits both firms.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model, while Section 3 derives
prices and profits in the two-period equilibrium and makes the comparison to the case where firms do not
learn the brand preferences of their past customers. Exchange of customer information is studied in section
4, and Section 5 concludes. Some of the more technical derivations can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Two firms, A and B, produce heterogenous products at no costs and compete in prices. Consumers’ brand
preferences are organized in a Hotelling model. A continuum of consumers is uniformly distributed on the
unit interval, and firm A is located at x = 0 while firm B is located at x = 1. Each consumer has unit
demand. A consumer located at x receives utility v − x − pA if she buys from firm A and v − (1− x) − pB
if she buys from firm B where pA and pB are the prices charged by the two firms. The location x measures
the consumer’s preference for firm B’s brand relative to firm A’s. It is assumed that v is large such that
consumers always buy from one of the firms.
The firms compete in two periods. In the first period, the firms have no information about the location
of the individual consumer and each firm charges a fixed price zi, i = A,B. In the second period, the same
continuum of consumers makes a another purchase.
The firms observe the first-period purchasing choice of every consumer. Apart from that, each firm gains
additional information from period 1 about the locations of each of its own past customers. The idea is that
the supplier through the interaction with the customer observes the customer’s exact location. The other
firm does not have access to this learning about its competitor’s past customers.
On its own turf, firm i charges in period 2 the price pi (x) to the consumer located at x. The other firm
j 6= i charges the flat price qj . To break ties, I assume that if a consumer is indifferent in the second period
between the two firms, she buys from the firm from which she bought in the first period.
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3 Deriving the Equilibrium
In this section, I solve for the prices strategies of the two-period sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. In the
spirit of backwards induction, I first consider the second period.
3.1 Period 2
In period 1, the consumers have distributed themselves between the two firms. I assume that a consumer
located at x purchases from firm A in the first period if and only if x ≤ 12 +γ where γ ∈
[− 12 , 12] is a measure
of the cut-off. The higher γ, the larger market share and the more customer information firm A has. The
structure is illustrated in Figure 1. I only consider firm A’s turf. On its own turf, A charges the pricing
function pA (x) while B charges the flat price qB . The equilibrium on firm B’s turf is found by replacing γ
with −γ.
0 1
2
1
2 + γ 1
Firm
A
Firm
B
A’s turf B’s turf
Prices:
pA (x) , qB
Prices:
pB (x) , qA
Figure 1: Turfs and prices in period 2 given γ > 0.
First, consider the case where γ ≤ 0. A consumer located at x buys from A if and only if
v − x− pA (x) ≥ v − (1− x)− qB .
Hence, firm A must offer a price
pA (x) ≤ 1− 2x+ qB
in order to capture this consumer. The best response by A is pA (x) = 1 − 2x + qB for all x ≤ 12 + γ. If
B now reduces its price slightly, it captures the entire turf. To prevent this deviation, the equilibrium must
have qB = 0 and, thus, pA (x) = 1− 2x. At these prices, no firm has an incentive to deviate and firm A sells
to all consumers on its own turf.
Second, consider the case where γ > 0. This case is more complicated to solve than the first as firm B
chooses a randomized pricing strategy. To see why, suppose that B plays the pure strategy qB > 0. Based
on the same argument as in the first case, any pure-strategy equilibrium must have qB = 0, but since γ > 0,
there are consumers on A’s turf who prefer B to A and firm B is able to capture these consumers at a positive
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price no matter A’s price. Hence, firm B plays a mixed strategy in any equilibrium. This argument resembles
the one given in Varian (1980).
Let firm B choose a mixed pricing strategy where qB is distributed with cdf. F (qB) and let qB and qB ,
respectively, be the lower and upper bounds of the support of F . I demonstrate in the Appendix that there
are no gaps and no point masses in the distribution such that F is continuous and strictly increasing. I shall
only search for equilibria where F is differentiable. Furthermore, the Appendix shows that for every qB in
the distribution, there exists a cut-off x (qB) ∈
[
0, 12 + γ
]
such that the consumer located at x buys from firm
A if and only if x ≤ x (qB).
At firm B’s highest price, qB , B must face positive demand, i.e. x (qB) <
1
2 + γ. Otherwise, qB cannot
be part of a mixed strategy where B makes a positive profit. Firm A never captures consumers located
at x > x (qB). On the other hand, firm A captures every consumer located at x < x (qB) with positive
probability. These two observations imply that when B charges its highest price, A only captures the
consumer at x (qB) at a price equal to zero. That is, 1− 2x (qB) + qB = 0, or equivalently
x (qB) =
1 + qB
2
. (1)
Firm B’s second-period profit on A’s turf given the price qB is
piB2,A (qB) =
(
1
2
+ γ − x (qB)
)
qB . (2)
Since all prices in the mixed strategy must provide the same profit, one has from (1) and (2) that
piB2,A (qB) = piB2,A (qB) =
(
γ − 1
2
qB
)
qB for all qB ∈
[
q
B
, qB
]
.
In order to maximize this term, firm B chooses qB = γ, and the profit at this price becomes
piB2,A (qB) =
1
2
γ2. (3)
Solving the equation piB2,A (qB) = piB2,A (qB) yields
x (qB) =
qB + 2qBγ − γ2
2qB
. (4)
At its lowest price, firm B must capture all consumers on the turf. If not, there are consumers who B never
captures, and A’s optimal price offers to these consumers will be pA (x) = 1−2x+ qB . But if B offers a price
marginally below q
B
, B will capture a set of additional consumers and, thus, increase its profit. In effect, q
B
follows from (4) as the solution x
(
q
B
)
= 0. This gives
q
B
=
γ2
1 + 2γ
.
To solve for firm A’s pricing function, pA (x), first, consider x > x (qB). As A never captures consumers
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at these locations, pA (x) can be anything as long as piB2,A (qB) ≤ piB2,A (qB) for any qB > qB so that firm
B will not gain by charging a price above qB . Second, consider x ≤ x (qB). For every price qB , the location
of the indifferent consumer, x (qB), is given from
v − x (qB)− pA (x (qB)) = v − (1− x (qB))− qB .
Inserting qB as a function of x given from (4) and solving for pA yields
pA (x (qB)) =
(1− 2x (qB) + γ)2
1− 2x (qB) + 2γ
Every consumer located at x ≤ x (qB) will be the indifferent consumer for some price qB since there are no
gaps in the distribution. Thus, one can replace x with x and get
pA (x) =
(1− 2x+ γ)2
1− 2x+ 2γ for all x ≤ x (qB) =
1
2
+
1
2
γ. (5)
0 1
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2γ
1
2 + γ 1
Firm
A
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B
A’s turf B’s turf
pA (x)
qB
q
B
qA = 0
pB (x)
Figure 2: Equilibrium prices for γ = .25.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate prices and utilities on A’s as well as B’s turf when γ > 0. In Figure 2, prices
offered to each consumer x are drawn. On A’s turf, firm B’s pricing strategy is represented by the upper and
lower bounds. Seen from the consumers’ perspective, Figure 3 shows the utility of each consumer contingent
on the choice of supplier. Let ui,j (x) be the net utility of consumer x if she buys from firm i while being
located on firm j’s turf, i, j = A,B. In the same vein, uB,j (x) and uB,j (x) denote the upper and lower
bound on utility, respectively, from choosing B when B is randomizing.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium utilities for γ = .25 and v = 1.3.
The final step is to find a function F such that firm A’s pricing strategy as stated in (5) is optimal for all
x. Firm A’s expected profit derived from a consumer located at x ≤ 12 + 12γ is
piA2,A (x) = (1− F (pA (x)− 1 + 2x)) pA (x) .
Firm A captures the consumer if pA (x) ≤ 1− 2x+ qB which occurs with probability 1−F (pA (x)− 1 + 2x).
The first-order condition is
1− F (pA (x)− 1 + 2x)− F ′ (p (x)− 1 + 2x) p (x) = 0
which is a necessary condition for the optimal p (x). Recall that qB = pA (x)− 1 + 2x for x = x (qB) so that
1− F (qB) = F ′ (qB) (1− 2x (qB) + qB)
Inserting x (qB) from (4) yields
1− F (qB) = F ′ (qB) (γ − qB)
2
qB
.
This is a differential equation of first order which can be solved by separation of variables. If one writes
F ′ (qB) as
dF (qB)
dqB
, rearranging and integration give
∫
1
1− F (qB)dF (qB) =
∫
qB
(γ − qB)2
dqB + C
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where C is an arbitrary constant. Hence, one gets2
− ln (F (qB)− 1) = γ
γ − qB + ln (qB − γ) + C. (6)
To find C, I use that F
(
q
B
)
= 0. At this price, (6) reduces to
C = −2γ + 1
γ + 1
− ln
(
γ
γ + 1
2γ + 1
)
− ln (−1) ,
and the cdf. can be written as
F (qB) = 1− γ + 12γ + 1
γ
γ − qB e
2γ+1
γ+1 − γγ−qB . (7)
Figure 4 depicts the distribution function and its derivative, the density function F ′ (qB). Note in particular
that almost no probability is put on prices close to the upper bound, qB .
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Figure 4: Examples of the cdf. and pdf. in firm B’s randomization strategy.
Proposition 1 summarizes the second-period equilibrium for all γ.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium on firm A’s turf is as follows:
(i) When γ ≤ 0, pA (x) = 1− 2x and qB = 0.
(ii) When γ ≥ 0, pA (x) = (1−2x+γ)
2
1−2x+2γ for all x ≤ 12 + 12γ while qB is distributed on
[
γ2
1+2γ , γ
]
with cdf.
F (qB) = 1− γ+12γ+1 γγ−qB e
2γ+1
γ+1 − γγ−qB .
2One has to allow for complex numbers for (6) to be defined.
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Using the prices in Proposition 1, profits are easily calculated. If γ ≤ 0, the profit earned by firm A on
its own turf as a function of γ is
piA2,A (γ) =
∫ 1
2+
1
2γ
0
(1− 2x) dx = 1
4
(
1− γ2)
while B makes no profit on this turf. When γ > 0, the profit of firm B is given from (3) as 12γ
2. For firm
A, the profit derived from each consumer is the price times the probability of capturing the consumer. This
probability is positive only for x < 12 +
1
2γ. Hence, the profit is
piA2,A (γ) =
∫ 1
2+
1
2γ
0
(1− F (pA (x)− 1 + 2x)) pA (x) dx.
Inserting the optimal price function from (5) and the equilibrium cdf. from (7), one gets after some rearranging
that A’s profit on its own turf is
piA2,A (γ) =
γ + 1
2γ + 1
e
2γ+1
γ+1
∫ 1
2+
1
2γ
0
(1− 2x+ γ) e− 1−2x+2γ1−2x+γ dx.
Added up for both turfs, the profit earned by firm A in period 2 as a function of γ is
piA2 (γ) =
 14
(
1 + γ2
)
if γ ≤ 0
γ+1
2γ+1e
2γ+1
γ+1
∫ 1
2+
1
2γ
0
(1− 2x+ γ) e− 1−2x+2γ1−2x+γ dx if γ > 0
. (8)
For firm B, the profit is simply
piB2 (γ) = piA2 (−γ) .
The profit function is continuous at γ = 0. Also, one can show that the first-order derivative is continuous
at γ = 0. Furthermore, the profit is u-shaped with a minimum at γ = 0 such that both firms benefit from
an unequal split of the market in period 1. This is in line with Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). A situation
where γ is close to zero is intuitively more informative than when γ is close to either 12 or − 12 and, thus, price
discrimination is in the former case more harmful to the firms.
In addition, it is possible to show that piA2 (γ) > piA2 (−γ). In words, each firm prefers to be the bigger
firm in an asymmetric market as this provides more customer information. In comparison, piA2 (γ) = piA2 (−γ)
in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) where there is no informational advantage from having the larger turf.
3.2 Period 1
In the first period, the consumers choose supplier given the prices zA and zB . Also, they foresee the impact
of their choices on the prices they are offered in period 2. It might be the case that a consumer buys from
her least preferred supplier in period 1 in order to get a better deal in period 2. Each consumer takes the
behavior of all other consumers as given. Thus, the individual consumer cannot affect the pricing strategies
pursued in period 2; she can only affect the particular prices offered to her.
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I search for an equilibrium where a consumer located at x buys from firm A if and only if x ≤ 12 + γ.
Hence, the indifferent consumer is located at 12 + γ. To determine γ as a function of the prices zA and zB , I
assume without loss of generality that γ ≥ 0. In this case, indifference at 12 + γ implies that
v − zA −
(
1
2
+ γ
)
+ δC
(
v − E [qB ]−
(
1−
(
1
2
+ γ
)))
=
v − zB −
(
1−
(
1
2
+ γ
))
+ δC
(
v − 2γ −
(
1−
(
1
2
+ γ
)))
(9)
where second-period utility is discounted with the factor δC . The left-hand side of (9) is the intertemporal
utility from choosing A in period 1 and buying from B in period 2 at the average price3
E [qB ] =
∫ qB
q
B
qBdF (qB) .
The right-hand side is the intertemporal utility from choosing B in period 1 and still buying from B in period
2 at the price 2
(
1
2 + γ
) − 1 = 2γ. If γ > 0, the indifferent consumer will pay less in period 2 if she buys
from A in period 1 than when she buys from B.4 That is, the indifferent consumer prefers to be located on
the larger turf if the two firms are considered equally attractive in period 1. Therefore, if one of the firms
decreases its first-period price to gain a larger turf it attracts even more additional consumers than would
have been the case if consumers were not forward-looking. This effect enhances competition compared to a
static one-period model and its strength is measured by the discount factor δC . Therefore, one will expect
the equilibrium prices in period 1 to be decreasing in δC .
Solving (9) for γ yields
γ =
zB − zA − δCE [qB ]
2 (1− δC) (10)
where it is understood that E [qB ] is a function of γ. The demand facing firm A in period 1 is 12 + γ which
gives the intertemporal profit
piA = zA
(
1
2
+ γ
)
+ δFpiA2 (γ) (11)
where piA2 (γ) is given from (8) and δF is the firms’ discount factor. I restrict attention to symmetric equilibria
where γ = 0. It then follows from differentiation of (8) that ∂piA2(γ)∂γ
∣∣∣
γ=0
= 0. This implies that the firms’
degree of foresight, δF , does not affect the equilibrium. Deriving the first-order condition and evaluating it
at γ = 0 produce the symmetric period 1 price
z = zA = zB = 1−
(
1− 1
2
∂E [qB ]
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
)
δC . (12)
3When γ = 0, the indifferent consumer is also indifferent in period 2. Thus, even if she chooses A in both periods, (9) is
still valid.
4Recall that E [qB ] ≤ qB = γ.
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Left is to determine how γ affects E [qB ]. Integrating by parts and applying F (qB) from (7) yield
E [qB ] =
∫ qB
q
B
qBdF (qB) =
γ
2γ + 1
(
γ + (γ + 1) e
2γ+1
γ+1
∫ γ
γ2
1+2γ
1
γ − qB e
− γγ−qB dqB
)
.
Now, the derivative with respect to γ evaluated at γ = 0 reduces to
∂E [qB ]
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
= e lim
γ→0
∫ γ
γ2
1+2γ
1
γ − q e
− γγ−qB dqB = eEi (1) ' 0.596
where Ei (·) is the exponential integral.5 Thus, the equilibrium price in the first period given from (12) is
z = 1−
(
1− 1
2
eEi (1)
)
δC ' 1− 0.702δC . (13)
As predicted, the price is decreasing in δC . Proposition 2 summarizes the final equilibrium prices. Note
that no firm randomizes in the symmetric equilibrium. Thus, mixed strategies become an out-of-equilibrium
property. In fact, the second-period equilibrium is identical to the one in Thisse and Vives (1988) where both
firms observe the locations of all consumers.
Proposition 2 In the symmetric equilibrium, the common first-period price is z = 1 − 0.702δC . In the
second period, firm A charges the price pA (x) = 1− 2x to the consumer located at x on its own turf and the
price qA = 0 to consumers on firm B’s turf. For firm B the prices are pB (x) = 2x− 1 and qB = 0.
3.3 The Effect of Customer Information
This section investigates the effect of firms having access to information about the locations of past customers
and is a direct comparison to the results in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). In a another interpretation,
I examine the impact a prohibiting the use of the exact consumer locations to determine prices or, put
differentially, prohibiting individual price offers.
Sticking to the notation above, the period 1 price in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) is6
zNI = 1 +
1
3
δC
where superscript NI refers to the ”no information” case. The equilibrium price in the static one-period
game is 1. When δC > 0 such that consumers are forward-looking, zNI > 1. In the model by Fudenberg
and Tirole (2000), second-period prices will be lower on the smaller turf and for this reason consumers prefer
buying from the firm with the smallest market share in period 1. In effect, a firm reducing its first-period
5The exact definition is Ei (z) ≡ ∫∞−z 1t e−tdt.
6Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) consider a general distribution of the continuum of consumers but focus on the uniform
distribution when they derive specific results. The prices reported here are for the uniform distribution. See Armstrong (2006)
for a basic introduction to the model.
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price will face less additional demand compared to the static model, and this competition-dampening effect
pushes the equilibrium price above one. One may think of this as a ”sympathy-for-the-underdog” effect.
In my model, consumers on the other hand prefer to be on the bigger turf. Thus, the fact that consumers
are forward-looking intensifies competition and the equilibrium price falls below one. I denote this effect the
”follow-the-majority” effect. In conclusion, when firms observe the exact locations of their past customers,
consumers gain in period 1 at the expense of the firms.
In period 2, the equilibrium prices in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) are
pNIA (x) = p
NI
B (x) =
2
3
and qNIA = q
NI
B =
1
3
.
It is easily shown that on firm A’s turf, the consumer located at x buys from A if and only if x ≤ 13 . The
equivalent cut-off on firm B’s turf is at 23 . Figure 5 illustrates the prices paid by consumers in period 2.
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pA (x) pB (x)
A’s turf B’s turf
Figure 5: Prices paid in period 2, with and without customer information.
Figure 5 reveals several interesting insights. First of all, there is poaching in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
This means that some of each firm’s past customers are captured by the rival such that these consumers buy
from the more distant supplier. The result is a welfare loss that is not present in my model where consumers
never switch. Second, it is evident from Figure 5 that consumers on average pay more in the Fudenberg
and Tirole (2000) setting. Since some consumers travel further, consumers’ surplus is reduced in period 2
compared to the outcome in this paper. In contrast, firms achieve a higher period 2 profit without customer
information. Proposition 3 summarizes.
Proposition 3 When firms have access to the exact locations of their past customers,
(i) profits decrease in both periods,
(ii) consumers’ surplus increases in both periods, and
(iii) welfare improves in period 2.
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4 Exchange of Customer Information
In numerous industries, firms exchange various kinds of information, and often these exchange schemes raise
concerns from antitrust authorities. The worry is that better information on the side of suppliers can be
detrimental to consumers and, in the end, welfare.7 In relation to the model in this paper, it is of interest to
investigate the effect of an arrangement where the firms in period 2 inform their rival about the locations of
their past customers. This information can e.g. be exchanged through a trade association.
When firms have exchanged customer information, each consumer makes up its own market in period
2 and firms compete a’la Bertrand. This implies that the price of the more distant supplier is zero while
the closer supplier charges a price that just captures the consumer. Thisse and Vives (1988) originally put
forward this argument. In effect, prices in period 2 are exactly as in the model without information exchange.
Things change, however, in period 1. The division of consumers into turfs (represented by γ) is of no
importance in period 2 since both firms obtain knowledge about the locations of all consumers. Therefore,
firms determine prices in period 1 as if there was no second period; consequently, the equilibrium price is
z = 1. Recalling (13), exchange of customer information increases prices and profits. Consumers suffer while
welfare is unchanged. Hence, if antitrust authorities care about consumers, this kind of information exchange
should be prohibited. Proposition 4 summarizes.
Proposition 4 If firms exchange customer information,
(i) profits increase in period 1,
(ii) consumers’ surplus decreases in period 1, and
(iii) there is no welfare effect.
So far, I have assumed that the firms ex ante are able to commit themselves to the information exchange;
e.g. by writing a contract. An interesting question arises if no such commitment device exists. Is it incentive
compatible to exchange customer information once period 2 is reached, or, rephrasing the question, is it an
non-cooperative equilibrium that both firms exchange information?
To address this question, consider a situation where the firms have charged identical prices in period
1 such that γ = 0. In this situation, there is no impact from an exchange in period 2 and the firms are
indifferent between exchanging information or not. However, if the period 1 prices are unequal such that
γ 6= 0, the firm in possession of the larger turf will find it optimal to hold back information. To see why, note
that if γ > 0, qB (x) = 0 for all x ≤ 12 when B get access to information about the consumers’ locations on
A’s turf; without this information, qB > 0, and the positive price charged by its rival benefits firm A.
In period 1, the equilibrium under information exchange dictates that zA = zB = 1. Instead, let firm
A deviate by changing its price. When observing unequal prices, the consumers infer that no exchange will
take place in period 2 and, consequently, they behave as in the model without information exchange. The
7The Danish antitrust authorities have for these reasons put forward a set of guidelines for which information exchange
schemes that can be allowed. See Danish Competition Authority (2007).
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change in A’s intertemporal profit at γ = 0 from a marginal increase in zA is given from (11) as
∂piA
∂zA
∣∣∣∣
zA=zB=1
=
1
2
+
∂γ
∂zA
.
Inserting the derivative of (10) yields
∂piA
∂zA
∣∣∣∣
zA=zB=1
=
1
2
− 1
δC
∂E[qB ]
∂γ
∣∣∣
γ=0
+ 2 (1− δC)
< 0
where the sign follows as ∂E[qB ]∂γ
∣∣∣
γ=0
= 0.596 < 2. Due to the negative sign, firm A will benefit from a small
reduction in its price. In conclusion, a promise to exchange customer information in period 2 is not credible
without an appropriate commitment device.
5 Concluding Remarks
Firms often have more information about the preferences of their own customers than those of their rivals.
The knowledge can be used to pursue highly targeted pricing strategies. This paper have investigated the
effects of such price discrimination in a standard, two-period setting.
I find that profits decrease while consumers’ surplus increases when firms learn the brand preferences of
their costumers. Social welfare improves as the equilibrium becomes efficient in the sense that all consumers
buy their most preferred brand. Even though the extra information harms profits, the firms have an incentive
to exchange their knowledge on consumer preferences in order to eliminate asymmetric information in the
market. However, such an information exchange is only credible if an appropriate commitment device exists.
Future research along these lines might consider a less extreme information structure where the firms only
observe an imperfect signal about the brand preferences of each consumer. Still, I conjecture that improved
information will increase competition and benefit consumers while reducing profits.
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A Appendix: Properties of the Mixed Strategy Equilibrium in
Period 2
On firm A’s turf in period 2, firm B randomizes on the interval
[
q
B
, qB
]
according to the cumulative
distribution function F (qB) whenever γ > 0.8 This appendix proves three properties of this randomization
strategy. First of all, a bit of formal notation is needed. Let χA (qB) ⊆
[
0, 12 + γ
]
be the set of consumers
buying from A in equilibrium given some price qB charged by firm B. Formally,
χA (qB) ≡ {x |pA (x) ≤ 1− 2x+ qB } . (14)
The complementary set, χB (qB) ≡ χA (qB) \
[
0, 12 + γ
]
, is the set of consumers buying from B.
Property 1 F has full support on
[
q
B
, qB
]
. That is, for any two prices q′B , q
′′
B ∈
[
q
B
, qB
]
where q′B < q
′′
B,
F (q′B) < F (q
′′
B)
Suppose on the contrary that q′B , q
′′
B ∈
[
q
B
, qB
]
, q′B < q
′′
B , are charged with positive density but every
price qB ∈ (q′B , q′′B) has zero density. For q′B and q′′B to provide the same profit for B, the set of additional
consumers captured by lowering the price from q′′B to q
′
B , χB (q
′
B) \ χB (q′′B), must have a positive measure.
The best response for A given that this structure holds is pA (x) = 1− 2x+ q′′B ∀x ∈ χB (q′B) \ χB (q′′B). But
if B offers a price marginally below q′′B , B will capture χB (q
′
B) \ χB (q′′B) and, thus, increase its profit.
8To be strictly formal, I shall in this appendix assume that the support of F is a closed set. This assumption is by no means
necessary, but it eases the exposition considerably.
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Property 2 There are no point masses at any qB ∈
[
q
B
, qB
]
.
First, suppose on the contrary that there is a point mass at q◦B ∈
[
q
B
, qB
)
. Given some ε > 0 define
X (ε) ≡ χA (q◦B + ε) \ χA (q◦B) .
Note, firstly, that X (ε) has a positive measure. Otherwise, B could increase its price from q◦B to q
◦
B + ε
without loosing demand and this violates the mixed strategy. Secondly, from the definition in (14),
1− 2x+ q◦B + ε ≥ pA (x) > 1− 2x+ q◦B ∀x ∈ X (ε) .
As a deviation, let A charge pA (x) = 1 − 2x + q◦B ∀x ∈ X (ε). This price reduction is negligible for any
x ∈ X (ε) when ε is sufficiently small. But due to the point mass, the increase in the probability of capturing
the consumers in X (ε) is substantial. Hence, A’s profit increases for every x ∈ X (ε) which provides the
contradiction.
Second, suppose on the contrary that there is a point mass at qB and let the probability assigned be
β > 0. Define G (qB) ≡ F (qB)1−β for qB < qB . That is, G is the cdf. of the mixed pricing strategy conditional
on qB < qB . Consider some x such that 1− 2x+ qB > 0, i.e. such that A is able to capture the consumer at
a positive price with positive probability. Firm A’s profit at this x is
piA2,A (x) = βpA (x) + (1− β) (1−G (pA (x)− 1 + 2x)) pA (x)
and
∂piA2,A (x)
∂pA (x)
= β + (1− β) (1−G (pA (x)− 1 + 2x))− (1− β)G′ (pA (x)− 1 + 2x) pA (x) .
Since β > 0, this derivative is positive when pA (x) is sufficiently low. Firm B has positive demand at qB
for which reason 1 − 2x + qB < 0 for x close to 12 + γ. Hence, there exists an x such that 1 − 2x + qB = 0.
Consider the interval [x− φ, x] where φ > 0. For all x ∈ [x− φ, x], ∂piA2,A(x)∂pA(x) > 0 for all pA ≤ 1 − 2x + qB
whenever φ is sufficiently low. Due to the positive derivative, the optimal price for A is pA = 1 − 2x + qB
for all x ∈ [x− φ, x]. But if B offers a price marginally below qB , B will capture all consumers located in
[x− φ, x] and increase its profit which provides the contradiction.
Property 3 For every qB ∈
[
q
B
, qB
]
, a cut-off x (qB) ∈
[
0, 12 + γ
]
exists such that χA (qB) = [0, x (qB)].
The profit of A for some x ∈ χA (qB) is (1− F (pA (x)− 1 + 2x)) pA (x). The first-order condition,
1− F (pA (x)− 1 + 2x)− F ′ (pA (x)− 1 + 2x) pA (x) = 0,
is necessary for the optimal pA (x). The second-order condition is
2F ′ (pA (x)− 1 + 2x) + F ′′ (pA (x)− 1 + 2x) pA (x) ≥ 0.
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Taking the derivative of the first-order condition with respect to x gives
−F ′ (pA (x)− 1 + 2x) (p′A (x) + 2)−F ′′ (pA (x)− 1 + 2x) (p′A (x) + 2) pA (x)−F ′ (pA (x)− 1 + 2x) p′A (x) = 0,
and solving for p′A (x) leads to
p′A (x) = −2 +
2F ′ (pA (x)− 1 + 2x)
2F ′ (pA (x)− 1 + 2x) + F ′′ (pA (x)− 1 + 2x) pA (x) .
Due to the second-order condition, p′A (x) > −2. If x ∈ χB (qB), by definition pA (x) > 1 − 2x + qB . The
derivative with respect to x of the left-hand side of this inequality is larger than the same derivative of the
right-hand side, i.e. if pA (x◦) > 1−2x◦+qB then pA (x) > 1−2x+qB for any x > x◦. In effect, x ∈ χB (qB)
for all x > x◦.
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